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Abstract   
EMOTION REGULATION IN RELATION TO COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING 
IN THE PRECLINICAL STAGES OF DEMENTIA 
by 
Erica P. Meltzer 
 
Dissertation Chairperson: Joan C. Borod, Ph.D. 
 
Emotion regulation (ER) is essential for effective functioning in daily life. Research 
suggests that ER improves in older adulthood despite concomitant declines in cognition and the 
presumed neural substrates of ER. The current understanding of ER in older adulthood, and 
particularly of the relationship between ER and cognition in older adulthood, is limited. This is 
likely because the construct of ER is challenging to operationalize and, therefore, difficult to 
study.  
The current study investigates ER in relation to cognitive functioning, specifically 
executive functioning and memory, in individuals with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties 
(i.e., in the preclinical stages of dementia).  The study sample was composed of 179 adults 
between the ages of 70 and 98 and included Healthy Controls (HCs, 42%), individuals with 
Subjective Cognitive Decline (SCD, 37%), and individuals with Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(MCI, 21%). Study participants completed a comprehensive neuropsychological battery 
consisting of a number of objective measures of executive functioning and memory, as well as 
two self-report measures of ER strategy use, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross 
& John, 2003) and the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, 
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& Spinhoven, 2001). Parametric and non-parametric techniques were employed to evaluate each 
of the following in a sample of non-demented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive 
difficulties: (1) psychometric properties of the ERQ and CERQ; (2) relationships between age 
and ER strategy use; (3) relationships between ER strategy use and cognition; and (4) 
relationships between affective behavior in vivo and executive functioning and memory 
performances.  
The results of the current study suggest that modified versions of the ERQ and CERQ 
have adequate psychometric properties for use as self-report measures of ER strategy in older 
adults with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties. Age (in years) was significantly, but 
weakly, inversely related to use of adaptive ER strategies. The study revealed some associations 
between cognition and ER strategy use. Specifically, HC participants endorsed significantly 
greater adaptive ER strategy use than did SCD participants, and MCI participants endorsed 
significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy use than did HC and SCD participants. In addition, 
adaptive ER strategy use was a significant predictor of memory functioning. On the whole, 
however, there was no strong consistent evidence of a link between cognitive functioning and 
ER strategy use.  
Results are discussed in the context of theories of ER in older adulthood. This work has 
implications for understanding ER across the lifespan and relationships between ER and 
cognition. It also has clinical implications for working with older adults with mild cognitive 
difficulties within the context of psychotherapy.  
 Keywords: emotion regulation, aging, executive functioning, memory, mild cognitive 
difficulties 
 
vi 
  
 
Acknowledgments 
Completion of my dissertation research is an accomplishment that is shared with several 
remarkable individuals who have shaped my life and deeply impacted my approach to scholarly 
endeavors.  
Above all, I would like to thank my mother, Sandra R. Meltzer, for her endless love and 
support. You provided me with the foundation needed to pursue a doctorate, and in particular, 
instilled in me the value of education, commitment to hard work, a positive outlook, and 
thoughtful consideration of others. You give me the strength to succeed, and you inspire me 
every day. I am forever indebted to you. 
I would also like to express tremendous gratitude to my grandparents, Doris and Harry 
Rossen, and my brothers, Aaron and David Meltzer. You are my home base, and I am supported 
by your love, warmth, and encouragement.  
I would also like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to my advisor, Dr. 
Joan C. Borod, for all of her guidance, support, and mentorship. You have been a role model to 
me not only as an accomplished researcher and neuropsychologist, but also as an incredible 
human being with unmatched passion, compassion, and kindness for others. I cannot imagine a 
more wonderful mentor to have guided me through graduate school.  
In addition, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my committee members, 
Dr. Laura A. Rabin and Dr. Justin L. Storbeck. Dr. Rabin generously gave me the opportunity to 
pursue this line of research, and her warm, enthusiastic spirit inspired me every step of the way. I 
am extremely grateful to her for her invaluable input to this research project. Dr. Storbeck 
offered his incredible expertise in emotion research and so many creative ideas that helped me to 
conceptualize this project. I would also like to thank my outside readers, Dr. Alan Kluger and Dr. 
vii 
  
 
J. Michael Schmidt, for offering fresh perspectives on this project and sharing many helpful 
insights. Lastly, I would like to thank members of Dr. Borod’s and Dr. Rabin’s labs, past 
mentors, and close friends who have offered support and words of encouragement on this 
journey. I am grateful to all of you.  
This project was supported by the National Institute on Aging (NIA) and National 
Institute of General Medical Sciences (SC2AG039235), NIA (AG03949), National Science 
Foundation (NSF Award #1156870), Czap Foundation, and The Leonard and Sylvia Marx 
Foundation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
  
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction 1 
             Cognitive Aging with a Focus on the Preclinical Stages of Dementia 1 
                          Normative Age-Related Decline 1 
                            Neuropathological Changes 1 
      Neurocognitive Changes 2 
     Preclinical Stages of Dementia 2 
      Subjective Cognitive Decline 3 
                   Neuropathological Changes 4 
        Neurocognitive Changes 6 
       Mild Cognitive Impairment 6 
                                                     Neuropathological Changes 7 
         Neurocognitive Changes 7 
             Emotion Regulation 8 
               What is Emotion? 8 
    What is Emotion Regulation? 9 
                  Related Constructs 10 
       Emotion Regulation in Psychiatric Disorders 11 
                           Emotion Regulation Strategies 12 
                  The Process Model of Emotion Regulation  12 
                                        Target by Function Classification of Emotion-Regulation        
                                         Strategies 
13 
                                         Explicit and Implicit Emotion Regulation: A Dual-Process                                                                                                                                             13
ix 
  
 
                                          Framework 
    Methodological Approaches to the Study of Emotion Regulation 14 
         Non-Experimental Approaches 15 
         Experimental Approaches 16 
             Emotion Regulation and Cognition 17 
                          Neural Correlates of Emotion Regulation 17 
                  Neuroanatomical Correlates 17 
       Neurocognitive Correlates 20 
    Consequences of Emotion Regulation  21 
       Affective Consequences 22 
       Cognitive Consequences 23 
                          Emotion Regulation and Aging 24 
                             Emotional Well-Being in Older Adults 24 
                             Emotion Regulation in Older Adults  25 
                                                     What Facilitates/Drives Ostensible Stability or     
                                                      Improvement in Emotion Regulation in Older   
                                                      Adulthood? 
28 
                                                        Psychological Perspective 28 
                                                        Cognitive Perspective 28 
                                                        Neural Perspective  30 
             Study Aims 31 
                          Aim I  31 
                          Aim II 32 
x 
  
 
                          Aim III 32 
                          Aim IV 34 
Method 35 
             Participants and Procedure 35 
                          The Einstein Aging Study (EAS) 35 
    The Current Study 35 
             Materials 36 
                          Study Relevant Measures 36 
                                       Executive Functioning Measures 36 
      Memory Measures 38 
      Measure of Premorbid Intellectual Functioning  40 
      Self-Report Mood Measures 40 
      Self-Report Emotion Regulation Measures 41 
             Participant Diagnostic Groups 44 
  Participant Conversion Groups 47 
  Statistical Analyses 48 
                          Data Inspection and Tests of Normality 48 
    Descriptive Statistics 48 
    Statistics Specific to Aims 48 
                            Aim I  48 
                                       Aim II 49 
                                       Aim III 49 
                                       Aim IV 52 
xi 
  
 
Results 53 
             Tests of Normality 53 
             Descriptive Statistics  54 
  Aim I 55 
  Aim II 58 
  Aim III 58 
             Aim IV 66 
Discussion 68 
             Summary of Results 68 
                          Validation of the ERQ and CERQ in an Older Adult Sample 69 
    Relationships Between Age and Emotion Regulation Strategy Use 71 
    Relationships Between Cognition and Emotion Regulation Strategy  
                          Use in Older Adults with Varying Degrees of Cognitive Difficulties 
72 
                          Relationships Between Affective Behavior In Vivo and Executive 
                          Functioning and Memory Performances 
80 
             Theoretical Considerations 82 
                          Measuring Emotion Regulation 82 
               Emotion Regulation, Aging, and Cognition 83 
             Clinical Considerations and Implications 86 
             Limitations 89 
             Directions for Future Research 91 
             Conclusion 92 
References 138 
xii 
  
 
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 179 Non-Demented Older Adults  94 
  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Three Diagnostic Participant Groups  95 
  
Table 3. Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 
Mean Item Scores for the Revised 8-Item Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
96 
  
Table 4. Results of the Forced 2-Factor Principal Components Analysis with Varimax 
Rotation on the Mean Item Scores for the Revised 31-Item Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire 
97 
  
Table 5. Spearman Rho Statistics (or Pearson Product-Moment Correlations) to 
Examine the Association between Age and each of the Revised Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire and Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Sub-Factors 
99 
  
Table 6. Diagnostic Group (3) x Gender (2) Analyses of Variance or Covariance 100 
 
Table 7. Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Participant 
Diagnostic Groups on CERQ Adaptive 
 
101 
  
Table 8. Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Participant 
Diagnostic Groups on CERQ Maladaptive 
101 
  
Table 9. Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Men vs. 
Women on CERQ Maladaptive 
101 
  
Table 10. One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) on Participant Conversion Group 
for Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Factor Scores 
102 
  
Table 11. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal as Predictors of 
Executive Functioning 
103 
  
Table 12. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and ERQ Expressive Suppression as Predictors of 
Executive Functioning 
104 
  
Table 13. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and CERQ Adaptive as Predictors of Executive 
Functioning 
105 
  
Table 14. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and CERQ Maladaptive as Predictors of Executive 
Functioning 
106 
xiii 
  
 
  
Table 15. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal as Predictors of 
Memory Functioning 
107 
  
Table 16. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and ERQ Expressive Suppression as Predictors of 
Memory Functioning 
108 
  
Table 17. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and CERQ Adaptive as Predictors of Memory 
Functioning 
109 
  
Table 18. Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic 
Variables, Mood Functioning, and CERQ Maladaptive as Predictors of Memory 
Functioning 
110 
  
Table 19. One-Way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) on Participant Behavior Groups 
for Cognitive Performance Scores  
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
  
 
Appendix 
Table 1. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for 
Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for the Whole 
Sample (n = 179) 
112 
  
Table 2. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Diagnostic Groups (Healthy Controls, Subjective 
Cognitive Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) 
114 
  
Table 3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, 
and Emotion Regulation Variables for Diagnostic Participant Groups (Healthy 
Controls, Subjective Cognitive Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) 
115 
  
Table 4. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Conversion Groups (Stable and Declined) 
116 
  
Table 5. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Conversion Groups (Improved and Unstable) 
117 
  
Table 6. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, 
and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Conversion Groups (Stable, 
Declined, Improved, Unstable) 
118 
  
Table 7. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for D-KEFS Tower (Emotion 
and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
119 
  
Table 8. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, 
and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for D-KEFS Tower 
(Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
120 
  
Table 9. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for MIST-A (Emotion and 
Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
121 
  
Table 10. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, 
Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for MIST-A 
(Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
122 
  
Table 11. Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion 
Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for BVMT-R Trial 1 (Emotion 
and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
123 
  
Table 12. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, 
Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups for BVMT-
124 
xv 
  
 
R Trial 1 (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Table 13. Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 
Mean Item Scores for the 10-Item Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 
125 
  
Table 14. Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 
Mean Item Scores for the 36-Item Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
126 
  
Table 15. Results of the Forced 2-Factor Principal Components Analysis with Varimax 
Rotation on the Mean Item Scores for the 36-item Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire 
129 
  
Table 16. Determination of Covariates: Comparing Participant Diagnostic Groups on 
Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
131 
  
Table 17. Determination of Covariates: Spearman’s Rho Statistics to Examine 
Associations between Potential Covariates and Emotion Regulation Dependent 
Variables in each of the Three Diagnostic Participant Groups  
132 
  
Table 18. Determination of Covariates: Comparing Participant Conversion Groups on 
Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
133 
  
Table 19. Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 
Mean Scores for 10 Cognitive Measures  
134 
  
Table 20. Determination of Covariates: Comparing D-KEFS Participant Behavior 
Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
135 
  
Table 21. Determination of Covariates: Comparing MIST-A Participant Behavior 
Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
136 
  
Table 22. Determination of Covariates: Comparing BVMT-R Trial 1 Participant 
Behavior Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
137 
 
 
1 
  
 
Introduction 
Cognitive Aging with a Focus on the Preclinical Stages of Dementia 
 Although aging is universally associated with cognitive decline, there is 
significant variability in the degree of age-related cognitive decline. In aging research, 
severity of cognitive decline is typically represented along a continuum ranging from 
normative age-related decline to frank dementia. Along this continuum, there is also an 
“intermediate zone” that falls somewhere between normative age-related cognitive 
decline and dementia, and we refer to this intermediate zone as the “preclinical stages of 
dementia.” One conceptualization of the earliest identifiable preclinical stage of dementia 
is termed “Subjective Cognitive Decline” (SCD), which precedes the somewhat more 
severe preclinical stage, termed “Mild Cognitive Impairment” (MCI). In this section, we 
provide a brief overview of normative age-related decline and preclinical stages of 
dementia (SCD and MCI), with a focus on associated neuropathological and cognitive 
changes.  
Normative Age-Related Decline 
Neuropathological changes. In normal aging, brain changes typically include 
atrophy, increased ventricular volume, reduced white matter density, increased white 
matter hyperintensities, and accumulation of neurofibrillary plaques and tangles (Rog & 
Fink, 2013).  The greatest amount of cortical thinning and volume loss is observed in 
prefrontal and occipital regions, as well as in the hippocampus, caudate, and cerebellum 
(Raz et al., 2005; Salat et al., 2004). White matter changes are often seen in the frontal 
and occipital regions (Head et al., 2004; Wen & Sachdev, 2004). Neurofibrillary tangles 
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tend to accumulate in the entorhinal cortex, CA1 region of the hippocampus, subiculum, 
amygdala, and inferior temporal regions (e.g., Green, Kaye, & Ball, 2000).  
Neurocognitive changes.  In the literature on cognition and aging, a distinction is 
made between crystallized and fluid cognitive abilities. Crystallized cognitive abilities 
are over-learned or well-practiced skills or abilities that are resistant to decline with 
aging. Crystallized cognitive abilities tend to remain stable or improve over the lifespan, 
and examples include vocabulary and general fund of knowledge (Harada, Natelson 
Love, & Triebel, 2013). In contrast, fluid cognitive abilities include a person’s ability to 
process and learn new information, as well as reason and problem-solve in novel 
situations. Fluid cognitive abilities are vulnerable to decline with normal aging, and 
examples include processing speed, executive functioning, memory, and psychomotor 
ability (Harada et al., 2013). Functional imaging studies reveal that neural activation 
associated with cognitive activity often becomes more widespread in older adults (e.g., 
Cabeza et al., 1997). Notably, more diffuse neural activation is associated with improved 
performance on cognitive tasks, suggesting that recruitment of additional brain regions 
compensates for age-related cognitive loss (e.g., Cherry, Adamson, Duclos, & Hellige, 
2005).  
Preclinical Stages of Dementia  
As the name implies, preclinical stages of dementia precede dementia. Dementia 
is a syndrome characterized by impairment in two or more domains of cognitive 
functioning and functional impairment. There are various etiologies or subtypes of 
dementia (e.g., Alzheimer’s type, vascular dementia, dementia due to Parkinson’s 
disease, etc.). A thorough review of specific dementia subtypes is beyond the scope of 
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this paper, and we refer the reader to Saykin and Rabin (2014) and Schoenberg and Duff 
(2011) for that information. Here, we focus on the preclinical stages of dementia, 
specifically Subjective Cognitive Decline and Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
Subjective Cognitive Decline. Subjective Cognitive Decline is a term that has 
been used to refer to a “pre-MCI” stage of decline that is characterized by the experience 
of cognitive decline in the absence of evidence of cognitive impairment on 
neuropsychological evaluation. This stage is estimated to last a mean of approximately 15 
years before emergence of the subsequent MCI stage (Prichep et al., 2006). 
More specifically, research criteria for pre-MCI SCD are delineated in Jessen and 
colleagues (2014) and are as follows: (1) Self-experienced persistent decline in cognitive 
capacity in comparison with a previously normal status and unrelated to an acute event, 
and (2) Normal age-, gender-, and education-adjusted performance on standardized 
cognitive tests, which are used to identify MCI or prodromal Alzheimer’s disease (AD). 
Exclusion criteria for SCD are: (1) Mild cognitive impairment, prodromal AD, or 
dementia; and (2) can be explained by a psychiatric or neurological disease (apart from 
AD), medical disorder, medication, or substance use. Of note, individual symptoms of 
depression or anxiety, which do not reach the threshold of a disorder, are not considered 
exclusion criteria. In addition, informant confirmation of SCD is not necessary because 
SCD is simply the self-perception of cognitive decline (Jessen et al., 2014).  
The experience of subjective cognitive decline is indeed relatively non-specific 
and has been associated with a variety of conditions, including normal aging; 
neurological, psychiatric, and medical disorders; substance use; and medication side-
effects (Jessen et al., 2014). As a result, in the past, it was commonly thought that 
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subjective cognitive complaints were not necessarily indicative of underlying brain 
dysfunction (Stewart et al., 2011). More recently, however, increased attention has been 
paid to SCD because of its utility as potentially one of the earliest indicators of dementia.  
There is evidence that SCD is a symptomatic indicator of preclinical AD, which is 
a condition characterized by biomarker evidence of AD but no impairment in cognition 
on formal assessment. Of note, biomarker evidence of AD includes cerebrospinal fluid 
Aβ42, total tau, and phosphorylated tau concentrations, positron emission tomography of 
brain amyloid deposition and glucose metabolism, and brain atrophy on magnetic 
resonance imaging (Hampel et al., 2010; Jessen et al., 2014). The evidence that suggests 
that SCD is a symptomatic indicator of preclinical AD is multi-fold. First, in those with 
SCD, there is increased prevalence of preclinical AD. Second, SCD is a risk factor for 
future cognitive decline, MCI, and AD dementia, particularly if individuals display 
biomarker evidence of AD (Jessen et al., 2014). In addition to biomarker evidence of AD, 
there are other features that increase the likelihood of preclinical AD in individuals with 
SCD, and these include subjective decline in memory in particular, onset of SCD within 
the last 5 years (as opposed to the presence of SCD for several years), concerns/worries 
associated with SCD, feeling of worse performance than others of the same age group, 
confirmation of cognitive decline by an informant, and presence of the apolipoprotein E 
(ApoE) ε4 (Jessen et al., 2014). 
Neuropathological changes. Individuals with SCD typically show structural 
brain changes intermediate between those seen in MCI and healthy older adults without 
cognitive complaints (Saykin et al., 2006). On magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
individuals with SCD have shown reduced gray matter hippocampal density, as compared 
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to healthy controls (Saykin et al., 2006). Individuals with subjective memory complaints 
have also been found to have smaller left hippocampal volumes than healthy controls 
(van der Flier et al., 2004). A 4-year prospective community study investigated 
associations between changes in volumetric measures/white matter lesions and subjective 
memory impairment at baseline and follow-up (Stewart et al., 2011). Subjective memory 
impairment at baseline was associated with subsequent change in hippocampal volume. 
Subjective memory impairment at follow-up was associated with previous change in 
hippocampal, cerebrospinal fluid and grey matter volume, as well as with subcortical 
white matter lesion increases. Of note, at follow-up, associations between hippocampal 
volume change and subjective memory impairment were independent of cognitive 
decline and depressive symptoms. In addition, these associations were stronger in 
individuals with the ApOE ε4 allele and in those without baseline subjective memory 
impairment (Stewart et al., 2011).  
In a positron emission tomography (PET) study, individuals with cognitive 
complaints who are ApoE ε4 carriers showed cerebral metabolic changes that are 
consistent with those seen in probable Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Small et al., 1995). 
Specifically, these ApoE ε4 carriers with cognitive complaints showed decrements, as 
compared to non-carriers, in cerebral metabolism for glucose in the parieto-temporal, 
occipital, and frontal cortices; fusiform gyrus; thalamus; and parahippocampal gyrus. The 
most severe reduction in cerebral metabolism was seen in the parahippocampal gyrus.  
Studies have also examined the relationship between subjective cognition and 
amyloid-β (Aβ) deposition in senile plaques using PET with the carbon 11-labeled 
Pittsburgh Compound B (PiB) radiotracer that binds specifically to fibrillar Aβ plaques. 
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In a study of cognitively normal elderly adults, reduced confidence about memory 
abilities was associated with greater PiB uptake in the right medial prefrontal cortex, 
anterior cingulate cortex, and the right precuneous and posterior cingulate cortex 
(Perrotin, Mormino, Madison, Hayenga, & Jagust, 2012). Likewise, a study using PET 
scanning with 2-(1-{6-[2-[F-18]fluoroethyl)(methyl)amino]-2-
naphthyl}ethylidene)malonotrile (FDDNP), which measures levels of amyloid plaques 
and tau neurofibrillary tangles in vivo, revealed that higher reported frequency of 
forgetting was associated with greater medial temporal, parietal, frontal, and global 
FDDNP-PET binding levels in middle-aged and older adults without dementia (Merrill et 
al., 2012).  
Neurocognitive changes. As stated earlier, individuals with SCD exhibit intact 
performance on neuropsychological exam. That said, there is evidence of individuals 
with SCD performing significantly worse than age-matched controls on 
neuropsychological measures, including measures of executive functioning (e.g., set-
shifting and abstract reasoning) and memory (e.g., immediate and delayed recall; Archer 
et al., 2006).  
Mild Cognitive Impairment. MCI is an intermediate stage between normal 
cognitive decline and dementia, and it is associated with increased risk for bonafide 
dementia (i.e., it is often thought of as a “dementia prodrome”). Approximately 10-15% 
of individuals who meet criteria for MCI will progress to clinically diagnosable AD per 
year, whereas only about 1-2% of cognitively intact older adults will convert to AD each 
year (Petersen et al., 2001). MCI is diagnosed in individuals with self- or informant-
reported cognitive complaint(s), objective cognitive impairment on formal examination 
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(exceeding that which is normatively expected), and relatively intact activities of daily 
living (Petersen, 2003). There are four subtypes of mild cognitive impairment 
characterized by the presence of episodic memory impairment and the number of 
impaired cognitive domains:  amnestic MCI—single domain, non-amnestic MCI—single 
domain, amnestic MCI—multiple domain, and non-amnestic MCI—multiple domain 
(Petersen, 2004). 
Neuropathological changes. The neuropathological changes in MCI are variable, 
dependent on the etiology/subtype, and may include volumetric brain loss, ventricular 
expansion, accumulation of plaques, etc. (for review, see Stephan et al., 2012). Often, the 
neuropathological changes of a specific MCI subtype mimic those of the dementia that it 
most closely resembles and/or the dementia to which it may progress. One study revealed 
that individuals with MCI that progressed to AD had volume loss in areas known to 
degenerate in AD (e.g., temporal lobes, temporoparietal regions, precuneus, and frontal 
lobes; Whitwell et al., 2008). Also, a few studies have found that individuals with MCI, 
relative to cognitively intact elders, exhibit reduced gray matter density in frontal regions 
(Chetelat et al., 2002; Pennanen et al., 2005; Saykin et al., 2006).  
Neurocognitive changes. Cognitive deficits seen in MCI vary, depending on the 
brain regions affected by the disease process. Individuals with amnestic-MCI exhibit 
deficits in learning and memory (e.g., a weak learning curve, rapid forgetting, poor 
recognition indicative of poor retention of information, and increased susceptibility to 
interference effects on episodic memory tasks; Greenaway et al., 2006). Individuals with 
non-amnestic MCI exhibit cognitive deficits in non-memory cognitive domains. For 
example, difficulties with attention/executive functioning may be observed in non-
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amnestic MCI. Interestingly, deficits in executive functioning may predict later 
conversion to AD (Albert, Moss, Tanzi, & Jones, 2001; Chen et al., 2000). 
Emotion Regulation 
What is Emotion?  
An emotion is a multi-faceted response involving changes in physiology, 
behavior, and experience (Gross, 2002). An emotion arises in response to an evocative 
stimulus (i.e., an external entity or internal mental representation) that captures one’s 
attention and is perceived as relevant to one’s goals or needs. Emotions may arise rapidly, 
seemingly automatically (e.g., fear conditioning; LeDoux, 1995) or after a prolonged 
period, following deep-level processing (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2002). Emotion is 
often conceptualized in terms of basic discrete emotions (e.g., happiness, surprise, 
sadness, disgust, fear, and anger), dimensions (e.g., valence 
[pleasantness/unpleasantness], activation or arousal [high/low], or motoric direction 
[approach/withdrawal]; Borod, 1992, 2000). Emotions are expressed and/or perceived via 
one or more communication channels (i.e., facial, bodily [e.g., gestural], 
prosodic/intonational, and lexical/verbal; Borod, 1993). Emotions are ubiquitous in 
everyday life and affect multiple aspects of functioning (e.g., attention, decision-making, 
memory, and interpersonal functioning) (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Of note, we can 
distinguish emotion from affect. Affect is considered a superordinate category for 
valenced states (Gross, 1998b; Scherer, 1984), including emotion, mood (relatively more 
diffuse and pervasive than emotion), stress responses, and motivational impulses (e.g., 
hunger, sexual drive, and aggression; Scherer, 1984). Most importantly, emotions are 
malleable and subject to change. 
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What is Emotion Regulation?  
Emotion regulation (ER) is a complex construct, and there is not one widely 
accepted definition. Further, some argue that emotion and ER are inseparable (Campos, 
Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Frijda, 1986). Adult emotions, for instance, are almost always 
regulated (Tomkins, 1984). What follows is an overview of several definitions of ER 
found in the literature. Eisenberg and Spinrad (2004) define emotion-related self-
regulation as: 
…the process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the 
occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related 
physiological, attentional processes, motivational states, and/or the behavioral 
concomitants of emotion in the service of accomplishing affect-related biological 
or social adaptation or achieving individual goals (p. 338).  
According to Gross (1998b), ER “refers to the processes by which individuals influence 
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express 
these emotions” (p. 275). Thompson (1994) states that “emotion regulation consists of the 
extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying 
emotional reactions, especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s 
goals” (pp. 27-28). ER is thought to involve changes in “emotion dynamics” (Thompson, 
1990), or the latency, rise time, magnitude, duration, and offset of responses in terms of 
behavioral, experiential, or physiological domains (Gross, 2002). ER may also impact 
concordance among responses in these domains. For example, as a consequence of ER, 
emotion response components may become incongruent: a person may wear a relaxed 
smile while experiencing heightened physiological arousal (e.g., increased heart rate).  
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The following should be noted about ER: (1) ER is not simply the down-
regulation or inhibition of affect, as it may also involve maintenance or up-regulation 
(e.g., strengthening or increasing) of affect; (2) ER varies with respect to the degree to 
which it occurs unconsciously/effortlessly versus consciously/effortfully (Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977); and (3) ER is not inherently good or bad (Gross, 2002; Thompson, 
1994). Importantly, ER is critical to an individual’s overall well-being. ER influences 
affective, cognitive, and social functioning (Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003).  
Related constructs. ER is often discussed in relation to, or used synonymously 
with, several closely related constructs: self-regulation, affect regulation, defense 
mechanisms, mood regulation, and coping. To provide clarity, here we provide a 
hierarchical conception of these terms, as described in Gross 1998b. Self-regulation is 
typically conceptualized as a superordinate category that includes affect regulation 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1990) and cognitive regulation (e.g., 
Wegner, 1994; Gross, 2002). It is rooted in the developmental literature on delayed 
gratification (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Affect regulation includes 
defense mechanisms, mood regulation, coping, and emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b). 
Defense mechanisms emerged from the psychoanalytic tradition initiated by Sigmund 
Freud and are defined as psychological strategies of the unconscious mind that are used 
to manage anxiety and unacceptable impulses (Freud, 1961); they include denial, 
repression, regression, displacement, projection, reaction formation, intellectualization, 
rationalization, and sublimation. Mood regulation is more connected with altering 
emotion experience, as opposed to emotion behavior (Forgas, 1995; Parkinson, 
Totterdell, Briner, & Reynolds, 1996; Thayer, 1996). The term coping emerged from the 
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stress and coping tradition, largely with the work of Richard Lazarus, and is defined as 
“constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or 
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person” 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) identified two forms of 
coping: problem-focused coping (i.e., aimed at solving a problem and previously termed 
“direct action” by Lazarus [1966]) and emotion-focused coping (i.e., aimed at decreasing 
negative emotion and previously termed “palliative”). Importantly, coping includes 
actions to achieve non-emotional and/or emotion-related goals (Scheier, Weintraub, & 
Carver, 1986), particularly down-regulation of negative emotion (Gross, 1998b). ER 
involves processes that are not traditionally addressed by the coping literature, such as 
augmenting positive emotion (Gross, 1998b).  
Emotion regulation in psychiatric disorders. Emotion dysregulation 
characterizes many disorders delineated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Gross 
& Levenson, 1997; Thoits, 1995) and is addressed by many psychotherapies (e.g., Beck, 
1976). Emotion dysregulation is one of the central features of borderline personality 
disorder (Linehan, 1993) and is also associated with mood disorders (e.g., depression) 
and anxiety. Anxiety and mood disorders have been associated with the use of 
suppression, an ER strategy that is frequently described as “maladaptive” (Baker, 
Holloway, Thomas, Thomas, & Owens, 2004; Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & 
Hofmann, 2006; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). It is unclear whether 
anxiety/mood disorders result in maladaptive ER or whether maladaptive ER promotes 
emergence of such disorders and/or maintenance of associated symptoms.  
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Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Numerous ER strategies are described in the literature. Classification systems 
(e.g., models of ER) have been proposed to categorize these strategies.  
The Process Model of Emotion Regulation. The Process Model of Emotion 
Regulation developed by James Gross (1998b, 2001), organizes ER strategies in terms of 
time-course (i.e., when they occur in the emotion-generative process, wherein emotional 
responses are generated in the context of a situation and evolve over time). ER strategies 
are broadly classified as antecedent-focused strategies or response-focused strategies. 
Antecedent-focused strategies occur early in the emotion-generative process in an attempt 
to influence an emotional response before it has fully burgeoned, and they include all of 
the following: (1) situation selection (i.e., approaching or avoiding particular people, 
places, or things), (2) situation modification (i.e., adjustment of a situation to modify its 
emotional impact), (3) attentional deployment (i.e., focus on particular aspect(s) of a 
situation; may involve distraction or concentration/rumination), and (4) cognitive change 
(i.e., selection of meaning to attach to an aspect of a situation). Response-focused 
strategies occur late in the emotion-generative process in an attempt to influence an 
emotional response once it has already been activated, and, thus, are often referred to as 
response modulation. Response modulation may target the behavioral, experiential, or 
physiological domains of emotion.  
Two ER strategies discussed in the Process Model that have received significant 
attention are cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Cognitive reappraisal is 
an antecedent-focused, cognitive change ER strategy, which involves construing an 
emotion-eliciting situation in different terms in order to alter its emotional impact. 
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Reappraisal may entail reinterpretation of a stimulus/situation or detachment/distancing 
of oneself from a stimulus. Expressive suppression is a response-focused strategy, 
defined as inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behavior.  
Target by function classification of emotion-regulation strategies. Koole 
(2009) provides a target by function classification system for grouping emotion-
regulation strategies that is a “descriptive framework” but not theoretically-driven. The 
targets of ER strategies are “attention,” “cognitive emotion-relevant knowledge,” and 
“bodily manifestations of emotion.” The psychological functions of ER strategies are 
“satisfaction of hedonic needs,” “supporting goal pursuits,” and “maintenance of the 
global personality system.” Here are a few examples: An ER strategy that targets 
attention and is aimed at satisfying hedonic needs is turning attention away from negative 
information or towards positive information; a strategy that targets cognitive emotion-
relevant knowledge and is aimed at supporting goal pursuits is cognitive reappraisal; and 
a strategy that targets bodily manifestations of emotion and is aimed at maintenance of a 
global personality system is controlled breathing (Koole, 2009).  
Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: A dual-process framework. Gyurak, 
Gross, and Etkin (2011) classify ER strategies in terms of “explicitness” or 
“implicitness.” Interestingly, explicit and implicit regulation are not conceptualized as 
mutually exclusive categories; a process may vary in terms of degree of 
explicitness/implicitness. Explicit ER is defined as “those processes that require 
conscious effort for initiation and demand some level of monitoring during 
implementation, and are associated with some level of insight and awareness” (Gyurak et 
al., 2011, p. 401). Explicit regulation strategies are frequently employed in research 
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studies, where participants are instructed to utilize reappraisal (e.g., Gross, 1998b), self-
distraction (e.g., Kalisch, Wiech, Herrmann, & Dolan, 2006), attentional control (Urry, 
2010), realistic evaluation of stimuli (Herwig et al., 2007), distancing from negative 
stimuli (Kalisch et al., 2005), or suppression (Gross & Levenson, 1993). Implicit ER is 
thought to be elicited automatically by a stimulus and to occur without monitoring or 
insight. Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin (2011) describe processes that are related to implicit 
ER, including emotional conflict adaptation (i.e., elicited with an emotional version 
[Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2006; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006] of 
the classic Stroop paradigm [Stroop, 1935]), habitual ER typically measured via self-
report instruments (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006), emotion regulatory goals and values 
(e.g., Schweiger-Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2009). As part of 
their description of processes related to implicit ER, they also include ER as an 
incidental/unintended result of affect labeling (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000) 
and error-related regulation (e.g., the presence of an error related negativity [ERN] on 
EEG, dependent on the interplay between the anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala 
[Olvet & Hajcak, 2008]).  
Methodological Approaches to the Study of Emotion Regulation 
The study of the construct termed “emotion regulation” is relatively new, with 
just a handful of papers published using this term as of the early 1990s. Recently, 
however, the construct has gained increased attention. Unsurprisingly, though, owing to 
the complexity of the phenomenon and absence of a single, clear operational definition, 
there is little agreement about optimal approaches to study ER. Here we review several 
ER assessment approaches.   
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Non-experimental approaches. Early work on ER was largely theoretical, laying 
the conceptual foundation for future empirical work. James Gross at Stanford University 
contributed significantly to this empirical work with his proposal of The Process Model 
of Emotion Regulation (Gross, 1998b, 2001). Others have contributed to this line of 
theoretical work, but that of Gross and colleagues has been particularly pivotal in moving 
the field forward. Self-report instruments are popular measures for the assessment of ER. 
Self-report instruments, such as the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & 
John, 2003) and the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, 
Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001), have been developed to measure individual differences in 
the habitual use of particular ER strategies and have been well-validated primarily in 
adolescent and/or young adult samples (Garnefski, et al., 2001; Gross & John, 2003; 
Melka, Lancaster, Bryant, & Rodriguez, 2011). In addition, the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) was developed to assess emotion 
dysregulation in different dimensions, including awareness and understanding of 
emotions; acceptance of emotions; the ability to engage in goal-directed behavior, and 
refrain from impulsive behavior, when experiencing negative emotions; and access to 
emotion regulation strategies perceived as effective. The DERS was validated in a young 
to middle-age adult sample (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Though popular, such self-report 
instruments have obvious validity-related limitations: self-report of ER may not be a 
valid index of true ER ability, as self-reports may be biased.  
Behavioral observation is another approach, frequently employed in the context 
of frustration-eliciting paradigms in the developmental child literature (e.g., Helmsen & 
Petermann, 2010). Rigorous approaches have been taken to standardize behavioral 
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observation. Thompson (1994) discusses analysis of response features, known as emotion 
dynamics, which reflect emotion regulatory processes. Specifically, he describes using 
continuous time-sampled ratings of facial and vocal measures of emotion to index 
response parameters like latency of the response (i.e., time from the onset of the eliciting 
stimulus until onset of the emotional response), rise time (i.e., time from the onset of the 
emotional response until peak intensity is achieved), duration of the emotional reaction, 
and recovery (i.e., time from the end of the eliciting stimulus until emotional responses 
return to a neutral baseline). 
Experimental approaches. Experimental studies of ER entail explicit 
manipulation of regulation strategy (Gross, 2002). Typically, participants are instructed 
to engage in either cognitive reappraisal (e.g., “try to think about what you are seeing in 
such a way that you don't feel anything at all”) or expressive suppression (e.g., “try to 
behave in such a way that a person watching you would not know you are feeling 
anything at all”) when presented with emotion-eliciting stimuli (e.g., sad films or 
unpleasant pictures). Consequences of ER are indexed via evaluation of experiential (e.g., 
self-reported subjective experience), behavioral (e.g., expressive behavior), physiological 
(e.g., heart rate, skin conductance response, or hormonal secretion), and neural (e.g., 
functional MRI [fMRI] activity) responses (Gross, 2002; Kalisch et al., 2005; Ohira et al., 
2006; Urry et al., 2006). Of note, investigation of cognitive reappraisal is popular because 
findings regarding reappraisal – a complex regulation strategy, thought to involve 
multiple processes and recruit multiple brain regions – are potentially applicable to our 
understanding of other simpler regulation strategies (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012).  
 
17 
  
 
Emotion Regulation and Cognition 
Neural Correlates of Emotion Regulation 
Neuroanatomical correlates. In the discussion that follows, we first highlight the 
basic neural structures implicated in ER and then briefly discuss popular neuroanatomical 
models of ER. Of note, findings discussed herein emerge largely from studies that 
combine cognitive reappraisal paradigms with neuroimaging techniques (i.e., PET and 
fMRI). 
ER is thought to involve activation of both affective and cognitive neural 
structures (for review, see Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012). More specifically, ER 
processes involve activation of structures that are important for affective processing and 
responding, including: (1) the amygdala, important for encoding and processing affective 
information; (2) the ventral striatum, implicated in encoding reward value of stimuli; (3) 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC), implicated in integrating input from the amygdala, 
ventral striatum, medial temporal lobe, other prefrontal regions, and brainstem regions, 
that is, regions which provide information regarding affective valuations, episodic 
memory, goals, and motivation, respectively; and (4) the insula, implicated in processing 
of visceral information and generally in negative affective experience (Craig, 2009; 
Cunningham, Johnsen, & Waggoner, 2011; Davachi, 2006; Murray, O’Doherty, & 
Schoenbaum, 2007; Fellows, 2011; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner et 
al., 2012; Öngür, Ferry, & Price, 2003; Price, 1999; Rudebeck & Murray, 2011; 
Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, McDannald, 2011; Wager & Feldman-Barrett, 2004).  
In addition, ER processes, particularly those involved in cognitive reappraisal, 
recruit structures that are important for higher-level cognitive processing, including:  (1) 
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the dorsolateral and posterior PFC, and inferior parietal regions, important for selective 
attention and working memory processes, which are necessary for generation of 
appraisals (Miller, 2000; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004; Wager & Smith, 2003); (2) 
dorsal regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), implicated in conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004); (3) ventrolateral PFC, implicated in selection of 
reappraisals and/or responses and inhibition of others (Badre & Wager, 2007; Thompson-
Schill, Bedney, & Goldberg, 2005);  and (4) dorsomedial PFC, implicated in mental state 
attribution (Olsson & Ochsner, 2008; Mitchell, 2009). In sum, ER relies on both affective 
and cognitive neural structures, but the connections among these structures most critical 
to ER are not well defined.  
A current popular neuroanatomical model of ER emerges from the study of the 
down-regulation of emotion via cognitive reappraisal and posits that the frontal cortex 
exerts inhibitory control over the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2012). This model emerges 
from neuroimaging data revealing an inverse relationship between activity in the frontal 
cortex (e.g., dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC) and amygdala activity. Mediation 
analyses, which are aimed at uncovering a third variable governing the relationship 
between an independent and a dependent variable, suggest that other regions (e.g., the 
ventromedial PFC) mediate the relationship between the frontal cortex and the amygdala, 
such that activity in the dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC is positively correlated with 
ventromedial PFC activity, which is negatively correlated with amygdala activity 
(Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Urry et al., 2006). As for 
models of other ER strategies, research suggests that expressive suppression involves 
activation of the dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC (Badre & Wagner, 2007; Thompson-
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Schill, et al., 2005; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004) along with increased activity in the 
insula and variable activity (i.e., increased or decreased) in the amygdala (Goldin, 
McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Hayes et al., 2010). Studies have also examined neural 
activity time courses associated with various ER strategies. For reappraisal, early activity 
in the frontal cortex reportedly produces decreased amygdala/insula activity over time. 
For suppression, relatively later activity in the frontal cortex produces increasing 
amygdala/insula activity over time (Ohira et al., 2006).   
Researchers have questioned whether neural activity in the aforementioned 
regions varies as a function of important cognitive reappraisal factors, such as reappraisal 
goal (e.g., down-regulation or up-regulation of emotion), reappraisal approach (e.g., 
reinterpretation or distancing), or stimulus valence (i.e., negative or positive). Ochsner 
and colleagues (2012) reviewed literature to address this question. With regard to 
reappraisal goal, studies have shown that the left prefrontal cortex is recruited for both 
up-regulation and down-regulation goals, but that the right prefrontal cortex is recruited 
to a greater extent for down-regulation than up-regulation (Ochsner et al., 2012). This is 
perhaps because down-regulation is more cognitively taxing (Ochsner et al., 2004) and/or 
requires inhibition processes linked to the right dorso- and ventrolateral PFC (Aron, et al., 
2004; Konishi et al., 1999; Ochsner et al., 2012). Up-regulation appears to involve 
anterior portions of the dorsomedial PFC or neighboring regions differentially (Ochsner 
et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 2004; Ichikawa et al., 2011). Furthermore, research suggests 
that down-regulation goals modulate the basal and lateral amygdala nuclei, central 
nucleus, and the sublenticular extended amygdala that lies between the amygdala and the 
striatum. By contrast, up-regulation goals modulate the central nucleus and sublenticular 
20 
  
 
extended amygdala (Davis & Shi, 1999; Liberzon & Sripada, 2008). There is speculation 
as to why this is the case with some researchers hypothesizing that up-regulation goals 
modulate the central nucleus because the central nucleus sends outputs to autonomic 
centers important for emotional response (Ochsner et al., 2012). Regarding reappraisal 
approach, reinterpretation appears to recruit the ventrolateral PFC, implicated in response 
selection and inhibition (e.g., Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005), 
and distancing appears to recruit parietal regions implicated in spatial attention (e.g., 
Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). Additionally, reinterpretation appears to be more 
left-lateralized in the PFC, and distancing appears to be more right-lateralized (Ochsner 
et al., 2012). Regarding valence, plots of activation of foci from 43 studies of reappraisal 
suggest that for positive stimuli, the left hemisphere is primarily recruited whereas for 
negative stimuli, both the right- and left-hemispheres are recruited (Ochsner et al., 2012).  
 Neurocognitive correlates. ER ability is thought to correlate with aspects of 
neurocognitive functioning, particularly executive functioning. Higher levels of verbal 
fluency have been associated with greater ability to up- and down-regulate emotion as 
measured in terms of changes in heart rate and facial behavior. This association likely 
occurs because both verbal fluency performance and ER involve monitoring, evaluation, 
and control (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2012; Gyurak et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, in depression, weaknesses in executive functioning have been associated 
with use of maladaptive ER strategies (e.g., rumination and expressive suppression). One 
study suggested that in depression, weakness in working memory (i.e., difficulty updating 
the contents of working memory) is significantly correlated with self-reported rumination 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). Reduced inhibition of negative material has also been 
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associated with greater rumination in depression (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Further, in a 
sample of individuals with varying degrees of depressive symptoms, reduced inhibition 
of negative material was related to less use of reappraisal and more use of expressive 
suppression (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010).  
 ER is also thought to correlate with episodic memory. Ready and Santorelli 
(2016) found that participants with better episodic memory recovered more quickly from 
mood induction than participants with lower scores. In addition, the positive association 
between joviality recovery and memory was significantly stronger in mid-life/older adults 
relative to younger adults. The authors concluded that stronger memory may facilitate 
emotion recovery, particularly in older adults, and older adults with memory difficulties 
may be at risk for emotion dysregulation. 
 Consequences of Emotion Regulation 
Research has attempted to understand the affective and cognitive consequences of 
antecedent-focused (intended to influence an emotional response before it has fully 
burgeoned) versus response-focused (intended to influence an emotional response once it 
has already been activated) ER strategies. The most typical comparison is between the 
antecedent-focused strategy of cognitive reappraisal and the response-focused strategy of 
expressive suppression. In brief, expressive suppression has been shown to be affectively 
and cognitively taxing to a greater degree than cognitive reappraisal, which has emerged 
as a relatively adaptive ER strategy.  
Gross (2002) provides a comprehensive review of the consequences of ER. The 
studies reviewed by Gross (2002) utilize explicit experimental manipulations of 
reappraisal and suppression to study the affective, cognitive, and social consequences of 
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these two ER strategies. Of note, we focus here on affective and cognitive consequences. 
Gross (2002) also discusses correlations between self-reported use of reappraisal and 
suppression, and subjective, as well as objective, affective and cognitive functioning. 
Though these correlations do not elucidate causality or consequences of particular ER 
strategies, they provide insight into possible relationships between ER and 
affective/cognitive functioning.  
Affective consequences. Regarding experimental findings, Gross (1998a) 
revealed that cognitive reappraisal, in response to presentation of a brief film to elicit 
disgust, decreased disgust-expressive behavior and disgust experience, but had no 
observable effect on sympathetic activation. Expressive suppression decreased disgust-
expressive behavior and had no effect on disgust experience, but increased sympathetic 
activation. Other studies have similarly demonstrated that expressive suppression results 
in increased sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system (e.g., Harris, 2001). 
Notably, some studies suggest that increased sympathetic activation is a unique effect of 
emotion suppression: Suppressing non-emotional behaviors (e.g., motor activity 
associated with pain) does not appear to produce the same sympathetic activation seen 
with suppression of emotional behavior (Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck 1976; 
Gross, 2002).  
Regarding correlational findings, Gross (1998a) found that the habitual use of 
cognitive reappraisal was associated with greater positive emotion experience and 
expression and with lesser negative emotion experience and expression. The habitual use 
of expressive suppression was associated with reduced positive and negative emotion 
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expressive behaviors, as well as lower levels of positive emotion experience and greater 
negative emotion experience.  
Cognitive consequences. Regarding experimental findings, one study from 
Richards and Gross (2000) revealed that expressive suppression, in response to the 
presentation of a film known to elicit negative emotion, resulted in reduced objective 
memory and memory confidence ratings for the auditory and visual details of the film 
(relative to the control condition). A second study from Richards and Gross (2000) 
revealed that expressive suppression, in response to the presentation of a series of slides 
designed to elicit high or low levels of negative emotion, resulted in reduced verbal, but 
not nonverbal, memory for both high- and low-emotion slides. Reappraisal reportedly 
had no effect on verbal memory for the slides.  
Richards and Gross (2000) also correlated self-reported use of reappraisal and 
suppression with cognitive variables (e.g., objective free-recall of memory for recent 
spontaneous ER episodes and subjective perception of memory for conversations). They 
found that greater habitual use of expressive suppression was associated with poorer 
objective memory and subjective perceptions of memory functioning, even when 
controlling for neuroticism and social desirability (Richards & Gross, 2000). Habitual use 
of cognitive reappraisal was not correlated with objective or subjective perceptions of 
memory. Baumeister and colleagues posit an ego-depletion model of self-regulation, 
which suggests that any form of self-regulation (e.g., emotion regulation, inhibition, 
impulse control, ability to delay gratification, etc.) is cognitively taxing (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). One study by 
Baumeister et al. (1998) demonstrated that participants instructed to engage in ER (“try to 
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deny any emotions you may feel…”) while viewing an emotional film subsequently 
solved fewer anagram problems than “no-regulation” participants. 
Emotion Regulation and Aging 
 Emotion regulation in older adulthood is a burgeoning area of research. The 
extant body of literature appears to address ER in the context of normative aging, which 
is the focus of this section. First, we discuss emotional well-being in older adulthood, and 
then, we turn to the “popular” notion of stable or improved ER in older adults. 
Throughout our discussion, we highlight seemingly paradoxical findings, which motivate 
the current proposed research on ER in older adults with varying degrees of cognitive 
difficulties (i.e., preclinical stages of dementia).  
Emotional Well-Being in Older Adults 
Old age is oftentimes marked by declines in functioning, including physical 
health, cognition, and activities of daily living. Old age is also associated with significant 
emotional loss, as close friends and family members pass away. Despite declined 
functioning and emotional loss, we typically do not observe a commensurate decline in 
emotional well-being in older age (e.g., Mather, 2012; Urry & Gross, 2010). In fact, in 
older adulthood there is evidence of declining negative affect and stable or only mildly 
decreased positive affect (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; 
Diener & Suh, 1998; Gross et al., 1997). Some studies have even reported mild increases 
in positive affect with age (e.g., Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). For example, a large 
longitudinal study “examined individual differences in change in affect across five time 
points over 23 years for four generations, representing adolescents to people in their mid-
80s” and revealed that for people at all ages, negative affect decreased over time (Charles 
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et al., 2001; Borod et al., 2004). Specifically, negative affect decreased steadily until 
about age 60, at which point the rate of decrease slowed. Positive affect, on the other 
hand, was stable in younger and middle-aged adults, but showed a small decrease over 
time in an older adult group (mean age of 67 at the start of the study and a mean age of 
84 at the conclusion of the study; Charles et al., 2001).  
To address common speculation about the high levels of emotional well-being in 
older adults, we note two interesting findings. First, for those who question whether 
stable or improved emotional well-being is a result of generally dampened subjective 
emotional experience in older age, we point out that older adults report experiencing 
emotions with the same intensity as younger adults (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; 
Grunwald et al., 1999). In other words, we cannot attribute decreased negative affect in 
older adulthood to decreased emotional intensity. Second, for those who speculate about 
relationships among age, health, and emotional well-being, we highlight that the Berlin 
Aging Study, using cross-sectional samples (age range 70-103 years), revealed that 
controlling for functional health constraints reverses an inverse relationship between age 
and positive affect and produces a negative association between age and negative affect 
(Kunzmann, Little, & Smith, 2000). In other words, “age per se is not a cause of decline 
in subjective well-being but health constraints are” (Kunzmann, Little, & Smith, 2000, p. 
511) 
Emotion Regulation in Older Adults 
 It is widely believed that ER is stable or even improves in older adulthood, and 
there is considerable evidence from self-report data (i.e., adults’ judgments of their 
emotional experiences and/or ability to regulate emotions) to make this claim. A number 
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of findings are typically used to argue that ER is stable or improves in older adulthood, 
and they are as follows: (1) older adults experience high levels of emotional well-being: 
they report less negative affect and more positive affect (e.g., Cartensen et al., 2000; 
Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998); (2) older adults report being better able to control their 
emotions (Gross et al., 1997); and (3) older adult reports of emotional control have been 
linked to decreases in negative affect. In one study, older adults, relative to younger 
adults, reported more inner control of anger using calming strategies, and age differences 
in anger regulation partly explained age-related decreases in negative affect (Phillips, 
Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2006).  
There is a relative paucity of research on performance-based assessment of ER 
ability in older adults. Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, and Levenson (2005) provide one of the 
few studies that measure ER in vivo in a controlled experimental setting. In their study, 
young (18-28 years) and old (60-85 years) adult participants were instructed to suppress 
or amplify their expressive behavior while viewing film clips about medical procedures 
known to elicit negative emotion, particularly disgust. Participants’ expressive behaviors 
and autonomic activity (e.g. heartbeat, skin conductance, blood pressure, respiration, etc.) 
were recorded. Following film viewing, participants rated how they felt during the film in 
terms of 16 different emotions and on two bipolar scales (i.e., pleasantness and 
engagement). Interestingly, the study found no age differences in the ability to suppress 
or amplify emotional expression or in participants’ physiological or subjective 
consequences. The authors interpreted these findings to suggest that the ability to regulate 
emotion is possibly one of the few functions that is spared from major decline in old age. 
The authors also suggested that, in the context of earlier findings that older adults tend to 
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assess their ER abilities positively (Gross et al., 1997), the finding of no significant age 
differences in ER ability suggests that older adults may have positively biased 
perceptions of their ER abilities. Of note, because there is a high likelihood of biased 
perceptions of ER abilities in older adulthood, one must be careful when drawing 
conclusions about ER from self-report data.  
Kliegel, Jäger, and Phillips (2007) also investigated ER in vivo in older adults. In 
their study, ER was assessed in terms of mood repair, that is, the ability to (consciously 
or unconsciously) return to a more positive mood state after negative mood induction. 
Specifically, in their study, younger (ages 21-32) and older (ages 60-79) adult 
participants were subject to a negative mood induction procedure that utilized both film 
and music. Participants completed the Mehrdimensionaler Befindlichkeitsfragebogen 
(MDBF; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997), a multidimensional questionnaire 
that assesses mood on three dimensions (pleasantness, calmness, and wakefulness), at 
three time points: before mood induction, after induction, and at the end of the 
experiment. Interestingly, ER in terms of mood repair was more effective among the 
older adults than younger adults. In summary, there is considerable evidence of improved 
ER in late adulthood.  
Following the emergence of evidence suggesting that ER is stable or even 
improves in older adulthood, researchers returned to The Process Model of Emotion 
Regulation (Gross 1998b, 2001) to question whether ER improves in terms of utilization 
of specific ER strategies or whether it simply improves in general (i.e., regardless of the 
ER strategy employed). It is generally thought that ER improves with respect to 
utilization of specific ER strategies. In particular, older adults may use situation selection 
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and attentional deployment more effectively than younger adults (Carstensen, Fung, & 
Charles, 2003; Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Urry & Gross, 2010). 
What facilitates/drives ostensible stability or even improvement in emotion 
regulation in older adulthood? Although functioning in a variety of domains declines 
with age, ER may actually improve with age. Drawing upon psychological, cognitive, 
and neural perspectives on aging, we discuss possible explanations for this finding and 
shed light on changes that occur with aging that may facilitate ER.  
Psychological perspective. From a psychological perspective, adults’ priorities 
change with age. Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Cartensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999) speaks to this notion and posits that in early adulthood, when time is 
frequently perceived as unlimited, future-oriented (e.g., knowledge-seeking) goals are 
prioritized. In later adulthood, when time is perceived as being more limited, present-
oriented, most notably emotion-related goals are prioritized. Consistent with 
prioritization of emotion-related goals, the development and maintenance of meaningful 
intimate relationships becomes increasingly important in later adulthood. Older adults 
tend to spend more time with close loved ones and less time with acquaintances, and their 
feelings of emotional closeness with loved ones tend to increase (Carstensen, 1992). 
Also, consistent with prioritization of emotion-related goals, thinking positively about 
one’s life experiences becomes increasingly important (Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 2008). 
In other words, with greater emphasis on emotion-related goals, ER becomes increasingly 
important and this may translate into improved ER.   
Cognitive perspective. From a cognitive perspective, there appear to be changes in 
cognitive processing in later adulthood that facilitate improved ER. Most notably, older 
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adults exhibit a “positivity effect” in information processing, particularly in attention and 
memory (for review see Mather & Carstensen, 2005). In terms of selective attention, eye-
tracking studies reveal that older adults tend to look toward positive emotional images 
and away from negative ones (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a, 2006b; 
Knight et al., 2007). Similarly, older adults show less of a negativity bias in sustained 
attention, meaning that they are less likely to sustain their attention to negative stimuli 
(Rösler et al., 2005). Regarding memory, older adults appear to exhibit a memory 
advantage for positive stimuli (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Kensinger, Garoff-
Eaton, & Schachter, 2006). Charles and colleagues (2003), for example, found that older 
adults have comparable memory for positive and negative images, but there are 
reductions in memory for negative images as older adults age (i.e., a shift in memory 
performance favoring positive over negative stimuli). 
Given that cognitive resources are thought to decline with age, it is reasonable to 
wonder about the degree to which the aforementioned positivity bias requires cognitive 
resources. One of the simplest ways to assess the degree to which the positivity bias relies 
on cognitive resources is to increase the cognitive demands of a task and observe whether 
the positivity bias increases, decreases, or remains the same (relative to a control task). If 
the positivity bias decreases with increased cognitive demands, then there is evidence 
suggesting that the positivity bias draws on cognitive resources and suffers when 
resources are diverted elsewhere.  Interestingly, this has been observed: studies suggest 
that the positivity effect diminishes in older adults when attentional resources are limited. 
For instance, one study found that in a divided attention task where cognitive demands 
are inherently greater, older adults’ tendency to avoid negative stimuli is reversed, that is, 
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they show a negativity bias rather than a positivity bias (Knight et al., 2007). In summary, 
though cognitive changes with age may potentiate ER, there is no question that ER does 
in fact rely on cognitive resources.   
Neural perspective. From a neural perspective, there are many questions about 
what drives improved ER.  It is challenging to reconcile the notion that ER improves with 
age with the notion that the likely neural substrate of ER (e.g., frontal cortex) declines 
with age. Researchers, in turn, are searching for answers, and one neural structure of 
particular interest is the amygdala. The amygdala does not decline in volume as other 
structures do with age (Mather, 2004; Allen, Bruss, Brown, & Damasio, 2005; Brabec et 
al., 2010), and this may facilitate the observed stability of ER. Further, age is associated 
with reduced amygdala activity to negative stimuli, likely consistent with the above-
discussed Socioemotional Selectivity Theory and “positivity effect.” Mather and 
colleagues (2004) revealed that for older and younger adults, there is greater amygdala 
activation for emotional than neutral stimuli. That said, for older adults only, amygdala 
activation for negative stimuli is less than that for positive stimuli. Interestingly, reduced 
amygdala activation to negative stimuli in older adults is associated with a tendency to 
use cognitive reappraisal, an adaptive ER strategy (Erk, Walter, & Abler, 2008). This 
finding appears to provide additional support for the hypothesis that reduced amygdala 
activation to negative stimuli is associated with enhanced ER.  
The frontal cortex is of course a second area of interest: What age-related changes 
in the frontal cortex facilitate ER? First, we note that the frontal cortex does not decline 
uniformly; some frontal regions important for ER are, in fact, preserved.  The 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) tend to 
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maintain their cortical thicknesses in normal aging, whereas dorsal and lateral regions of 
the PFC thin significantly (Fjell et al., 2009). Second, there has been suggestion that older 
adults compensate for age-related neural decline by recruiting additional neurocognitive 
resources, particularly when engaged in emotion-related tasks. Consistent with this notion 
of recruitment of additional resources, functional imaging studies reveal that when 
processing negative stimuli, older adults, as compared to younger adults, show more 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC activity and less amygdala activity (Gunning-Dixon et 
al., 2003; Tessitore et al., 2005). Of note, increased PFC activity and reduced amygdala 
activity are consistent with a current popular neural model of ER, which posits that ER 
involves the frontal cortex exerting inhibitory control over the amygdala. 
Study Aims 
The extant literature on ER in older adulthood suggests that ER improves in late 
life despite declining cognition. Our understanding of ER in older adulthood, and 
particularly of the relationship between ER and cognition in older adulthood, is limited 
because the construct of ER is challenging to operationalize and, therefore, difficult to 
study. The overarching goal of the current research study was two-fold. First, we 
endeavored to establish self-report measures that could be used to examine ER strategy 
use in older adults. Second, we attempted to investigate relationships between ER 
strategy use and cognitive functioning in older adults.  
This study has four aims and associated hypotheses, and these are discussed 
below.  
 Aim I. To examine the factor structure and internal consistency of the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
32 
  
 
Questionnaire (CERQ) in a sample of non-demented older adults with varying 
degrees of cognitive difficulties. We predicted that we would replicate the two-factor 
structures of the ERQ (Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive Suppression) and CERQ 
(Adaptive and Maladaptive Regulation Strategies) in our older adult sample. We also 
expected that the ERQ and CERQ subscales would have good internal consistency in our 
sample. 
Aim II. To examine relationships between age and emotion regulation 
strategy use. Based on the extant literature that suggests ER improves with age, we 
hypothesized that age would be positively related to the use of adaptive regulation 
strategies and inversely related to the use of maladaptive regulation strategies. We 
recognize that the alternative hypothesis, that age is inversely related to the use of 
adaptive regulation strategies and positively related to the use of maladaptive regulation 
strategies, is reasonable as well. Indeed, the use of adaptive regulation strategies may be 
more cognitively demanding than the use of maladaptive regulation strategies. As a 
result, as individuals age and cognitive functioning declines, there may be an increase in 
use of maladaptive regulation strategies and a decrease in use of adaptive regulation 
strategies.  
Aim III. To examine relationships between emotion regulation strategy use 
and cognition in non-demented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive 
difficulties.  
Aim IIIa. To compare diagnostic groups (Healthy Control [HC], Subjective 
Cognitive Decline [SCD], and Mild Cognitive Impairment [MCI]) in terms of self-
reported emotion regulation strategy use. The extant literature suggests that there is an 
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association between executive dysfunction and the use of maladaptive ER strategies. As 
such, we hypothesized that cognitive difficulty, in general, is positively related to use of 
maladaptive ER strategies and inversely related to use of adaptive regulation strategies. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that regarding magnitude of self-reported 
maladaptive ER strategy use, we would observe the following pattern: MCI > SCD > HC. 
Regarding magnitude of self-reported adaptive ER strategy use, we predicted the 
following pattern: HC > SCD > MCI. We also examined gender as a factor contributing 
to variance in ER strategy use, given that gender differences in emotion processing have 
been well-documented in the literature (Borod & Madigan, 2000). 
Aim IIIb. To compare participant conversion groups (Stable, Decline, Improve, 
and Variable) in terms of self-reported emotion regulation strategy use.  Prior research 
demonstrates that poor ER ability is associated with mood disturbance, and mood 
disturbance is a known risk factor for cognitive decline (Gualtieri & Johnson, 2008). As 
such, we hypothesized that there is an association between maladaptive ER strategy use 
and cognitive decline. More specifically, individuals who underwent diagnostic 
conversion (i.e., from HC to SCD or from SCD to MCI) over the course of two to four 
years, meaning the “Decline” or “Variable” participants, would report greater use of 
maladaptive ER strategies and lesser use of adaptive ER strategies than those who did not 
convert, meaning the “Stable” or “Improve” participants.   
Aim IIIc. To examine emotion regulation strategy use, mood functioning, 
premorbid intellectual functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of 
executive functioning. Prior studies have documented associations between executive 
functioning and demographic variables (e.g., age and gender), premorbid intellectual 
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functioning, and mood functioning (e.g., depression and anxiety) (Anderson, Anderson, 
Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; Dempster, 1992; Kalkut, Han, Lansing, Holdnack, 
& Delis, 2009; Wood & Liossi, 2007; Yochim, Mueller, & Segal, 2013). 
In addition, studies have suggested that a potential neurocognitive correlate of ER ability 
is executive functioning (Gyurak et al., 2012; Gyurak et al., 2009; Joorman & Gotlib, 
2008; Joorman & Gotlib, 2010). We hypothesized that significant predictors of executive 
functioning would include demographic factors, premorbid intellectual functioning, and 
importantly, mood functioning and ER strategy use. 
Aim IIId. To examine emotion regulation strategy use, mood functioning, 
premorbid intellectual functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of 
memory functioning. Prior studies have documented associations between memory 
functioning and demographic variables (age and gender), premorbid intellectual 
functioning, and mood (depression and anxiety) (Andreano & Cahill, 2009; Craik & 
Jennings, 1992; Eysenck & Halstead, 1945; Yochim et al., 2013). In addition, prior 
studies suggest that an individual’s approach to regulating his/her emotional state can 
affect memory functioning (Richards & Gross, 2000). As such, we hypothesized that 
significant predictors of memory functioning would include demographic factors, 
premorbid intellectual functioning and, importantly, mood functioning and ER strategy 
use. 
Aim IV. To examine relationships between affective behavior in vivo and 
executive functioning and memory performances. The ego-depletion model of self-
regulation postulates that any form of self-regulation, including ER, is cognitively taxing 
and has consequences for cognition (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & 
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Baumeister, 1998). We hypothesized that displays of affective behavior while engaged in 
an executive functioning or memory task would be associated with poorer task 
performance.   
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The Einstein Aging Study (EAS). The current study was conducted in 
collaboration with the EAS, a longitudinal aging study of individuals aged 70 and older 
residing in the Bronx, NY (Katz et al., 2012; Lipton et al., 2003). Over 1900 participants 
have been enrolled in the EAS since 1993. Between 1993 and 2004, EAS participants 
were recruited through systematic sampling from Medicare registration lists. Since 2004, 
EAS participants have been recruited through systematic sampling from voter registration 
lists for Bronx County. Individuals were mailed introductory letters regarding the study 
and, then, were contacted by telephone to complete a screening interview. Potential 
participants who met preliminary eligibility criteria based on the telephone interview 
were invited for comprehensive screening at the EAS research center to determine final 
eligibility for the study (Katz et al., 2012). Exclusion criteria for the EAS were severe 
audiovisual disturbance or medical or psychiatric conditions that could interfere with the 
ability to complete the study, non–English-speaking, being institutionalized, and non-
ambulatory status. Notably, as EAS is a longitudinal aging study, participants are invited 
to return for annual follow-up and receive comprehensive annual medical and 
neuropsychological evaluations.  
The current study. Participants were a subset of individuals recruited from the 
EAS who agreed to participate in an additional day of testing (Day 2) and who did not 
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meet criteria for dementia at a consensus case conference, which included a 
comprehensive review of cognitive test results, relevant neurological signs and 
symptoms, and functional status  (see Katz et al., 2012 for details). Data were collected 
from November 2012 to June 2013. Participants provided written informed consent, were 
transported to and from the testing facility via car service, provided with lunch, and 
compensated for their participation. All measures were administered by highly trained 
graduate students/research assistants. The local Institutional Review Board approved the 
study protocol. 
Participants were assessed on two occasions, separated by approximately two 
weeks. During the first visit (i.e., Day 1, their annual EAS visit), participants completed a 
traditional neuropsychological assessment (described below), a neurological examination, 
and physical measures (see Katz et al. 2012). During their second visit (i.e., Day 2), 
participants completed study-specific neuropsychological measures and self-report 
questionnaires (described below).  
Materials 
Study-relevant measures. We focused on measures of executive functioning, 
memory, premorbid intellectual functioning, depression, anxiety, and ER that were 
administered on either study Day 1 or Day 2.  
 Executive functioning measures. Study-relevant Day 1 objective executive 
function measures included FAS Letter Fluency (Spreen & Strauss, 1998), Golden Stroop 
(Stroop, 1935), and Trail Making Test, Part B (TMT, Part B; Reitan, 1958). Study-
relevant objective executive function measures administered on Day 2 included Letter-
Number Sequencing (LNS) of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition 
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(WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2008), Tower Test of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
(D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, Kramer, 2001), and the Test of Practical Judgment (TOP-J; 
Rabin et al., 2007).  
Letter Fluency. Letter Fluency measures verbal initiation and retrieval skills. 
Participants spontaneously produced words beginning with the letters F—A—S across 
three 1-minute trials, and scores were the total number of correct words. 
Golden Stroop. The Golden Stroop task measures cognitive processing speed and 
inhibitory control. We analyzed the Color-Word Interference trial, wherein incongruent 
ink-colored items (e.g., RED printed in green ink) were presented, and participants were 
instructed to name the color of the ink in which the words were printed. The Color-Word 
score is the number of items completed in 45 seconds. 
Trail Making Test, Part B. The TMT, Part B is a measure of set-shifting and 
cognitive flexibility. Participants drew lines to connect 25 encircled numbers and letters 
in alternating order as fast as possible. The examiner pointed out any errors that the 
participants made as they occurred, and the participants were instructed to correct these 
errors. Scores for the TMT-B were seconds to task completion, with the maximum being 
300 seconds.  
 WAIS-IV Letter-Number Sequencing. LNS measures auditory attention and 
working memory. Participants listened to number-letter strings and were asked to recall 
the numbers first in ascending order and then the letters in alphabetical order. Scores 
were the total number of correct item strings and ranged from 0 to 30. 
 D-KEFS Tower Test. The Tower Test measures spatial planning and problem-
solving. Participants moved five disks across three pegs to build target towers in the 
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fewest number of moves possible. We analyzed the total achievement score, which is 
based on how many towers were correctly completed in the allotted time and how many 
moves were made to complete them. Scores ranged from 0 to 30.  
Test of Practical Judgment. The TOP-J is an open-ended measure that evaluates 
judgment related to safety, medical, social/ethical, and financial issues. Participants 
listened to brief scenarios about everyday problems and reported aloud their proposed 
solutions. Responses to each of 15-items were scored on a 4-point scale and total raw 
scores ranged from 0 to 45.  
Memory measures. Study-relevant Day 1 objective memory measures included 
free recall from the Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test (FCSRT; Buschke, 1984) 
and the Logical Memory I subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale–Revised (WMS-R; 
Wechsler, 1987). Study-relevant objective memory measures administered on Day 2 
included the Memory for Intentions Screening Test-A (MIST-A; Raskin, 2009; Raskin, 
Buckheit, & Sherrod, 2010) and the Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised (BVMT-R; 
Benedict, 1997).  
Free recall from Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test. The FCSRT is a 
measure of verbal episodic memory/word learning. Participants were presented 16 line 
drawings, four at a time on a card (one picture in each quadrant). For each card, the 
participant named aloud each item (e.g., grapes) after its cue (fruit) was orally presented. 
The card was then removed, and immediate cued recall of just those four items was tested 
by presenting the cues again. The participant was reminded of any item that he/she failed 
to retrieve by presenting the cue and the item together. Once these steps were completed 
for a card, the next card was presented for study. Following the study phase, participants 
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counted backwards for 20 seconds. Then, three immediate free recall trials were 
administered (cued recall trials were not administered as part of this study). Scores were 
the total number of words recalled across three trials and ranged from 0 to 48.   
 WMS-R Logical Memory I. Logical Memory I is a standardized measure of verbal 
episodic memory/story recall. Participants listened to two stories, each consisting of 25 
bits of information, and recalled each story immediately after its presentation. Scores 
were the total number of accurate details recalled for the two stories and ranged from 0 to 
50. 
 Memory for Intentions Screening Test-A. The MIST-A is a measure of prospective 
memory (PM), which is thought to rely upon both episodic memory and executive 
functioning systems. The MIST-A consists of eight PM tasks (four time-based and four 
event-based tasks with delay intervals of either 2 or 15 minutes). The time-based tasks 
include instructions such as, “In 15 minutes tell me it’s time to take a break,” while the 
event-based tasks include instructions such as, “When I show you a red pen, sign your 
name on the paper.” Between administrations of tasks, participants completed a word 
search puzzle (i.e., distracter task). Tasks were scored as follows: 0 indicated no response 
or an incorrect response; 1 indicated a correct response at the incorrect time or an 
incorrect response at the correct time; and 2 indicated a correct response at the correct 
time or upon appearance of an event. Total scores ranged from 0 to 48.  
Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised. The BVMT-R is a measure of visual 
learning and memory. Participants were shown an 8 x 11-inch page containing six simple 
geometric figures in a 2 x 3 matrix over three learning trials, each 10 seconds in duration. 
Following each learning trial, an immediate recall trial was administered in which 
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participants were instructed to reproduce on a blank sheet of paper as many of the figures 
as possible, in the same location as they appeared on the display. There was no time limit 
for recall. After 25 minutes of distracter tasks, a delayed recall trial was administered in 
which participants were asked to reproduce the figures again. Each reproduced figure 
drawn is scored in terms of accuracy and location. Two points are given for each 
reproduction that is correct with regard to accuracy and location. One point is given if the 
reproduction is accurately drawn but incorrectly placed or if the reproduction is 
inaccurately drawn but recognizable as the target and correctly placed. Zero points are 
awarded if the drawing is not present or present but not recognizable as the target. The 
maximum total for each recall trial is 12. Scores for total immediate recall and delayed 
recall range from 0 to 36 and 0 to 12, respectively. Of note, a non-standardized 
administration of the BVMT-R was employed for this study, as participants were asked a 
series of metacognitive questions prior before beginning the task. Specifically, 
participants were asked to indicate how many designs they thought they would recall 
after the first 10-second presentation, second 10-second presentation, third 10-second 
presentation, and finally after a 25-minute delay period. 
Measure of premorbid intellectual functioning. The Wechsler Test of Adult 
Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) was administered on Day 2. The WTAR is a single 
word-reading test and a measure of premorbid intellectual functioning. Scores range from 
0 to 50, with higher scores indicating stronger premorbid intellectual functioning.  
Self-report mood measures. The short form of the Geriatric Depression Scale 
(GDS; Yesavage et al., 1982) and Adult Manifest Anxiety Scale-Elderly (AMAS-E; 
Reynolds, Richmond, & Lowe, 2003) were administered on Day 2.  
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Geriatric Depression Scale. The GDS is a 15-item (yes/no) self-report scale used 
to identify emotional and psychological aspects of depression in the elderly; scores range 
from 0 to 15, with higher scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. Previous 
analysis of the GDS reported an internal consistency-reliability of 0.80 (Marc, Raue, & 
Bruce, 2008).  
Adult Manifest Anxiety Scale-Elderly. The AMAS-E is a 44-item (yes/no) self-
report measure of anxiety developed for use in the elderly population, with overall scores 
ranging from 0 to 44 and higher scores indicating greater anxiety symptoms. The AMAS-
E has three clinical scales (Worry/Oversensitivity, Physiological Anxiety, and Fear of 
Aging). The Worry/Oversensitivity scale consists of 23 items, such as “I worry a lot of 
the time.” The Physiological Anxiety scale is a measure of somatic response to 
anxiety/stress and consists of 7 items, such as “I become tired easily.” The Fear of Aging 
scale consists of 7 items, including “I worry about becoming senile.” An alpha coefficient 
of 0.91 was previously reported for the total anxiety score (Lowe & Reynolds, 2006). !
Self-report emotion regulation measures. ER measures included the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), the Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001), and a pilot behavioral 
measure of ER in vivo. These measures were administered on Day 2 of the study. 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The ERQ is a 10-item self-report measure of 
two ER strategies: Cognitive Reappraisal (e.g., “I control my emotions by changing the 
way I think about the situation I’m in.”) and Expressive Suppression (e.g., “I control my 
emotions by not expressing them”). Each item is rated on a scale of 1-7, with 1 indicating 
that the respondent “strongly agrees” and 7 indicating that the respondent “strongly 
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disagrees.” The ERQ has two subscales: Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive 
Suppression. The ERQ was developed using samples of undergraduate students. Alpha 
reliabilities averaged 0.79 for the Cognitive Reappraisal subscale and 0.73 for the 
Expressive Suppression subscale (Gross & John, 2003). Gross and John (2003) provide 
further description of the psychometric properties of the ERQ. For the Cognitive 
Reappraisal subscale, scores are the sum of six item responses and range from 6 to 42. 
For the Expressive Suppression subscale, scores are the sum of four item responses and 
range from 4 to 28. For our study, however, we analyzed average item scores for the two 
subscales. In addition, in our study, scores on the ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal subscale 
will be considered a measure of adaptive ER strategy use, and scores on the ERQ 
Expressive Suppression subscale will be considered a measure of maladaptive ER 
strategy use.  
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The CERQ is a 36-item self-report 
measure of nine cognitive coping strategies: Self-blame, Acceptance, Focus on 
Thought/Rumination, Positive Refocusing, Refocus on Planning, Positive Reappraisal, 
Putting into Perspective, Catastrophizing, and Blaming Others. Respondents are 
instructed to respond to each item by thinking about what they generally think when 
experiencing negative or unpleasant events. Each item is rated on a scale of 1-5, with 1 
indicating that the respondent “(almost) never” thinks that way and 5 indicating that the 
respondent “(almost) always” thinks that way. The CERQ has nine subscales, which 
correspond to the nine cognitive coping strategies that are listed above, and each subscale 
is composed of four items. For each of the nine subscales, scores are the sum of 
individual item responses and range from 4 to 20. A principal components analysis 
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(PCA) of the nine subscales yielded two factors (Garnefski et al., 2001; Melka et al., 
2011). The first factor consisted of the “theoretically more adaptive” or “positive-focused 
cognitive emotion regulation” strategies: acceptance, positive refocusing, refocus on 
planning, positive reappraisal, and putting into perspective. The second factor consisted 
of the “theoretically less adaptive” or “negative-focused emotion regulation” strategies: 
self-blame, focus on thought/rumination, catastrophizing, and blaming others. The CERQ 
was developed using healthy adolescent and/or young adult samples (e.g., Garnefski et 
al., 2001). The alpha reliabilities for the adaptive and maladaptive subscales were 0.91 
and 0.87, respectively (Garnefski et al., 2001). Garnefski and colleagues (2001) provide 
additional description of the psychometric properties of the CERQ. For our study, 
however, we analyzed average item scores for the two factors of adaptive and 
maladaptive ER strategies. Moving forward, the two factors or subscales of the CERQ 
will be referred to as “CERQ Adaptive” and “CERQ Maladaptive.”  
Pilot behavioral observation measure of emotion regulation. A pilot behavioral 
observation measure of ER was utilized during administration of the D-KEFS Tower 
Test, MIST A/B, and BVMT-R. This pilot measure required the examiner to tally the 
number of times that a participant verbalized negative affect (i.e., self-defeat, distress, 
frustration, or disappointment) related to his/her task performance and the number of 
times that a participant verbalized an adaptive coping strategy (e.g., acceptance, positive 
refocusing, refocus on planning, positive reappraisal, and putting into perspective) while 
engaged in a task. A tally was kept for the duration of the Tower Test and for the duration 
of the MIST A/B. For the BVMT-R, however, five separate tallies were recorded (i.e., for 
immediate recall trials 1-3, the delayed recall trial, and the recognition trial). Tally scores 
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were then coded as follows: 1 = participant verbalized negative affect related to his/her 
task performance and verbalized an adaptive coping strategy, 2 = participant only 
verbalized negative affect related to his/her task performance, 3 = participant only 
verbalized an adaptive coping strategy, and 4 = participant did not verbalize negative 
affect related to his/her task performance and did not verbalize an adaptive coping 
strategy.  
There was some concern of error in the data due to examiners experiencing 
difficulty accurately recording all of the participants’ affective behaviors while engaged 
in cognitive tasks. To reduce the amount of error in the data, two of the four above-stated 
categories were collapsed into one. Specifically, participants were classified into one of 
three participant behavior groups based on their behavior during administration of D-
KEFS Tower, MIST-A, and BVMT-R Trial 1. The three participant behavior groups 
were: 1 = Participants who verbalized negative emotion and a coping strategy (herein 
referred to as Emotion and Coping), 2 = Participants who verbalized either negative 
emotion or a coping strategy (herein referred to as Emotion or Coping), and 3 = 
Participants who verbalized neither emotion nor a coping strategy (herein referred to as 
No Affect).  
Participant Diagnostic Groups   
Participants were designated as Healthy Controls (HCs), Subjective Cognitive 
Decline (SCD), or Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) using a novel psychometric 
approach to classification (Rabin, Wang, Katz, & Lipton, 2014). First, to determine the 
presence or absence of neuropsychological deficits, a PCA was conducted among robust 
norms (i.e., only included participants without dementia for 3 years [411 participants] and 
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did not include the participants in the current study). The PCA used scores on 13 
neuropsychological tests, administered on Day 1, which were as follows: (1) verbal 
episodic memory/word learning – free recall from the Free and Cued Selective 
Reminding Test (FCSRT; Buschke, 1984); (2) verbal episodic memory/story recall – 
Logical Memory I subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 
1987); (3) verbal fluency/word generation according to an initial letter – Letter Fluency 
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998); (4) verbal fluency/naming exemplars from a category – 
Category Fluency (Rosen, 1980); (5) confrontation naming – short form of the Boston 
Naming Test (BNT, Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983); (6–7) visuomotor tracking, 
divided attention, and cognitive flexibility – Trail Making Test Parts A and B (Reitan, 
1958); (8) psychomotor processing speed – Digit Symbol subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale–Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981); and select subtests of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997), including 
(9) visuospatial organization – Block Design; (10) auditory attention and working 
memory – Digit Span; (11) general fund of knowledge – Information; (12) vocabulary 
level – Vocabulary; and (13) verbal abstraction of categories – Similarities. Confirmatory 
factor analysis was then performed and yielded three underlying factors: memory 
(FCSRT, Category Fluency, Logical Memory), executive/processing speed (Block 
Design, Digit Symbol-Coding, and Trail Making Test Parts A & B), and global/verbal 
(Boston Naming, Information, Similarities, Vocabulary, Digit Span, and Letter Fluency). 
Cognitive domain scores were calculated for participants in the current study as the 
average of the Z-scores of each test in the domain, using means and standard deviations 
from the robust sample (described above) stratified by age group of age 70–79 and 80 
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and above (subsequently referred to as the memory factor Z-score, executive/processing 
speed factor Z-score, and global/verbal factor Z-score).  
MCI was classified in participants whose cognitive domain scores fell 
considerably lower (>1 SD) than the mean of the robust sample on one or more cognitive 
factors and who also had a cognitive complaint on either the Cognitive Impairment 
Questionnaire of the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease 
(CERAD; Heyman, Fillenbaum, & Nash, 1997), a yes/no rating scale of current 
functioning across several cognitive domains, or on the cognitive item from the short 
form of the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS), a depressive symptom scale of 15 yes/no 
items (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986).  
SCD was classified in cognitively intact participants, i.e., cognitive domain scores 
for all three domains did not fall considerably lower (>1 SD) than the mean of the robust 
sample, but participants exceeded a cut-off point for self- and/or informant-complaints. 
We utilized cognitive complaints items with known reliability and predictive validity for 
dementia (Rabin et al., 2012) to derive scores that were the proportion of positive 
responses. Sample items included: “Do you have difficulty remembering things that 
happened recently?” Do you forget conversations that occurred a few days or hours 
earlier?” Subsequently, we derived an optimal cut-off point from a receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) analysis, stratified by young-old (age 70–79) and old-old (age 80 
and above) groups, which used the robust sample and was based on the cross-sectional 
association between the self- or informant complaint and MCI. The cut-off point was the 
value that maximized the Youden index (Youden, 1950), or equivalently, maximized the 
sum of sensitivity and specificity. The cut-off for self-complaint score was 12.5% for the 
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younger group and 22.2% for the older group. The cut-off for the informant-complaint 
score was 21.0% for the younger group and 10.0% for the older group.  
 HC was classified in cognitively intact participants (i.e., cognitive domain scores 
for all three domains did not fall considerably lower than the mean of the robust sample) 
who also did not exceed the optimal cut-off point for self and/or informant complaints.  
Participant Conversion Groups 
As the EAS is a longitudinal aging study, study participants who return annually 
may be classified into one of three diagnostic categories (HC, SCD, or MCI) on a yearly 
basis based on the criteria presented above. Diagnostic classification data were available 
for many of the current study participants for the year in which this study was completed 
and for two to four years following study completion. Participants were classified into 
one of four participant conversion groups (Stable, Decline, Improve, or Variable) 
depending on their diagnostic classifications over time. Participants were classified as 
Stable if their diagnostic classification did not change over two to four years. Participants 
were classified as Decline if their diagnostic classification changed over time and 
indicated worsening of cognitive functioning (e.g., conversion from HC to SCD or from 
SCD to MCI). Participants were classified as Improve if their diagnostic classification 
changed over time and indicated improvement in cognitive functioning (e.g., conversion 
from SCD to HC or from MCI to SCD). Lastly, participants were classified as Variable if 
their diagnostic classifications fluctuated over time (e.g., conversion from HC to SCD 
and then back to HC or conversion from SCD to MCI and then back to SCD).  
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Statistical Analyses 
Data inspection and tests of normality. Prior to testing specific hypotheses, data 
entered into the database was double-checked, and data entry errors were corrected. A 
few of the planned analyses (e.g., analysis of variance, Pearson’s product-moment 
correlations, and multiple linear regression analysis) are based on the assumption that 
data are normally distributed. Therefore, tests of skewness and kurtosis were performed 
for all demographic, cognitive, mood, and ER variables for the entire sample and for 
individual participant groups (i.e., diagnostic groups, conversion groups, and behavior 
groups). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality were also performed for all of these 
variables for the entire sample and for individual participant groups. All statistical 
analyses were run using SPSS 22.0 (IBM). 
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics were calculated for all demographic, 
cognitive, mood, and ER variables for the entire sample and for each of the participant 
diagnostic groups (HC, SCD, & MCI).  
Statistics specific to aims. Statistical analyses were conducted for each study 
aim, as detailed below. 
Aim I. To examine the factor structure and internal consistency of the ERQ and 
CERQ in a sample of non-demented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive 
difficulties. Principal component analyses (PCA) with varimax rotation were conducted 
with ERQ and CERQ scores, separately, to determine whether questionnaire structures 
(i.e., subscales or factors) could be replicated with our sample. Of note, varimax rotation 
attempts to maximize the dispersion of loadings within factors, and, therefore, attempts to 
load a smaller number of variables highly on each factor, resulting in more interpretable 
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clusters of factors (Field, 2014). To examine internal consistency or reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha was computed for each ERQ and CERQ subscale/factor. 
Aim II. To examine relationships between age and emotion regulation strategy 
use. In order to test the hypothesis that age is positively correlated with adaptive 
regulation strategy use and inversely related to maladaptive regulation strategy use, 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficients or Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficients were calculated between age and each of the ER questionnaire factor scores 
for the whole sample.  
Aim III. To examine relationships between cognition and emotion regulation 
strategy use in older adults with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties.  
Aim IIIa. To compare diagnostic groups (Healthy Control, Subjective Cognitive 
Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) in terms of self-reported emotion regulation 
strategy use. To test the hypothesis that cognitive difficulties are, in general, positively 
correlated with use of maladaptive ER strategies and inversely related to use of adaptive 
ER strategies, diagnostic groups were compared in terms of questionnaire factor scores 
(i.e., ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and 
CERQ Maladaptive). Analyses of variance or covariance (i.e., ANOVA or ANCOVA) 
were conducted. We also examined gender as an independent variable contributing to 
variance in ER strategy use, given that gender differences in emotion processing have 
been well-documented (Borod & Madigan, 2000).  
 To determine whether covariates were required in these analyses, the three 
diagnostic groups were compared on key demographic (i.e., age, gender, and years of 
education) and mood variables (i.e., depressive symptoms [GDS scores] and anxiety 
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symptoms [AMAS-E scores]) using a one-way ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVA, or chi-square analysis, as appropriate. Variables for which there was a 
significant difference between groups were correlated with each of the ER questionnaire 
factor scores in each of the diagnostic groups. Variables that significantly correlated with 
ER questionnaire factor scores were used as covariates in subsequent analyses. Of note, 
for these particular analyses, we only included participants who completed both the ERQ 
and CERQ.  
Aim IIIb. To compare participant conversion groups (Stable, Decline, Improve, 
and Variable) in terms of self-reported ER strategy use. To test the hypothesis that 
individuals who underwent diagnostic conversion (i.e., conversion from HC to SCD or 
from SCD to MCI) over the course of two to four years would report greater use of 
maladaptive and lesser use of adaptive ER strategies than those who did not convert, 
participants were classified into one of four conversion groups (i.e., Stable, Decline, 
Improve, or Variable). Participant conversion groups were compared on the ER 
questionnaire factor scores (i.e., ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive 
Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ Maladaptive) using ANOVAs. Again, 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs were employed as needed. In order to first determine 
whether covariates should be used in these analyses, conversion groups were compared 
on key demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, and years of education) and on mood 
variables (i.e., depressive and anxiety symptoms) using one-way Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVA or chi-square analyses, as appropriate.  
 In preparation for Aims IIIc and IIId, attempts were made to consolidate the 
cognitive data into an executive functioning and a memory composite factor. A PCA was 
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conducted with raw scores from six executive functioning measures (Trail Making Test B 
[TMT-B], Letter Fluency, Golden Stroop Color-Word Interference, Letter-Number 
Sequencing, Test of Practical Judgment [TOP-J], and D-KEFS Tower Test [Total 
Achievement]) and four memory measures (WMS-R Logical Memory [Immediate recall 
total], Free and Cued Recall Selective Reminding Test [FCSRT total], Memory for 
Intentions Test-A [MIST-A total], and Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised [BVMT-
R delayed recall]). Based on the PCA results, the cognitive measures that could be used 
for each cognitive composite (i.e., cognitive domain factor) were determined. Next, 
cognitive domain scores were calculated for participants as the average of the z-scores of 
each measure in the domain. Note that participants’ z-scores for each cognitive measure 
were computed using means and standard deviations from the largest available sample of 
healthy controls stratified by age group (i.e., ages 70-79 and 80 and above), and the z-
scores were adjusted for directional differences in the meaning of the raw scores. These 
cognitive domain scores are subsequently referred to as the Executive Factor Z-score and 
Memory Factor Z-score.  
Aim IIIc. To examine ER strategy use, mood functioning, premorbid intellectual 
functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of executive functioning. To test 
the hypothesis that ER strategy use and mood functioning are significant predictors of 
executive functioning ability, hierarchical multiple regression analyses (with blockwise 
entry) were conducted. In hierarchical regression analyses, known predictors are 
generally entered into the model in order of their importance in predicting the outcome. 
After known predictors have been entered, new predictors are entered involving ERQ 
Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ 
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Maladaptive. To elaborate, we conducted four multiple linear regression analyses. In each 
regression analysis, premorbid intellectual functioning was entered first (Block 1: WTAR 
scores) followed by relevant demographic (Block 2: age and gender) and mood variables 
(Block 3: depression and anxiety [GDS and AMAS-E scores, respectively]). The last 
predictor variable was one of the four ER strategy use variables (Block 4: ERQ Cognitive 
Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, or CERQ Maladaptive). The 
dependent variable was the Executive Factor Z-score. 
Aim IIId. To examine ER strategy use, mood variables, premorbid intellectual 
functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of memory functioning. 
To test the hypothesis that ER strategy use and mood functioning are significant 
predictors of memory functioning, we conducted four multiple regression analyses. The 
blocks of predictor variables that were included in the regression analyses for Aim IIIc 
were also used for this analysis. Here, however, the dependent variable was the Memory 
Factor Z-score. 
Aim IV. On an exploratory basis, to examine relationships between affective 
behavior in vivo and executive functioning and memory performances. To test the 
hypothesis that the display of affective behavior while engaged in an executive 
functioning or memory task is associated with poorer task performance, participants were 
classified into one of three groups based on their behavior during the administration of 
each of three cognitive measures. The participant behavior groups were Emotion and 
Coping, Emotion or Coping, and No Affect, and the cognitive measures were a measure 
of planning (D-KEFS Tower), prospective memory measure (MIST-A), and a 
visuospatial encoding measure (BVMT-R Trial 1). Participant behavior groups for each 
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cognitive measure were compared in terms of their performance on that particular 
measure using one-way ANOVA or ANCOVA. Note that Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVA was employed as appropriate. In order to determine covariates to use in these 
analyses, the participant behavior groups were compared on key demographic and mood 
variables using a method identical to the one described for Aim IIIa. 
Results 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of skewness and kurtosis were performed for all demographic, cognitive, 
mood, and ER variables for the entire sample and for individual participant groups (i.e., 
diagnostic, conversion, and behavior groups). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality 
were also performed for all of these variables for the entire sample and for individual 
participant groups. See Tables 1 to 12 in the Appendix. Results indicated that many of the 
variables for the entire sample and for individual participant groups were not normally 
distributed.  
Several attempts were made to normalize the data using logarithmic and square 
root transformations, but these attempts were largely unsuccessful. Initially, analyses 
were run using both parametric and non-parametric procedures. The overall pattern of 
findings was the same regardless of whether parametric or non-parametric procedures 
were used. As a result, non-parametric procedures were primarily utilized moving 
forward. The Spearman’s rank-order correlation procedure was used to examine 
relationships between age and ER strategy use, as well as between cognitive functioning 
(i.e., executive functioning and memory) and ER strategy use. In most cases, Kruskal-
Wallis tests were used to test group differences. However, there were several analyses for 
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group differences that required the inclusion of covariates. For these analyses, analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) were used despite ANCOVA being a parametric procedure. 
Principal component analyses (PCAs) do not involve an assumption of normality (Abdi 
& Williams, 2010), so these analyses were run regardless of some variables having non-
normal distributions. Lastly, multiple regression procedures are relatively robust for 
minor deviations from normality (Mertler & Vannatta, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), 
so these were utilized as well.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The original study sample was composed of 212 participants. Because this study 
focuses on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ), only participants who completed these two 
questionnaires were included in the data analysis. As a result, the final sample was 
composed of 179 participants, and Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for this 
sample. The sample had an average age of over 81 years and approximately 14 years of 
education. More than two-thirds of the sample were female, and approximately 60% of 
the sample was Caucasian. In addition, the sample was composed of Healthy Controls 
(42%), individuals with SCD (37%), and individuals with MCI (21%). Mean raw scores 
for all performance-based measures of executive functioning and memory functioning 
were within the normal range based on available age-based test norms. In addition, 
participants typically endorsed minimal depressive symptoms on the GDS and only an 
average number of anxiety symptoms on the AMAS-E. Average item scores for ERQ 
Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ 
Maladaptive are provided in Table 1, and these values will be examined in the analyses 
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that follow below.   
Descriptive statistics for demographic, cognitive, mood, and ER variables for 
each of the participant diagnostic groups (HC, SCD, & MCI) are shown in Table 2. These 
are provided for subsequent group difference analyses that are described below.  
Aim I. To examine the factor structure and internal consistency of the ERQ and 
CERQ in a sample of non-demented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive 
difficulties.  
ERQ. Principal component analyses (PCAs) with varimax rotation were 
conducted with ERQ item scores to determine whether the questionnaire structures (i.e., 
subscales or factors) could be replicated with our sample. First, a PCA was conducted 
with all 10 ERQ items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy 
for the analysis (KMO = 0.72), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 
0.001). Three factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and, in combination, 
explained 57.25% of the variance. Table 13 in the Appendix shows the factor loadings 
after rotation. Items associated with cognitive reappraisal loaded highly on component 1, 
and items associated with expressive suppression loaded highly on component 2. Two of 
the items did not load neatly into this two-factor structure. Specifically, item #4 (“When I 
am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them”), an item on the 
Expressive Suppression subscale in the original ERQ, loaded as a singleton on a third 
component. Item #5 (“When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think 
about it in a way that helps me stay calm.”), an item on the Cognitive Reappraisal 
subscale in the original ERQ, loaded on two factors and more so on the wrong factor (i.e., 
the Expressive Suppression factor instead of the Cognitive Reappraisal factor).  
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Next, items 4 and 5 were removed, and the PCA was re-run. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis (KMO = 0.69), and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 0.001). Two factors had eigenvalues 
over Kaiser’s criterion of 1.00 and, in combination, explained 52.8% of the variance. 
Table 3 shows the factor loadings after rotation. Items associated with cognitive 
reappraisal loaded highly on Factor 1, and items associated with expressive suppression 
loaded highly on Factor 2. In sum, based on the results of this PCA, the ERQ factor 
structure with two factors/subscales (Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive Suppression) 
that was originally obtained with younger adult populations (Gross & John, 2003) held up 
in our older adult sample. Thus, the revised ERQ for the purpose of this study is 
composed of the same two subscales but only has 8 items (i.e., Cognitive Reappraisal [5 
items] and Expressive Suppression [3 items]). Cronbach’s alpha values for the current 
sample (n = 179) were acceptable (Cognitive Reappraisal α = 0.70; Expressive 
Suppression α = 0.67).   
CERQ. Principal component analyses with varimax rotation were conducted with 
CERQ scores to determine whether the original questionnaire structures (i.e., subscales or 
factors) could be replicated with our sample. First, a PCA was conducted with all 36 
CERQ items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the 
analysis (KMO = 0.82), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 0.001). 
Eight factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and, in combination, explained 
61.15% of the variance. Table 14 in the Appendix shows the factor loadings after 
rotation. For each of the 36 items, we found the component on which that item loaded the 
highest. Although it was clearly difficult to replicate the CERQ 9-factor structure in our 
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sample, the maladaptive and adaptive coping strategies did separate out nicely. In fact, 
there were only three components (i.e., numbers 6, 7, and 8), for which both an adaptive 
and maladaptive item loaded on it, as shown in Table 14 in the Appendix.  
Next, because the extant literature supports examining the CERQ in terms of its 
adaptive and maladaptive items, a forced two-factor PCA was run with all 36 CERQ 
items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis 
(KMO = 0.82), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 0.001). Two factors 
had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 33.6% of the 
variance. Table 15 in the Appendix shows the factor loadings after rotation. A cut-off 
score was not utilized to determine which component each item loaded on. Instead, the 
loadings of each item on the two components were examined, and the higher loading was 
accepted. Items associated with adaptive ER loaded highly on Factor 1, and items 
associated with maladaptive ER loaded highly on Factor 2. Five items did not load neatly 
into this two-factor structure (i.e., items 3, 10, 20, 21, and 29). Item #3 (“I often think 
about how I feel about what I have experienced.”) and item #10 (“I feel that I am the one 
who is responsible for what has happened.”), both originally classified as “maladaptive” 
items, loaded almost equally on two factors. Item #20 (“I think that I cannot change 
anything about it.”) and item #29 (“I think that I must learn to live with it.”), both 
originally developed as “adaptive” items, loaded on the “maladaptive” component. 
Lastly, item #21 (“I want to understand why I feel the way I do about what I have 
experienced.”), originally developed as a “maladaptive” item, loaded on the “adaptive” 
component.  
58 
  
 
Subsequently, items 3, 10, 20, 21, and 29 were removed, and the forced two-
factor PCA was re-run. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy 
for the analysis (KMO = 0.83), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 
0.001). Two factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1.00 and, in combination, 
explained 36.5% of the variance. Table 4 shows the factor loadings after rotation. In sum, 
in a PCA with only five CERQ items removed (two adaptive items and three maladaptive 
items), the original two-factor structure was upheld. As a result, our revised CERQ is 
composed of the same two factors but only contains 31 items (i.e., Adaptive Strategies 
[18 items] and Maladaptive Strategies [13 items]). Cronbach’s alpha values for the 
current sample (n = 179) were acceptable (Adaptive α = 0.91; Maladaptive α = 0.79).  
Aim II. To examine relationships between age and emotion regulation strategy use. 
 To examine relationships between age and ER strategy use, Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficients were calculated between age (in years) and three of the ER 
variables that were not normally distributed (i.e., ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ 
Expressive Suppression, and CERQ Maladaptive). A Pearson product-moment 
correlation was calculated between age and the one normally distributed ER variable, 
ERQ Adaptive. Increased age was weakly associated with lower scores on the ERQ 
Reappraisal and CERQ Adaptive subscales. None of the other correlations was 
significant (see Table 5). 
Aim III. To examine relationships between cognition and emotion regulation 
strategy use in older adults with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties.  
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Aim IIIa. To compare participant diagnostic groups (Healthy Controls, 
Subjective Cognitive Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) in terms of self-reported 
emotion regulation strategy use. 
Two-way between-subjects ANOVAs or ANCOVAs (Diagnostic Group [3: HC, 
SCD, & MCI] x Participant Gender [2: Male & Female]) were conducted on ER 
questionnaire factor scores (ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, 
CERQ Adaptive, & CERQ Maladaptive).  
First, in order to determine the covariates to use in these analyses, the three 
diagnostic groups were compared on key demographic variables (i.e., age and years of 
education) and mood variables (i.e., depressive and anxiety symptoms) using a one-way 
ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA, or chi-square analysis as appropriate. See 
Table 16 in the Appendix for results of these analyses. There were no significant 
differences in age, gender, or depressive symptoms (GDS scores) across diagnostic 
groups. There were, however, significant differences between diagnostic groups in terms 
of years of education and anxiety symptoms (AMAS-E scores). Specifically, MCI 
participants had significantly fewer years of education than HC and SCD participants (p 
< 0.001). In addition, SCD and MCI participants had significantly greater anxiety scores 
than HCs (p = 0.007 & p = 0.018, respectively). These two variables (i.e., years of 
education and AMAS-E scores) were then correlated with each of the ER variables (ERQ 
Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ 
Maladaptive) for each of three diagnostic groups. See Table 17 of the Appendix for the 
correlation results. The following findings were significant (p < 0.05). For HCs, 
education was positively (p = 0.033) associated with CERQ Adaptive scores. In addition, 
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AMAS-E scores were positively (p < 0.001) associated with CERQ Maladaptive scores. 
In participants with SCD, AMAS-E scores were positively (p = 0.005) associated with 
CERQ Maladaptive scores. In participants with MCI, AMAS-E scores were positively (p 
= 0.028) associated with Maladaptive scores.  
Based on these analyses, education was employed as a covariate when examining 
group differences in CERQ Adaptive scores, and AMAS-scores were employed as 
covariates when examining group differences in CERQ Maladaptive scores.  Of note, we 
covaried for education only, and not both premorbid intellectual functioning (WTAR 
scores) and education, because WTAR scores significantly correlated with years of 
education in our sample (Spearman’s rho = 0.53, p < 0.001). We covaried for education, 
instead of premorbid intellectual functioning, because the former variable is commonly 
discussed in the cognitive aging literature.   
After the covariates were determined, statistical analyses were run to examine 
group differences in ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ 
Adaptive, and CERQ Maladaptive scores. Results of these analyses are shown in Tables 
6, 7, and 8 and are discussed below.  
ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal. A two-way ANOVA (Diagnostic Group [3: HC, 
SCD, & MCI] x Participant Gender [2: Male & Female]) was conducted to examine 
group differences in ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal scores. There were no significant 
differences in terms of ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal scores as a function of diagnostic 
group membership or gender.  The interaction between diagnostic group and gender was 
not significant.  
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ERQ Expressive Suppression. A two-way ANOVA (Diagnostic Group [3: HC, 
SCD, & MCI] x Participant Gender [2: Male & Female]) was conducted to examine 
group differences in ERQ Expressive Suppression scores. There were no significant 
differences in ERQ Expressive Suppression scores for diagnostic group or gender. The 
interaction between diagnostic group and gender was not significant.  
CERQ Adaptive. A two-way ANCOVA (Diagnostic Group [3: HC, SCD, & MCI] 
x Participant Gender [2: Male & Female]), with education as a covariate, was conducted 
to examine group differences in CERQ Adaptive scores. The main effect of diagnostic 
participant group trended towards significance (p = 0.051). Fisher’s Least Significant 
Difference (LSD) post-hoc analysis revealed that Healthy Controls had significantly (p = 
0.015) greater CERQ Adaptive scores than individuals with SCD. There was no 
significant difference in CERQ Adaptive scores between men and women. The 
interaction between diagnostic participant group and gender was not significant (see 
Table 7).  
CERQ Maladaptive. A two-way ANCOVA (Diagnostic Group [3: HC, SCD, & 
MCI] x Participant Gender [2: Male & Female]), with AMAS-E scores as a covariate, 
was conducted to examine group differences in CERQ Maladaptive scores. The main 
effect of participant diagnostic group was significant (p = 0.009). Fisher’s LSD post-hoc 
analysis revealed that individuals with MCI had significantly greater CERQ Maladaptive 
scores than HCs (p = 0.014) and individuals with SCD (p = 0.003). In addition, the main 
effect of gender was significant (p = 0.001). Men had significantly greater CERQ 
Maladaptive scores than women. The interaction between diagnostic group and gender 
was not significant (see Tables 8 and 9). 
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Aim IIIb. To compare participant conversion groups (Stable, Decline, Improve, 
& Variable) in terms of self-reported emotion regulation strategy use. Participant 
conversion groups were compared on the ER questionnaire factor scores (i.e., ERQ 
Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ 
Maladaptive) using ANOVAs. To first determine whether covariates should be used in 
these analyses, conversion groups were compared on key demographic variables (i.e., 
age, gender, and years of education) and on mood variables (i.e., depressive and anxiety 
symptoms). There were no significant differences between conversion groups on these 
variables, as shown in Table 18 in the Appendix. As a result, covariates were not used in 
the analyses comparing the conversion groups on self-reported ER strategy use. Three 
parametric one-way ANOVAs and one Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA were run, and 
results revealed that there were no significant differences among the four conversion 
groups in terms of ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ 
Adaptive, or CERQ Maladaptive scores (see Table 10).  
In preparation for Aims IIIc and IIId, attempts were made to consolidate the 
cognitive data into an executive functioning and memory functioning composite 
factors. A PCA with varimax rotation was conducted with raw scores from 10 
neuropsychological measures (six executive functioning and four memory measures as 
categorized in the neuropsychological literature) that were administered as part of this 
study. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis 
(KMO = 0.79), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p < 0.001). Two factors 
had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1.00 and, in combination, explained 43.8% of 
the variance. Table 19 in the Appendix shows the factor loadings after varimax rotation. 
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A cut-off score was not utilized to determine which factor each item loaded on. Instead, 
the loadings of each item on the two factors were examined, and the higher loading was 
accepted. Items associated with executive functioning loaded highly on Factor 1, and 
items associated with memory loaded highly on Factor 2. Thus, this PCA yielded two 
underlying factors: Executive functioning (Trail Making Test B, Letter Fluency, Golden 
Stroop Color-Word Interference, Letter-Number Sequencing, Test of Practical Judgment, 
and D-KEFS Tower Test) and Memory (WMS-R Logical Memory [Immediate Recall], 
Free and Cued Recall Selective Reminding Test, Memory for Intentions Test-A, and 
Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised [Delayed Recall]). 
Aim IIIc. To examine emotion regulation strategy use, mood functioning, 
premorbid intellectual functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of 
executive functioning. Four multiple linear regression analyses were conducted using the 
hierarchical blockwise entry method. In each regression, premorbid intellectual 
functioning was entered first (Block 1: WTAR scores) followed by relevant demographic 
variables (Block 2: age and gender) and mood variables (Block 3: depression and anxiety 
[GDS and AMAS-E scores, respectively]). The last predictor variable was one of the four 
ER strategy use variables (Block 4: ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive 
Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, or CERQ Maladaptive). The dependent variable was the 
Executive Factor Z-score (see Tables 11 to 14).  
Multiple regression with ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal. Premorbid intellectual 
functioning (WTAR scores) and age (in years) were significant predictors of executive 
functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively related to Executive Factor Z-
scores (p = 0.003), and age was inversely related to Executive Factor Z-scores (p = 
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0.006). ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal strategy use, depression, anxiety, and gender were 
not significant predictors, that is, these variables did not have an effect above and beyond 
the effect of premorbid intellectual functioning and age.  
Multiple regression with ERQ Expressive Suppression. Again, premorbid 
intellectual functioning (WTAR scores) and age (in years) were the only variables that 
significantly predicted executive functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively 
related to Executive Factor Z-scores (p = 0.003), and age was inversely related to 
Executive Factor Z-scores (p = 0.005). ERQ Expressive Suppression strategy use, 
depression, anxiety, and gender were not significant predictors of executive functioning.  
Multiple regression with CERQ Adaptive. Again, premorbid intellectual 
functioning (WTAR scores) and age (in years) were the only variables that significantly 
predicted executive functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively related to 
Executive Factor Z-scores (p = 0.003), and age was inversely related to Executive Factor 
Z-scores (p = 0.010). CERQ Adaptive ER strategy use, depression, anxiety, and gender 
were not significant predictors of executive functioning.  
Multiple regression with CERQ Maladaptive. Again, premorbid intellectual 
functioning (WTAR scores) and age (in years) were the only variables that significantly 
predicted executive functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively related to 
Executive Factor Z-scores (p = 0.001), and age was inversely related to Executive Factor 
Z-scores (p = 0.004). CERQ Maladaptive ER strategy use, depression, anxiety, and 
gender were not significant predictors of executive functioning.  
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Aim IIId. To examine emotion regulation strategy use, mood variables, 
premorbid intellectual functioning, and demographic variables as predictors of 
memory functioning. 
To test the hypothesis that ER strategy use and mood functioning are significant 
predictors of memory functioning, we conducted multiple regression analyses. The 
blocks of predictor variables that were included in the regression analyses for Aim IIIc 
were also used for this analysis. Here, however, the dependent variable was the Memory 
Factor Z-score (see Tables 15 to 18).  
Multiple regression with ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal. Premorbid intellectual 
functioning (WTAR scores), age (in years), and anxiety (AMAS-E scores) were 
significant predictors of memory functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively 
related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p < 0.001), and age was inversely related to Memory 
Factor Z-scores (p = 0.032). AMAS-E scores were inversely related to Memory Factor Z-
scores (p = 0.014). ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal strategy use, depression, and gender were 
not significant predictors of memory functioning.  
Multiple regression with ERQ Expressive Suppression. Premorbid intellectual 
functioning (WTAR scores), age (in years), anxiety (AMAS-E scores), and depression 
(GDS scores) were significant predictors of memory functioning. Specifically, WTAR 
scores were positively related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p < 0.001), and age was 
inversely related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.020). AMAS-E scores were inversely 
related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.012), and GDS scores were directly related to 
Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.047). Expressive Suppression strategy use and gender 
were not significant predictors of memory functioning.  
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Multiple regression with CERQ Adaptive. Premorbid intellectual functioning 
(WTAR scores), anxiety (AMAS-E scores), depression (GDS scores), and adaptive ER 
strategy (CERQ Adaptive scores) use were significant predictors of memory functioning. 
Specifically, WTAR scores were positively related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p < 
0.001), AMAS-E scores were inversely related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.022), 
GDS scores were directly related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.042), and CERQ 
Adaptive scores were directly related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.017). Age (in 
years) as a predictor variable trended toward significance, with age inversely related to 
Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.053). Gender was not a significant predictor.  
Multiple regression with CERQ Maladaptive. Premorbid intellectual functioning 
(WTAR scores), age (in years), and anxiety (AMAS-E scores) were significant predictors 
of memory functioning. Specifically, WTAR scores were positively related to Memory 
Factor Z-scores (p < 0.03), age was inversely related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 
0.019), and AMAS-E scores were inversely related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 
0.019). GDS scores, as a predictor variable, trended toward significance, with depression 
directly related to Memory Factor Z-scores (p = 0.056). Gender and CERQ Maladaptive 
scores were not significant predictors of memory functioning. 
Aim IV. On an exploratory basis, to examine relationships between affective 
behavior in vivo and executive functioning and memory performances. Recall that 
participants were classified into one of three participant behavior groups based on their 
behavior during administration of each of three cognitive measures: “Emotion and 
Coping,” “Emotion or Coping,” and “No Affect,” and the cognitive measures were a 
measure of planning (D-KEFS Tower), prospective memory measure (MIST-A), and a 
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visuospatial encoding measure (BVMT-R Trial 1). Participant behavior groups for each 
cognitive measure were compared in terms of their performance on that particular 
measure using ANOVA. 
Affective behavior in vivo and performance on the D-KEFS Tower. First, in order 
to determine whether covariates should be used in this analysis, participant behavior 
groups for the D-KEFS Tower were compared on key variables (i.e., age, gender, 
education, and GDS and AMAS-E scores). Results revealed no significant differences 
between behavior groups on these variables (see Table 20 in the Appendix). Next, a one-
way ANOVA revealed no significant differences among the behavior groups in terms of 
D-KEFS Tower scores (see Table 19). 
Affective behavior in vivo and performance on the MIST-A. Participant behavior 
groups for the MIST-A were compared on age, gender, education, and GDS and AMAS-
E scores, and no significant differences were observed (see Table 21 in the Appendix). A 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences among the behavior 
groups on MIST-A scores (see Table 19). 
Affective behavior in vivo and performance on BVMT-R Trial 1. Participant 
behavior groups for BVMT-R Trial 1 were compared on age, gender, education, and 
GDS and AMAS-E scores. Participant behavior groups differed significantly on gender 
(see Table 22 in the Appendix). A one-way ANCOVA with gender as a covariate 
revealed no significant differences among the behavior groups on BVMT-R Trial 1 
scores (see Table 19). 
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Discussion 
The current study examined ER strategy use in relation to cognitive functioning in 
the preclinical stages of dementia and had two overarching goals. First, as there are few 
tools available for measuring ER strategy use in older adults, we sought to validate two 
existing measures (the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire [ERQ; Gross & John, 2003] 
and the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire [CERQ; Garnefski et al., 2001]) in 
an older adult sample. Second, we sought to investigate relationships between ER 
strategy use, aging, and cognition, specifically, executive functioning and memory given 
their known relation to ER. 
Summary of Results 
Results revealed that modified versions of the ERQ and CERQ are valid and 
reliable instruments for measuring the use of ER strategies in older adults. Age (in years) 
was weakly inversely related to use of adaptive ER strategies, and no significant 
relationship was observed between age and maladaptive ER strategy use, as measured via 
the ERQ and CERQ, 
With regard to relationships between ER strategy use and cognition, on the 
CERQ, Healthy Control (HC) participants endorsed significantly greater adaptive ER 
strategy use than Subjective Cognitive Decline (SCD) participants, and Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI) participants endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy 
use than HC and SCD participants. There were no significant differences among 
diagnostic groups in terms of self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal or expressive 
suppression on the ERQ. In addition, participant conversion groups (Stable, Decline, 
Improve, & Variable) did not significantly differ in terms of self-reported ER strategy use 
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on either the ERQ or CERQ. Lastly, potential predictors of executive functioning and 
memory were examined (i.e., ER strategy use, mood, premorbid intellectual functioning, 
age, and gender). The only significant predictors of executive functioning were 
premorbid intellectual functioning and age. Significant predictors of memory functioning 
included premorbid intellectual functioning, age, anxiety, depression, and adaptive ER 
strategy use, as measured using the CERQ. On an exploratory basis, relationships 
between affective behavior in vivo and executive functioning and memory performances 
were examined. On three relevant cognitive measures, performance scores did not 
significantly differ among participants who verbalized negative emotion and a coping 
strategy, participants who verbalized either negative emotion or a coping strategy, and 
participants who verbalized no affect. 
Validation of the ERQ and CERQ in an older adult sample. The first study 
aim was to examine the factor structure and internal consistency of the ERQ and CERQ 
in a sample of non-demented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties. 
Principal component analyses (PCAs) with varimax rotation were conducted with ERQ 
and CERQ scores, separately, and Cronbach’s alpha values were computed.  
With regard to the ERQ, the original two-factor structure (Cognitive Reappraisal 
and Expressive Suppression) was not replicated with all 10 ERQ items. However, with 
removal of two items, the two same factors were obtained. Therefore, the revised ERQ 
consisted of 8 items in total. The revised Cognitive Reappraisal subscale consisted of 5 
items, and the revised Expressive Suppression subscale consisted of 3 items. The internal 
consistency of both of these subscales was acceptable. The two items that did not fit 
neatly into the two-factor structure of the ERQ and were not included in the revised ERQ 
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were “When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them” (an item 
on the Suppression subscale in the original ERQ) and “When I’m faced with a stressful 
situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay calm” (an item on the 
Cognitive Reappraisal subscale in the original ERQ). Though we did not inquire about 
the comprehensibility of specific items, these two items, like other ERQ items, are 
syntactically complex and may be difficult for older adults to understand. Further, these 
ERQ items may be perceived as somewhat unusual, as they require readers to reflect on 
regulation processes that they are not consciously aware of. For instance, the item “When 
I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them” may be confusing, as 
older adults may not be accustomed to the notion of exerting conscious effort to suppress 
the display of positive emotion. It is worth noting that some participants appeared to have 
difficulty interpreting the wording of some of the ERQ items and required assistance to 
complete this measure, that is, they needed some of the questionnaire items to be read 
aloud and repeated a few times. 
With regard to the CERQ, the original two-factor structure (Adaptive and 
Maladaptive) was not replicated with all 36 CERQ items. However, with removal of five 
items, the two same factors were obtained. The revised Adaptive factor consisted of 18 
items and the revised Maladaptive factor consisted of 13 items (31 items in total). The 
internal consistency of both of these factors was acceptable. The five items that did not fit 
neatly into this two-factor structure included three items originally developed as 
maladaptive items (“I often think about how I feel about what I have experienced, “I feel 
that I am the one who is responsible for what has happened,” and “I want to understand 
why I feel the way I do about what I have experienced”) and two items originally 
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developed as adaptive items (“I think that I cannot change anything about it” and “I think 
that I must learn to live with it”). A careful read of these individual items reveals that 
they are ambiguous and could be interpreted as referring to adaptive or maladaptive 
regulation strategies. For instance, the item “I think that I cannot change anything about 
it” could be interpreted as consistent with acceptance, thought to be adaptive, or 
consistent with learned helplessness, thought to be maladaptive. As with the ERQ, 
however, we did not inquire about the level of comprehensibility of individual items.  
Relationships between age and emotion regulation strategy use. The second 
aim was to examine relationships between age and ER strategy use in older adults with 
varying degrees of cognitive difficulties. Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficients 
were calculated between age (in years) and three of the ER variables that were not 
normally distributed (i.e., ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, and 
CERQ Maladaptive). A Pearson product-moment correlation was calculated between age 
and the one normally distributed ER variable, ERQ Adaptive. Age was weakly inversely 
related to adaptive ER strategy use, as measured using the ERQ Reappraisal and CERQ 
Adaptive scales.  None of the other correlations was significant.  
In short, our results did not suggest that a strong relationship exists between age 
and ER strategy use. The absence of a strong positive or strong inverse relationship 
between age and ER strategy use may reflect stability of ER in older adulthood, which 
has been previously discussed (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000). It is also possible, however, 
that the absence of a strong association between age and ER strategy use as observed in 
the current study is due to limited variability in the study data, specifically the sample 
having a restricted range of ages and scores. To elaborate, we examined older adults 
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ranging in age from 70 to 89 years, and it is possible that the magnitude of the association 
between age and ER strategy use would be greater in a sample with a larger age range 
(e.g., 50 to 100 years). In addition, the ERQ item response scale ranges from 1 to 7, with 
1 indicating that the respondent “strongly agrees” and 7 indicating that the respondent 
“strongly disagrees.” Average item scores for the ERQ Expressive Suppression subscale 
ranged from 1 to 7; however, average item scores for the ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal 
subscale ranged from 2.20 to 7.00, which indicates that the full Likert scale was not 
utilized. The CERQ item response scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that the 
respondent “(almost) never” thinks that way and 5 indicating that the respondent 
“(almost) always” thinks that way. Average item scores for the CERQ Adaptive subscale 
ranged from 1.39 to 5.00, whereas average item scores for the CERQ Maladaptive 
subscale ranged from 1.08 to 3.85, which again indicates that our study participants did 
not use the full Likert scale. 
Relationships between cognition and emotion regulation strategy use in older 
adults with varying degrees of cognitive difficulties. The third aim was multi-fold. The 
overall purpose was to examine relationships between ER strategy use and cognition, 
specifically executive functioning and memory, in older adults with varying degrees of 
cognitive difficulties.  
The first part of the third aim was to compare participant diagnostic groups (HC, 
SCD, & MCI) in terms of self-reported ER strategy use, and this was accomplished by 
running two-way ANOVAs (parametric and non-parametric) and ANCOVAs, as 
appropriate. The effect of gender was also examined. Education (in years) and anxiety 
(AMAS-E scores) were used as covariates, as there were significant differences among 
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diagnostic groups on these two variables. Specifically, MCI participants had significantly 
fewer years of education than HC and SCD participants. In addition, SCD and MCI 
participants endorsed significantly greater anxiety than HCs. Of note, there were no 
significant differences in age, gender, or depressive symptoms (GDS scores) across 
diagnostic groups. Regarding the findings from this analysis, there were no significant 
differences among diagnostic groups in terms of self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal 
or expressive suppression on the ERQ. On the CERQ, however, HCs endorsed 
significantly greater adaptive ER strategy use than participants with SCD, and 
participants with MCI endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy use than 
HC and SCD participants. Men endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy 
use on the CERQ than did women.  
These findings are generally consistent with those previously discussed in the 
literature. First, it is unsurprising that HCs endorsed significantly greater adaptive ER 
strategy use than participants with SCD. The experience of subjective cognitive 
complaints has been associated with depression (Minett, Da Silva, Ortiz, & Bertolucci, 
2008; Zandi, 2004), which is commonly marked by negative appraisals of functioning 
and problems with adaptive ER. Second, it is not surprising that participants with MCI 
endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy use than HC and SCD 
participants. Studies have shown that, for example, the prevalence of depression is 
increased in MCI (e.g., Barnes, Alexopoulos, Lopez, Williamson, & Yaffe, 2006). Lastly, 
the finding that men endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy than women 
is consistent with prior findings in the literature, particularly with findings that men tend 
to endorse greater use of expressive suppression than women (Gross & John, 2003).  
74 
  
 
With all of that said, given the design of the current study, we cannot necessarily 
attribute the observed group difference findings (i.e., HCs endorsing greater adaptive ER 
strategy use than participants with SCD, and MCI participants endorsing greater 
maladaptive ER strategy use than HCs) to differences among the diagnostic groups in 
terms of mood/emotional functioning. This is because participants in the sample endorsed 
minimal depressive symptoms on the GDS, and differences in anxiety across diagnostic 
groups were controlled in the analyses conducted. Because this study controlled for 
differences in basic mood/emotional functioning, it is, in fact, possible to speculate about 
non-emotional factors (e.g., cognitive factors) that may be contributing to observed group 
differences in ER strategy use.  
It is conceivable that individuals with mild cognitive difficulties use adaptive ER 
strategies less frequently than healthy older adults because they have diminished ability 
to use cognitively demanding ER strategies. For example, consider the use of cognitive 
reappraisal, the most well-studied adaptive regulation strategy. Cognitive reappraisal is 
remarkably complex. Cognitive reappraisal entails keeping the goal to reappraise in 
working memory, selectively attending to this goal, retrieving relevant past experiences 
from episodic memory stores, generating alternative appraisals, and selecting among 
these possible reappraisals while inhibiting other appraisals (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
Lastly, it should, again, be noted that there were no significant differences among 
diagnostic groups in terms of self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal or expressive 
suppression on the ERQ. Although it may be the case that the diagnostic groups do not 
actually differ in their use of cognitive reappraisal or expressive suppression, it is also 
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possible that the ERQ lacks sensitivity to identify these group differences (issues with 
this self-report instrument were previously discussed above).  
The above-discussed group difference analysis compared the three participant 
diagnostic groups (HC, SCD, & MCI) in terms of self-reported ER strategy use. After 
completing this analysis, it occurred to us that it would be important to also compare MCI 
subgroups (i.e., amnestic MCI [aMCI] and non-amnestic MCI [naMCI]) in terms of self-
reported ER strategy use, as these diagnostic classification data were, in fact, also 
available for analysis.  
To determine whether covariates were required in these analyses, the amnestic 
and non-amnestic MCI groups were compared on key demographic (i.e., age, gender, and 
years of education) and mood variables (i.e., depressive symptoms [GDS scores] and 
anxiety symptoms [AMAS-E scores]) using independent-samples t-test or ANCOVA. A 
significant difference was observed between groups in terms of age. Specifically, the 
average age for the amnestic MCI group (M = 85.02, SD = 7.07) was significantly greater 
than that for non-amnestic MCI group (M = 79.72, SD = 6.27), t(36) = 2.40, p = 0.022. 
Age was then correlated with each of the dependent variables (i.e., ERQ Expressive 
Suppression, ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, CERQ Adaptive, and CERQ Maladaptive) in 
the aMCI and naMCI groups, separately. Age significantly correlated with only CERQ 
Maladaptive in the naMCI group. As a result, age was used as a covariate when 
comparing the aMCI and naMCI group in terms of CERQ Maladaptive scores. Analyses 
revealed that the non-amnestic MCI group (M = 5.47, SD = 0.93) had significantly 
greater ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal scores than the amnestic MCI group (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.17), t(38) = -4.10, p < 0.001. There were no significant differences between the aMCI 
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and naMCI groups in terms of ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, or CERQ 
Maladaptive scores.  
The second part of the third aim was to compare participant conversion groups 
(Stable, Decline, Improve, & Variable) in terms of self-reported ER strategy use, and this 
was accomplished by running one-way ANOVAs (parametric and non-parametric). Of 
note, participant conversion groups did not significantly differ in terms of age, gender, 
education (in years), depression (GDS scores), or anxiety (AMAS-E scores). Results 
revealed that there were no significant differences among the four conversion groups in 
terms of ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, or 
CERQ Maladaptive scores. This suggests that neither stability nor change in cognitive 
functioning over time (whether it be improvement or decline) is related to ER strategy 
use. The absence of an observed relationship between change in cognitive functioning 
and ER strategy use is consistent with what has been described in the literature about ER 
in older adulthood, specifically that it is often stable in late life. This finding is 
inconsistent, however, with the notion that ER is related to cognitive functioning. It is 
also inconsistent with the notion that emotion dysfunction increases risk for cognitive 
decline, as best exemplified by the finding that depression confers increased risk for MCI 
(e.g., Barnes et al., 2006; Geda et al., 2006; Jorm, 2001).  
Although it may be the case that there is no relationship between ER strategy use 
and change in cognitive functioning, it should be noted that the approach used to 
investigate this aim had its own set of limitations, which may have impacted the findings. 
First, diagnostic classification data were available for many of the study participants for 
the year in which the study was completed and for two to four years following study 
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completion. As a result, the number of years over which conversion was examined varied 
across participants, that is, for some participants, we examined conversion over two 
years, while for others, we examined conversion over three or four years. This likely 
introduced error variance into the data. In addition, some participants were classified as 
Variable if their diagnostic classifications fluctuated over time (e.g., conversion from HC 
to SCD and then back to HC or conversion from SCD to MCI and then back to SCD). It 
is, of course, possible that some of these “variable” participants did not experience real 
fluctuations in cognitive functioning but rather that their diagnostic classifications were 
inaccurate for some of the study years due to the way they performed or reported 
cognitive symptoms on the day of the in-person evaluation.   
The third part of the third aim was to examine potential predictors of executive 
functioning and memory, with a focus on ER strategy use as a possible predictor. 
Because several measures of executive functioning and memory were administered, we 
consolidated the relevant available cognitive data into two dependent variables: an 
Executive Factor Z-Score and a Memory Factor Z-Score, as determined via principal 
components analysis. The Executive Factor Z-Score was composed of measures of set-
shifting, verbal initiation/fluency, inhibition, working memory, judgment, and planning 
(i.e., Trail Making Test B, Letter Fluency, Golden Stroop Color-Word Interference, 
Letter-Number Sequencing, Test of Practical Judgment, and D-KEFS Tower Test). The 
Memory Factor Z-Score was composed of measures of verbal contextual memory 
encoding, word learning, prospective memory, and delayed recall of visuospatial 
information (i.e., WMS-R Logical Memory [Immediate Recall], Free and Cued Recall 
Selective Reminding Test, Memory for Intentions Test-A, and Brief Visuospatial 
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Memory Test-Revised [Delayed Recall]). These are, indeed, a diverse set of memory 
measures that assess different aspects of memory functioning, which may have impacted 
the findings. The examined predictors of executive functioning and memory included ER 
strategy use (ERQ Reappraisal, ERQ Expressive Suppression, CERQ Adaptive, CERQ 
Maladaptive), depression (GDS scores), anxiety (AMAS-E scores), premorbid 
intellectual functioning (WTAR scores), age, and gender. 
Multiple linear regression analyses (with blockwise entry) were used to examine 
these potential predictors of cognition. Known predictors (premorbid intellectual 
functioning, age, gender, and mood functioning) were entered into the model in the order 
of their importance in predicting the outcome. After known predictors were entered, new 
predictors were entered, and these were the ER variables. Regarding predictors of 
executive functioning, premorbid intellectual functioning and age were the only variables 
that predicted executive functioning, with premorbid functioning being directly related to 
executive functioning and age being inversely related to executive functioning. 
Regarding predictors of memory functioning, premorbid intellectual functioning, age, 
anxiety, depression, and adaptive ER strategy predicted memory functioning. 
Specifically, premorbid intellectual functioning was directly related to memory 
functioning, and age was inversely related to memory. While anxiety was also inversely 
related to memory functioning, depression was directly related to memory functioning. 
Adaptive ER strategy use, measured using the CERQ, was positively related to memory 
functioning. Use of cognitive reappraisal or expressive suppression, as measured using 
the ERQ, and maladaptive ER strategy use, as measured using the CERQ, were not 
significant predictors of memory functioning.  
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These findings are generally consistent with those found in the 
neuropsychological literature. Premorbid intellectual functioning is certainly a robust 
predictor of executive functioning and memory (Wood & Liossi, 2007; Eysenck & 
Halstead, 1945). In addition, memory is known to decline with increasing age and anxiety 
(Craik & Jennings, 1992; Yochim et al., 2013). A somewhat more novel finding from the 
current study is that adaptive ER strategy use is predictive of better memory functioning. 
A relatively limited literature examines the relationship between ER and memory 
functioning, and it is largely the work of James Gross. Richards and Gross (2000) found 
that the habitual use of expressive suppression, a maladaptive ER strategy (but not 
cognitive reappraisal, an adaptive regulation strategy), was associated with poorer 
memory functioning on objective measures. In addition, surprisingly, we observed a 
direct relationship between depression and memory functioning, which is inconsistent 
with prior findings that suggest depression is associated with reduced memory 
functioning (e.g., Yochim et al., 2013).  
Lastly, the above-discussed multiple regression analyses included premorbid 
intellectual functioning, but not education, as a predictor variable. After carrying out 
these analyses, it occurred to us that even though education and premorbid intellectual 
functioning are significantly correlated, it would still be important to re-run these 
analyses using education, instead of premorbid intellectual functioning, as a predictor 
variable. The overall pattern of findings did not significantly change when education was 
included as a predictor variable, and education was consistently directly related to 
executive functioning and memory. 
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Relationships between affective behavior in vivo and executive functioning 
and memory performances. The fourth aim was to further explore relationships 
between affective behavior and executive functioning and memory and, specifically, to 
understand whether the display of affective behavior while engaged in an executive 
functioning or memory task is associated with poorer performance on that task.  
To put this aim into context, one of our overarching goals was to test the 
hypothesis that adaptive ER strategy use is associated with better cognitive functioning. 
An important qualifier of this statement is that under certain circumstances, any form of 
ER (adaptive or maladaptive) may negatively impact cognitive functioning. ER utilizes 
cognitive resources; as a result, actively engaging in ER while in the midst of a 
cognitively demanding task may divert attention away from the task and, in some 
situations, compromise one’s performance. The ego-depletion model of self-regulation in 
fact posits that any form of self-regulation (e.g., emotion regulation, inhibition, impulse 
control, ability to delay gratification, etc.) is cognitively taxing (Baumeister et al.,1998; 
Muraven et al., 1998).  
To address the question of whether ER in vivo negatively impacts cognitive 
functioning, as part of the current study, a pilot behavioral observation measure of ER 
was designed for use during administration of the D-KEFS Tower Test, MIST A/B, and 
BVMT-R. This pilot measure required the examiner to tally the number of times that a 
participant verbalized negative affect related to his/her task performance and the number 
of times that a participant verbalized an adaptive coping strategy while engaged in a task. 
Participants were then classified into one of four groups: 1) those who verbalized 
negative affect and an adaptive coping strategy, 2) those who verbalized negative affect 
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only, 3) those who verbalized an adaptive coping strategy only, and 4) those who did not 
verbalize negative affect or a coping strategy.  
Clearly, this pilot behavioral observation is an expeditious measure of ER, and 
ultimately it was difficult to have confidence in the data that it yielded. To reduce the 
amount of error in the data, two of the four above-stated categories were collapsed into 
one, and the purpose of this fourth aim was modified accordingly. The aim shifted from 
examining associations between ER and cognitive performance to examining associations 
between affective behavior, in general, and cognitive performance. Participants were 
classified into one of three participant behavior groups based on their behavior during 
administration of D-KEFS Tower, MIST-A, and BVMT-R Trial 1. The three participant 
behavior groups were: 1 = Participants who verbalized negative emotion and a coping 
strategy (herein referred to as Emotion and Coping), 2 = Participants who verbalized 
either negative emotion or a coping strategy (herein referred to as Emotion or Coping), 
and 3 = Participants who verbalized neither emotion nor a coping strategy (herein 
referred to as No Affect).  
Participant behavior groups (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, & No 
Affect) were compared in terms of their performances on measures of planning (D-KEFS 
Tower), prospective memory (MIST-A), and visuospatial encoding (BVMT-R Trial 1) 
using analyses of variance. No significant differences were observed among the 
participant behaviors groups on the D-KEFS Tower, MIST-A, or BVMT-R Trial 1. These 
findings are perhaps at odds with the ego-depletion model of self-regulation (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998) and with the associated hypothesis that displays of 
affective behavior while engaged in an executive functioning or memory task are 
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associated with poorer performance on that task. The current findings raise the possibility 
that engaging in affective behavior does not necessarily compromise cognitive 
functioning. Perhaps displaying or communicating affect is a beneficial outlet and helps 
one to actually perform better. 
Theoretical Considerations 
Measuring emotion regulation. ER is a complex construct, for which there is no 
agreed-upon definition in the literature. As a result, to date, a lot of the work on ER has 
been largely theoretical and has focused on model development. The Process Model of 
Emotion Regulation (Gross 1998b, 2001), which has become one of the most popular, 
delineates specific regulation strategies and their relative time-course (i.e., when they 
occur in the emotion-generative process). The Process Model laid the foundation for 
future empirical work by providing a conceptual way to think about ER, as well as 
operational definitions of specific regulation strategies (e.g., cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression). Furthermore, a variety of methods have been utilized to measure 
the complex construct termed ER. Popular methods include self-report instruments, 
behavioral observation, and experimental manipulation (in which participants are 
instructed to engage in a particular regulation strategy, and subjective experience, 
behavior, physiology, and/or neural responses are measured) (Garnefski et al., 2001; 
Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; Kalisch et al., 2005; Ohira et al., 2006; Thompson, 
1994; Urry et al., 2006).  
Given the reliance on self-report instruments to measure ER, it is critically 
important that these measures are validated in each of the populations in which they are 
utilized. That is, psychometric properties of the instrument should be carefully 
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investigated in different populations, as sometimes instruments do not perform as 
originally intended in certain populations (Melka et al., 2011). In fact, in the current 
study, the original two-factor structure of the ERQ was not replicated with all 10 ERQ 
items, and the original two-factor structure of the CERQ was not replicated with all 36 
CERQ items. This is not an uncommon finding, however. For instance, the original ERQ 
factor structure was not replicated in a German community sample (mean age = 49.4 
years, SD = 18.2; Wiltink et al., 2011) or in two other community samples (17-95 years) 
in Australia and the United Kingdom (Spaapen, Waters, Brummer, Stopa, & Bucks, 
2014). Yet, the ERQ has been used relatively widely to measure ER. 
Lastly, measuring ER ability is difficult, and self-report instruments are not an 
ideal method for doing so. Currently, ER ability is measured using self-report instruments 
by indexing use of adaptive versus maladaptive ER strategies. Greater reported use of 
adaptive (versus maladaptive) regulation strategies is thought to be indicative of 
better/stronger ER ability. Although adaptive ER strategy use may be a proxy for 
regulation ability, it is just that, a proxy variable, and should not be equated with ability. 
Additional research is needed to identify face- and construct-valid ER measures.  
Emotion regulation, aging, and cognition. The literature on aging and ER 
suggests that ER is stable or improves in older adulthood. Several findings are used to 
support this claim. Older adults experience high levels of emotional well-being, and 
studies have shown evidence of declining negative affect and stable or only mildly 
decreased positive affect in older adulthood (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Mroczek & 
Kolarz, 1998). Older adults report being better able to control their emotions (Gross et al., 
2007), and older adults’ reports of emotional control have been linked to decreases in 
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negative affect (e.g., Phillips et al., 2006). The notion that ER is stable or improves in 
older adulthood has also been supported by findings from research studies utilizing 
performance-based measures of ER. In particular, Kunzmann and colleagues (2005) 
found no differences between young (18-25 years) and old (60-85 years) adults in the 
ability to suppress or amplify emotional expressions or in the physiological 
consequences. Kliegel and colleagues (2007) found that mood repair, a measure of ER, 
was more effective among old (60-79 years) than young adults (21-32 years).  
 Several theories (psychological, cognitive, and neural) have been proposed to 
explain stable or improved ER in older adulthood. From a psychological perspective, the 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen et al., 1999) posits that in later 
adulthood, time is perceived as being limited and, as a result, present-oriented and 
emotion-related goals (e.g., emotion regulation) are prioritized. From a cognitive 
perspective, studies suggest that older adults exhibit a “positivity effect” in information 
processing (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2005), that is, they tend to focus more on positive 
than negative stimuli and exhibit a memory advantage for positive stimuli. From a neural 
perspective, studies suggest that the amygdala, important for emotion processing, does 
not decline in volume as other structures do with age (Mather et al., 2005). In addition, in 
older adults, amygdala activation for negative stimuli is less than that for positive stimuli 
(Mather at al., 2004). The frontal cortex, important for ER, does not decline uniformly 
(i.e., the ventromedial PFC and ACC tend to maintain cortical thickness, whereas dorsal 
and lateral regions of the PFC thin significantly with aging, Fjell et al., 2009). Lastly, 
older adults compensate for age-related neural decline by recruiting additional 
neurocognitive resources, particularly when engaged in emotion-related tasks. Consistent 
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with this notion of recruitment of additional resources, which is thought to facilitate ER 
processes and make up for declines with aging, functional imaging studies reveal that 
when processing negative stimuli, older adults, as compared to younger adults, show 
more dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC activity and less amygdala activity (Gunning-
Dixon et al., 2003; Tessitore et al., 2005).  
 ER processes are thought to recruit brain structures, particularly in the frontal 
lobe, that are important for higher-level cognitive processing. In particular, ER processes 
recruit the dorsolateral and posterior prefrontal cortex (PFC), and inferior parietal 
regions, important for selective attention and working memory processes; dorsal regions 
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), implicated in conflict monitoring; ventrolateral 
PFC, implicated in selection of reappraisals and/or responses and inhibition of others; and 
dorsomedial PFC, implicated in mental state attribution (Badre & Wager, 2007; 
Botvinick et al., 2004; Miller, 2000; Mitchell, 2009; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 2005; Wager et al., 2004; and Wager & Smith, 2003). A current 
popular neuroanatomical model of ER posits that the frontal cortex exerts inhibitory 
control over the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2012). Consistent with the notion that ER 
processes recruit frontal lobe structures, associations have been observed between ER 
abilities and executive functions. For instance, higher levels of verbal fluency have been 
associated with greater ability to up- and down-regulate emotion (Gyurak et al., 2009, 
2012). In addition, in depression, weaknesses in executive functioning have been 
associated with the use of maladaptive regulation strategies.  
 With all of this in mind, it is somewhat paradoxical that ER abilities are stable or 
improve in older adulthood, and yet, the proposed underlying neural substrate of ER 
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abilities, the frontal cortex, declines with advancing age. The current study was motivated 
to address this paradox and explore relationships among ER, aging, and cognition. 
Results did not suggest a strong relationship between age and ER strategy use, although 
there was some evidence that adaptive ER strategy use declines with advancing age. In 
addition, there was some evidence of a relationship between ER strategy use and 
cognitive functioning, particularly that adaptive regulation strategy use is associated with 
stronger cognitive functioning, although this evidence was not compelling. Specifically, 
we observed that HC participants endorsed significantly greater adaptive ER strategy use 
than participants with SCD, who are thought to represent a “pre-MCI” stage of decline. 
We also saw that individuals with MCI endorsed significantly greater maladaptive ER 
strategy use than HC and SCD participants. Lastly, adaptive ER strategy use emerged as 
a significant predictor of memory functioning. There was no relationship observed, 
however, between worsening of cognitive difficulties (e.g., conversion from HC to SCD 
or from SCD to MCI) or variability in cognitive functioning over time and ER strategy 
use. The absence of a relationship between conversion and regulation strategy use indeed 
makes the relationship between cognition and ER somewhat more tenuous, although this 
is likely worthy of further investigation.  
Clinical Considerations and Implications 
There is a multitude of factors that can impact cognitive functioning, including 
mood, pain, quality of sleep, nutrition, medication, etc.  Therefore, when older adults 
present in a clinical setting with complaints of cognitive difficulties, it is critically 
important to consider all of the factors that may be impacting their performance. The 
current study suggests that an individual’s ER processes should be one such 
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consideration. The extant literature on ER and the current findings suggest an association 
between ER and cognition, and particularly between maladaptive ER strategy use and 
cognitive difficulty. The directionality of this relationship is not clear, although clinicians 
should be concerned with this association regardless of the directionality. For example, 
suppose that an individual’s cognitive functioning affects the types of ER strategies 
he/she uses in daily living and/or is able to learn/apply in treatment. It is conceivable, for 
instance, that an individual would have difficulty using cognitive reappraisal because of 
difficulty with aspects of executive functioning, such as inhibiting over-learned responses 
and set-shifting. Weaknesses in cognitive functioning could be targeted in treatment 
using cognitive rehabilitation techniques, and this could potentially have carry-over 
effects in the domain of ER.  Alternatively, suppose that an individual’s habitual ER 
processes impact cognitive functioning. For instance, use of expressive suppression while 
learning new information has been associated with poorer memory recall for that 
information (Gross, 2002). Psychotherapeutic treatment could address the ways in which 
individuals regulate or manage emotions, which might impact the individual’s cognitive 
functioning in daily living, particularly in individuals with SCD, who are reporting 
cognitive difficulties yet performing well on formal neuropsychological examination.  
More generally, it is important to target ER in the treatment of older adults, 
particularly to the extent that it is a feature of depression. Studies have shown that 
depression, for example, confers increased risk for MCI (e.g., Barnes et al., 2006; Geda et 
al., 2006; Jorm, 2001). In addition, MCI patients with depression may be at increased risk 
for conversion to dementia (Modrego & Ferrádez, 2004). Of course, in some cases, 
emotional/mood disturbance is part and parcel of a neurodegenerative disorder. For 
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example, in some cases of Alzheimer’s disease, elevated depressive symptoms are the 
first signs of a disease process (Barnes et al., 2012). With all of that said, the current 
study only enrolled non-depressed older adults, and, therefore, the extent to which we can 
speculate about implications of the current study for treatment of emotion dysregulation 
in older adults with depression is limited.  
ER can be formally targeted in treatment, and this can positively impact 
functioning in individuals with cognitive deficits. A recent study by Kiosses and 
colleagues (2015), for example, investigated Problem Adaptation Therapy (PATH). 
PATH is a treatment for older adults with cognitive impairment (from mild cognitive 
deficits to moderate dementia), major depression, and disability that specifically targets 
ER. PATH applies the Process Model of Emotion Regulation (Gross 1998b, 2001) by 
teaching regulation strategies, such as situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. PATH reduced 
depression and disability, as measured using the Montgomery Ashberg Depression 
Rating Scale (Montgomery & Åsberg, 1979) and the interview-administered World 
Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule II (Epping-Jordan, Chatterji, & 
Ustun, 2000), respectively, in an older adult sample (age ≥ 65 years).  
Lastly, because objective performance-based clinical measures are often not 
sensitive to the earliest symptoms of cognitive decline and self-reported symptoms of 
cognitive decline can be indicative of future decline, it is critically important for 
clinicians to pay heed to patients’ reported symptoms and to utilize validated self-report 
measures/symptom inventories.  
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Limitations  
 The current study has a number of limitations, which must be considered. First, 
the study had a limited sample size (n = 179) relative to other studies on aging and 
cognition. Second, the study investigated ER using a self-report instrument. Subjective 
report measures are vulnerable to biases related to order, scale, and halo-effects 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and their strong relation to 
psychological factors such as depression, anxiety, and personality (Balash et al., 2013; 
Merema, Speelman, Foster, & Kaczmarek, 2013). In addition, older adults may have 
positively biased perceptions of their ER abilities (Kunzmann et al., 2005). To elaborate, 
studies have shown no age differences in the ability to suppress or amplify emotional 
expression or associated physiological effects (e.g., Kunzmann et al., 2005), yet older 
adults tend to report being better able to control their emotions (Gross et al., 1997).  
A third major limitation is that the current study is largely correlational and, 
therefore, we cannot draw inferences about causal relationships between variables. For 
example, we are unable to infer whether an individual’s use of particular ER strategies 
impacts cognitive functioning or whether cognitive functioning affects the types of 
regulation strategies that are regularly used.  
A fourth limitation is that the study design did not allow for extensive 
investigation of relationships between ER strategy use and aging. First, the study was 
largely cross-sectional in design; it would be interesting for future research to examine 
how self-reported ER strategy use changes over a period of time (for example, over 2 and 
4 years as individuals change in cognitive status). Second, the age range (70 to 89 years) 
of the sample was limited, and there was no younger comparison sample available.  
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A fifth limitation is that the current self-report data on ER only speak to 
participants’ ER strategy use, not their actual abilities. As discussed earlier, although 
adaptive ER strategy use may be a proxy for regulation ability, it is just that, a proxy 
variable, and should not be equated with ability. In addition, in our experience, the ERQ 
was difficult for some study participants to complete, particularly because the items 
require participants to reflect on processes that they likely do not ordinarily think about 
and also many of the items were oddly worded from participants’ perspectives, as 
evidenced by participants’ requests to repeat and/or rephrase some of the questionnaire 
items. Anecdotally, the CERQ appears to be a better measure to use to assess ER strategy 
use with older adults. 
 A few other limitations are worth noting.  Although differences in ER strategy use 
as a function of ethnicity have been reported in the literature (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), 
differences in ethnicity across participant diagnostic groups were not investigated as part 
of this study. To address this issue, as part of follow-up analyses, diagnostic groups (3: 
HC, SCD, & MCI) were compared in terms of ethnic composition (% Caucasian vs. % 
Non-Caucasian [i.e., African American, Hispanic White, Hispanic Black, Asian, and 
Other]) using chi-square. Results revealed that the participant groups significantly 
differed in terms of ethnic composition χ²(2) = 18.21, p < 0.001. While the HC and SCD 
groups were 60% and 74% Caucasian, respectively, the MCI group was only 32% 
Caucasian. This is consistent with prior research showing that minority ethno-racial 
groups and groups with low education are at increased risk for dementia (Demirovic et 
al., 2003; Froehlich, Bogardus, & Inouye, 2001; Tang et al., 2001). !
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In addition, while numerous traditional measures of executive functioning were 
administered, relatively fewer measures of memory functioning were administered as part 
of this study, and these only indexed select (and somewhat disparate) aspects of memory 
functioning, particularly verbal contextual memory encoding, word learning, prospective 
memory, and delayed recall of visuospatial information. Delayed recall of verbal 
information was not included but would be very valuable in future work.  
Directions for Future Research 
 Future research should address the limitations mentioned above. First, given the 
issues with using the ERQ in the current sample, it would be beneficial to repeat the 
study using other available ER questionnaires. For instance, the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is worthy of investigation in an older 
adult population and would offer a different perspective on the topic. In addition, we 
utilized revised ERQ and CERQ factor scores that excluded some of the original 
questionnaire items, based on results from principal component analyses. It would be 
worthwhile to re-run statistical analyses using ERQ and CERQ factor scores that include 
all of the original questionnaire items to determine whether our exclusion of certain items 
altered the study findings. 
Second, it would be important to investigate relationships between age and ER 
strategy use across the life course, ideally using a longitudinal study. As part of this type 
of study, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which change in self-reported 
ER strategy use over the life span is related to changes in cognitive functioning. In 
addition, examination of the correspondence between ER and cognitive functioning at 
different time points in the life course would be worthwhile. One hypothesis is that there 
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is a stronger association between cognitive functioning and ER in young individuals than 
adults. Third, it would be worthwhile to investigate ER in relation to other aspects of 
memory functioning, particularly free recall after a delay. Lastly, it would be valuable to 
examine relationships among ethnicity, ER strategy use, and cognition, given that the 
participant diagnostic groups differed in terms of ethnic composition, as discussed in the 
limitations section above. 
 More generally, the current study examined self-report of ER strategy use in 
relation to cognitive functioning in the preclinical stages of dementia. Future research 
should use more rigorous methodological approaches to investigate relationships between 
ER and cognitive functioning in this older adult population. Ideally, a rigorous approach 
would utilize a multi-modal approach to the assessment including self-report, behavioral 
observation, physiological recordings, and neuroimaging. As part of this multi-modal 
assessment, it would, of course, be important to delineate clear operational definitions of 
ER and to utilize experimental manipulations (e.g., explicit manipulation of regulation 
strategy).  It may also be helpful to include informant-report, as there are individuals in 
the early stages of AD that exhibit poor insight into their functioning. Lastly, it would be 
important to look at medication as a variable that could impact ER and cognition, 
particularly given that many older adults are prescribed multiple medications.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the current study examined ER strategy use in relation to cognitive 
functioning in the preclinical stages of dementia. The primary motivation for this work 
was to address an ostensible paradox described in the literature, specifically, that ER 
abilities are stable or improve in older adulthood, despite the proposed underlying neural 
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substrate, the frontal cortex, declining with age. The study revealed some associations 
between cognition and ER strategy use. HC participants endorsed significantly greater 
adaptive ER strategy use than did SCD participants, and MCI participants endorsed 
significantly greater maladaptive ER strategy use than did HC and SCD participants 
In addition, adaptive ER strategy use was a significant predictor of memory. On the 
whole, however, there was no strong consistent evidence of a clear link between 
cognitive functioning and ER strategy use (i.e., adaptive versus maladaptive). In short, 
although the current study certainly does not resolve the aforementioned paradox, it sheds 
light on the complexity of the relationships among emotion regulation, aging, and 
cognition. The prevailing theme in the literature that emotion regulation is stable or 
improves in older adulthood is likely an oversimplified evaluation. Future studies should 
further investigate relationships among emotion regulation, aging, and cognition.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 179 Non-Demented Older Adults  
 
Variables M (SD) or % (n) 
Demographics   
    Age (years) 81.38 (5.82) 
    Gender (% female) 69.30% (124) 
    Education (years) 14.45 (3.50) 
    Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 59.22% (106) 
Participant Diagnostic Groups  
     Healthy Controls (%) 41.90% (75) 
     Subjective Cognitive Decline (%) 36.87% (66) 
     Mild Cognitive Impairment (%) 21.23% (38) 
Cognitive Measures  na  
Executive Factor Z-scoreb 81 0.10 (0.61) 
Memory Factor Z-scorec 170 -0.14 (0.78) 
WTAR, total raw score 179 38.26 (10.20) 
Letter Fluency, total raw score 179 37.50 (13.92) 
Golden Stroop, Color-Word trial, total raw score 172 42.02 (8.26) 
Trail Making Test, Part B, time in seconds 169 123.92 (65.52) 
WAIS-IV Letter-Number Sequencing, total raw 
score 
178 14.91 (4.10) 
D-KEFS Tower Test, total achievement score 134 14.22 (4.92) 
Test of Practical Judgment, total raw score 178 33.19 (4.96) 
FCSRT, Free Recall, total raw score 178 47.66 (0.91) 
WMS-R Logical Memory I, total raw score 179 21.98 (7.10) 
MIST-A, total raw score 173 27.14 (11.42) 
BVMT-R, Delayed Recall, total raw score 176 5.22 (3.00) 
Mood Measures   
     GDS, total raw score 175 1.97 (2.53) 
     AMAS-E, total raw score 177 11.82 (8.00) 
Emotion Regulation Measures   
     ERQ Reappraisal, average item score 179 4.98 (1.11) 
     ERQ Suppression, average item score 179 4.18 (1.44) 
     CERQ Adaptive, average item score 179 3.09 (0.72) 
     CERQ Maladaptive, average item score 179 1.94 (0.51) 
 
aThe sample sizes varied depending on the number of participants who completed the 
measure.  
b/cThese values were computed strictly for the purpose of addressing Aim III of this 
study. They are distinct from the cognitive factor Z-scores computed for the purpose of 
participant diagnostic classification. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Three Diagnostic Participant Groups  
 
Healthy Controls 
 
(n = 75) 
Subjective 
Cognitive Decline 
(n = 66) 
Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
(n = 38) 
 
 
 
Variables M (SD) or % (n) M (SD) or % (n) M (SD) or % (n) 
Demographic    
    Age  81.14 (5.56) 81.48 (5.44) 81.67 (6.98) 
    Gender  70.70% (53) 65.15% (43) 73.70 (28) 
    Education  14.81 (3.17) 15.35 (3.29) 12.18 (3.59) 
    Ethnicity (%   
Caucasian) 
60.00% (45) 74.24% (49) 31.58% (12) 
Cognitive    
    WTAR 39.79 (9.29) 42.26 (7.32) 28.29 (9.92) 
Exec/PS Factor Z-
score* 
0.82 (0.73) 0.98 (0.73) -0.36 (1.11) 
Memory Factor Z-
score* 
0.93 (0.90) 0.71 (0.96) -0.74 (0.81) 
Global/Verbal Factor 
Z-score* 
0.56 (0.74) 0.64 (0.75) -1.01 (0.87) 
Mood    
    GDS 1.26 (1.83) 2.52 (2.79) 2.38 (2.91) 
AMAS-E 9.66 (7.01) 13.32 (8.70) 13.39 (7.77) 
Emotion Regulation     
    ERQ Reappraisal 5.18 (1.08) 4.77 (1.03) 4.96 (1.23) 
    ERQ Suppression  4.25 (1.42) 4.08 (1.39) 4.21 (1.59) 
    CERQ Adaptive 3.27 (0.74) 2.93 (0.70) 3.00 (0.66) 
    CERQ Maladaptive 1.86 (0.47) 1.91 (0.50) 2.16 (0.53) 
 
*Used for the purpose of diagnostic classification (i.e., to classify participants into one of 
the three diagnostic participant groups [Healthy Control, Subjective Cognitive Decline, or 
Mild Cognitive Impairment]) 
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Table 3 
Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the Mean Item 
Scores for the Revised 8-Item Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 
A priori 
classification 
Factors after Rotation  
 
 
 
 
Item 
Cognitive 
Reappraisal (CR) 
or Expressive 
Suppression (ES) 
I 
 
II 
 
1. When I want to feel more positive 
emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about.  
CR 0.60 -0.06 
2. I keep my emotions to myself.  ES <0.01 0.75 
3. When I want to feel less negative 
emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
CR 0.73 0.03 
6. I control my emotions by not 
expressing them.  
ES 0.06 0.76 
7. When I want to feel more positive 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation.  
CR 0.76 0.06 
8. I control my emotions by changing 
the way I think about the situation I’m 
in. 
CR 0.65 0.13 
9. When I am feeling negative 
emotions, I make sure not to express 
them.  
ES 0.17 0.81 
10. When I want to feel less negative 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
CR 0.68 0.19 
  Reap-
praisal 
Sup-
pression 
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Table 4 
Results of the Forced 2-Factor Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on 
the Mean Item Scores for the Revised 31-Item Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire 
 
A priori 
classification 
Factors after Rotation  
 
 
Item 
Adapt. (A) or 
Maladapt. (MA) 
I II 
1.  I feel that I am the one to blame for it. MA 0.13 0.28 
2.  I think that I have to accept that this has 
happened. A 0.27 -0.09 
4.  I think of nicer things than what I have 
experienced. A 0.64 0.12 
5.  I think of what I can do best. A 0.62 0.15 
6.  I think I can learn something from the 
situation. A 0.70 -0.16 
7.  I think that it all could have been much 
worse. A 0.57 0.06 
8.  I often think that what I have experienced 
is much worse than what others have 
experienced. 
MA 0.20 0.41 
9.  I feel that others are to blame for it. MA -0.13 0.42 
11. I think that I have to accept the situation. A 0.32 -0.03 
12. I am preoccupied with what I think and 
feel about what I have experienced.  MA 0.01 0.67 
13.  I think of pleasant things that have      
       nothing to do with it. A 0.62 0.24 
14. I think about how I can best cope with the  
      situation.  A 0.73 0.07 
15. I think that I can become a stronger  
      person as a result of what has happened. A 0.76 0.09 
16. I think that other people go through much  
      worse experiences. A 0.61 -0.03 
17. I keep thinking about how terrible it is  
      what I have experienced. MA 0.06 0.70 
18. I feel that others are responsible for what  
      has happened. MA -0.11 0.48 
19.  I think about the mistakes I have made in  
       this matter.  MA 0.31 0.41 
22. I think of something nice instead of what  
      has happened. A 0.63 0.15 
23. I think about how to change the situation. A 0.66 0.13 
24. I think that the situation also has its  
      positive sides. A 0.70 0.01 
25. I think that it hasn’t been too bad  A 0.64 -0.04 
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       compared to other things. 
26.  I often think that what I have experienced  
       is the worst that can happen to a person. MA -0.05 0.58 
27.  I think about the mistakes others have  
       made in this matter.  MA 0.07 0.55 
28.  I think that basically the cause must lie  
       within myself. MA 0.10 0.49 
30.  I dwell upon the feelings the situation has  
       evoked in me. MA -0.02 0.67 
31.  I think about pleasant experiences. A 0.72 0.06 
32.  I think about a plan of what I can do best.  A 0.71 <0.001 
33.  I look for the positive sides to the matter. A 0.71 -0.09 
34.  I tell myself that there are worse things in  
       life. A 0.60 0.15 
35.  I continually think how horrible the  
       situation has been. MA -0.05 0.62 
36.  I feel that basically the cause lies with  
       others. MA 0.03 0.43 
  Adaptive Maladaptive 
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Table 5  
Spearman Rho Statistics (or Pearson Product-Moment Correlations) to Examine the 
Association between Age and each of the Revised Emotion Regulation Questionnaire and 
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Sub-Factors 
 
Age Variable 
r p 
ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal  -0.17 0.020 
ERQ Expressive Suppression  0.09 0.250 
CERQ Adaptive* -0.20 0.008 
CERQ Maladaptive -0.01 0.925 
 
*Pearson product-moment correlation 
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Table 6 
Diagnostic Group (3) x Gender (2) Analyses of Variance or Covariance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion Regulation Sub-
factor (dependent variable) 
Covariate(s) Source df F p 
ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal      
 Diagnostic 
Group 
2, 
173 
1.92 0.150 
 Gender  1, 
173 
0.89 0.346 
 
 
-- 
Diagnostic 
Group x 
Gender 
2, 
173 
1.39 0.253 
ERQ Expressive Suppression      
 Diagnostic 
Group 
2, 
173 
0.28 0.754 
 Gender  
 
1, 
173 
0.41 0.523 
 
 
 
 
 
-- 
Diagnostic 
Group x 
Gender 
2, 
173 
0.95 0.388 
CERQ Adaptive      
 Diagnostic 
Group 
2, 
172 
3.04 0.051 
 Gender  
 
1, 
172 
0.07 0.788 
 
Education 
Diagnostic 
Group x 
Gender 
2, 
172 
1.53 0.220 
CERQ Maladaptive      
 Diagnostic 
Group 
2, 
170 
4.83 0.009 
 Gender  
 
1, 
170 
10.56 0.001 
 
AMAS-E 
Diagnostic 
Group x 
Gender 
2, 
170 
0.54 0.587 
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Table 7 
Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Participant Diagnostic 
Groups on CERQ Adaptive 
 
 
Table 8  
Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Participant Diagnostic 
Groups on CERQ Maladaptive 
 
 
Table 9 
Least Significant Difference (LSD) Pairwise Comparisons for Men vs. Women on CERQ  
Maladaptive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostic Group (I) Diagnostic Group 
(J) 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error p 
Healthy Control Subjective Cognitive 
Decline 
0.32 0.13 0.015 
 Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
0.11 0.16 0.518 
Subjective Cognitive 
Decline 
Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
-0.21 0.17 0.208 
Diagnostic Group (I) Diagnostic Group 
(J) 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error p 
Healthy Control Subjective Cognitive 
Decline 
0.06 0.08 0.483 
 Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
-0.25 0.10 0.014 
Subjective Cognitive 
Decline 
Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
-0.31 0.10 0.003 
Gender (I) ! Gender (J) Mean difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error p 
Male Female 0.25 0.08 0.001 
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Table 10 
One-Way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) on Participant Conversion Group for Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire Factor Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was computed for this variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion Regulation Factor  df Test Statistic p 
ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal* 3 0.87 0.832 
ERQ Expressive Suppression 3, 155 0.68 0.564 
CERQ Adaptive 3, 155 0.31 0.820 
CERQ Maladaptive* 3 1.40 0.705 
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Table 11 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal as Predictors of Executive Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -0.96 0.31  -3.14 0.002 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.37 3.55 0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 3.17 1.40  2.27 0.026 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.29 0.002 
    Age -0.03 0.02 -0.29 -2.88 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
Model 3      
    Constant 3.21 1.42  2.26 0.027 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.33 3.14 0.002 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.89 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.803 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.04 0.35 0.730 
Model 4      
   Constant 3.13 1.50  2.09 0.040 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.33 3.09 0.003 
    Age -0.04 0.02 -0.30 -2.84 0.006 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.25 0.217 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.829 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.04 0.34 0.737 
    ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.859 
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Table 12 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and ERQ Expressive Suppression as Predictors of Executive Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -0.96 0.31  -3.14 0.002 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.37 3.55 0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 3.17 1.40  2.27 0.026 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.20 0.002 
    Age -0.04 0.02 -0.29 -2.88 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
Model 3      
    Constant 3.21 1.42  2.26 0.027 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.33 3.14 0.002 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.89 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.803 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.04 0.35 0.730 
Model 4      
   Constant 3.30 1.47  2.25 0.028 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.07 0.003 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.87 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.29 0.201 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.759 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.759 
    ERQ Expressive Suppression -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.26 0.795 
 
 
 !
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Table 13 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and CERQ Adaptive as Predictors of Executive Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -0.96 0.31  -3.14 0.002 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.37 3.55 0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 3.17 1.40  2.27 0.026 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.20 0.002 
    Age -0.04 0.02 -0.29 -2.88 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
Model 3      
    Constant 3.21 1.42  2.26 0.027 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.33 3.14 0.002 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.89 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.803 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.04 0.35 0.730 
Model 4      
   Constant 2.70 1.49  1.81 0.074 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.03 0.003 
    Age -0.04 0.02 -0.28 -2.66 0.010 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.30 0.198 
    GDS 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.46 0.648 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.05 0.43 0.670 
    CERQ Adaptive 0.09 0.09 0.12 1.08 0.285 
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Table 14 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and CERQ Maladaptive as Predictors of Executive Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -0.96 0.31  -3.14 0.002 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.37 3.55 0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 3.17 1.40  2.27 0.026 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.32 3.20 0.002 
    Age -0.04 0.02 -0.29 -2.88 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
Model 3      
    Constant 3.21 1.42  2.26 0.027 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.33 3.14 0.002 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.89 0.005 
    Gender -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -1.27 0.207 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.803 
    AMAS-E <0.01 0.01 0.04 0.35 0.730 
Model 4      
   Constant 2.81 1.44  1.95 0.055 
    WTAR 0.02 0.01 0.34 3.30 0.001 
    Age -0.05 0.02 -0.30 -2.97 0.004 
    Gender -0.15 0.14 -0.11 -1.05 0.299 
    GDS 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.44 0.664 
    AMAS-E <-0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.47 0.640 
    CERQ Maladaptive 0.25 0.17 0.18 1.47 0.146 
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Table 15 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal as Predictors of Memory Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -1.46 0.21  -7.01 <0.001 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.45 6.48 <0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 0.59 0.82  0.72 0.475 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.44 6.48 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -2.63 0.009 
    Gender -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.35 0.726 
Model 3      
    Constant 0.59 0.81  0.73 0.468 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.42 6.10 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.17 -2.43 0.016 
    Gender -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.883 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.14 1.91 0.058 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.49 0.014 
Model 4      
   Constant 0.14 0.91  0.15 0.881 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.43 6.20 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.15 -2.16 0.032 
    Gender -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.16 0.876 
    GDS 0.05 0.03 0.13 1.72 0.087 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.50 0.014 
    ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal 0.05 0.05 0.08 1.08 0.282 
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Table 16 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and ERQ Expressive Suppression as Predictors of Memory Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -1.46 0.21  -7.01 <0.001 
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.45 6.48 <0.001 
Model 2      
    Constant 0.59 0.82  0.72 0.475 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.44 6.48 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -2.63 0.009 
    Gender -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.35 0.726 
Model 3      
    Constant 0.59 0.81  0.73 0.468 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.42 6.10 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.17 -2.43 0.016 
    Gender -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.883 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.14 1.91 0.058 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.49 0.014 
Model 4      
   Constant 0.69 0.82  0.84 0.400 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.41 5.92 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.16 -2.35 0.020 
    Gender -0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.21 0.833 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.15 2.00 0.047 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.53 0.012 
    ERQ Expressive Suppression -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.75 0.454 
 
 
 
 !
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Table 17 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and CERQ Adaptive as Predictors of Memory Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  Β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -1.46 0.21  -7.01 <0.001!
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.45 6.48 <0.001!
Model 2      
    Constant 0.59 0.82  0.72 0.475 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.44 6.48 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -2.63 0.009 
    Gender -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.35 0.726 
Model 3      
    Constant 0.59 0.81  0.73 0.468 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.42 6.10 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.17 -2.43 0.016 
    Gender -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.883 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.14 1.91 0.058 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.49 0.014 
Model 4      
   Constant -0.29 0.87  -0.34 0.737 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.41 6.13 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.13 -1.95 0.053 
    Gender -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.29 0.775 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.15 2.05 0.042 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.17 -2.32 0.022 
    CERQ Adaptive 0.18 0.07 0.17 2.41 0.017 
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Table 18 
Multiple Regression: Premorbid Intellectual Functioning, Demographic Variables, Mood 
Functioning, and CERQ Maladaptive as Predictors of Memory Functioning 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
 B SE  β t p 
Model 1      
   Constant -1.46 0.21  -7.01 <0.001!
   WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.45 6.48 <0.001!
Model 2      
    Constant 0.59 0.82  0.72 0.475 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.44 6.48 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -2.63 0.009 
    Gender -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -.35 0.726 
Model 3      
    Constant 0.59 0.81  0.73 0.468 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.42 6.10 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.17 -2.43 0.016 
    Gender -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.883 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.14 1.91 0.058 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -2.49 0.014 
Model 4      
   Constant 0.47 0.90  0.52 0.604 
    WTAR 0.03 0.01 0.42 5.93 <0.001 
    Age -0.02 0.01 -0.16 -2.37 0.019 
    Gender -0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.947 
    GDS 0.06 0.03 0.14 1.92 0.056 
    AMAS-E -0.02 0.01 -0.20 -2.37 0.019 
    CERQ Maladaptive 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.31 0.756 
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Table 19 
One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) on Participant Behavior Groups for Cognitive 
Performance Scores  
 
*A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was computed for this variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive performance 
variable 
Covariate Df Test 
Statistic 
p 
Tower, Achievement  -- 2, 107 0.62 0.538 
MIST-A* -- 2 3.98 0.137 
BVMT-R Trial 1 Gender 2, 122 0.76 0.468 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation 
Variables for the Whole Sample (n = 179) 
Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test   
Variables Statistic SE Statistic SE Statistic df p 
Demographics        
    Age (years) 0.19 0.18 -0.63 0.36 0.05 179 0.200* 
    Gender -0.84 0.18 -1.31 0.36 0.44 179 <0.001 
    Education (years) -0.36 0.18 <-0.01 0.36 0.11 179 <0.001 
Cognitive Variables/Measures        
Executive Factor Z-score** -0.15 0.27 0.15 0.53 0.05 81 0.200* 
Memory Factor Z-score** 0.06 0.19 -0.46 0.37 0.05 170 0.200* 
WTAR, total raw score -0.75 0.18 -0.61 0.36 0.16 179 <0.001 
Letter Fluency, total raw score 0.36 0.18 -0.14 0.36 0.05 179 0.200* 
Golden Stroop, Color-Word, 
total raw score 
0.60 0.19 0.03 0.37 0.11 172 <0.001 
Trail Making Test, Part B, time 
in seconds 
2.17 0.19 8.25 0.37 0.15 169 <0.001 
WAIS-IV Letter-Number 
Sequencing, total raw score 
-1.31 0.18 2.42 0.36 0.14 178 <0.001 
D-KEFS Tower, total 
achievement score 
-0.21 0.21 -0.18 0.42 0.07 134 0.091 
Test of Practical Judgment, 
total raw score 
-0.48 0.18 0.06 0.36 0.09 178 0.002 
FCSRT, Free Recall, total raw 
score 
-4.00 0.18 20.74 0.36 0.45 178 <0.001 
WMS-R Logical Memory I, 
total raw score 
0.02 0.18 -0.96 0.36 0.08 179 0.015 
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*This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
**Computed for this study to address Aim III and distinct from the cognitive domain Z-scores used for classifying participants into 
diagnostic groups. 
MIST-A, total raw score -0.26 0.19 -0.74 0.37 0.10 173 0.001 
BVMT-R, Delayed Recall, 
total raw score 
0.36 0.18 -0.79 0.36 0.12 176 <0.001 
Mood Measures        
     GDS, total raw score 2.02 0.18 4.26 0.37 0.25 175 <0.001 
     AMAS-E, total raw score 0.75 0.18 0.06 0.36 0.09 177 0.001 
Emotion Regulation Measures        
     ERQ Reappraisal, average 
item score 
-0.31 0.18 -0.14 0.36 0.10 179 <0.001 
     ERQ Suppression, average 
item score 
-0.04 0.18 -0.69 0.36 0.08 179 0.008 
     CERQ Adaptive, average item 
score 
1.01 0.18 1.19 0.36 0.05 179 0.200* 
     CERQ Maladaptive, average 
item score 
0.18 0.18 -0.58 0.36 0.13 179 <0.001 
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Table 2 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Diagnostic Groups 
(Healthy Controls, Subjective Cognitive Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) 
 
Healthy Controls  
(n = 75) 
Subjective Cognitive Decline 
(n = 66) 
Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(n = 38) 
Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
 
 
 
Variables Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE 
Demographic             
    Age (years) 0.21 0.28 -0.64 0.55 -0.14 0.30 -0.98 0.58 0.41 0.38 -0.61 0.75 
    Gender  -0.93 0.28 -1.17 0.55 -0.65 0.30 -1.63 0.58 -1.12 0.38 -0.79 0.75 
    Education (years) 0.01 0.28 -0.84 0.55 -0.52 0.30 0.12 0.58 -0.37 0.38 0.49 0.75 
Cognitive             
    WTAR, total raw score -0.94 0.28 0.02 0.55 -1.18 0.30 0.64 0.58 0.44 0.38 -0.94 0.75 
Exec/PS Factor Z-score* -0.08 0.28 0.07 0.55 -0.23 0.30 -0.68 0.58 0.18 0.39 -1.07 0.76 
Memory Factor Z-score* 0.24 0.28 -0.23 0.55 0.59 0.30 0.88 0.58 -0.42 0.38 -0.39 0.75 
Global/Verbal Factor Z-score* 0.11 0.28 -0.69 0.55 0.01 0.30 -0.21 0.58 0.11 0.38 0.10 0.75 
Mood             
    GDS, total raw score 2.06 0.28 4.09 0.56 1.63 0.30 2.26 0.58 2.17 0.39 5.00 0.76 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.97 0.28 0.91 0.56 0.67 0.30 -0.31 0.58 0.41 0.38 -0.16 0.75 
Emotion Regulation              
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
-0.55 0.28 0.23 0.55 <-0.01 0.30 0.18 0.58 -0.42 0.38 -0.33 0.75 
    ERQ Suppression, average  
    item score 
-0.10 0.28 -0.68 0.55 0.08 0.30 -0.75 0.58 -0.11 0.38 -0.54 0.75 
    CERQ Adaptive, average item  
    score 
-0.05 0.28 -0.25 0.55 0.11 0.30 <0.01 0.58 0.44 0.38 0.24 0.75 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.86 0.28 0.46 0.55 1.17 0.30 1.76 0.58 1.08 0.38 1.62 0.75 
*Used for the purpose of diagnostic classification (i.e., to classify participants into one of the three participant diagnostic groups 
[Healthy Control, Subjective Cognitive Decline, or Mild Cognitive Impairment]) 
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Table 3 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Diagnostic 
Participant Groups (Healthy Controls, Subjective Cognitive Decline, and Mild Cognitive Impairment) 
 
Healthy Controls 
(n = 75) 
Subjective Cognitive Decline 
(n = 66) 
Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(n = 38) 
 
 
Variables Statistic df p Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Demographic          
    Age (years) 0.08 75 0.200* 0.08 66 0.200* 0.10 38 0.200* 
    Gender  0.45 75 <0.001 0.42 66 <0.001 0.46 38 <0.001 
    Education (years) 0.13 75 0.002 0.14 66 0.003 0.14 38 0.068 
Cognitive          
    WTAR, total raw score 0.16 75 <0.001 0.15 66 0.001 0.17 38 0.007 
Exec/PS Factor Z-score** 0.08 75 0.200* 0.08 66 0.200* 0.14 37 0.078 
Memory Factor Z-score** 0.05 75 0.200* 0.06 66 0.200* 0.08 38 0.200* 
Global/Verbal Factor Z-score** 0.06 75 0.200* 0.07 66 0.200* 0.14 38 0.048 
Mood          
    GDS, total raw score 0.29 72 <0.001 0.24 66 <0.001 0.28 37 <0.001 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.11 73 0.023 0.12 66 0.019 0.11 38 0.200* 
Emotion Regulation           
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.11 75 0.031 0.15 66 0.001 0.10 38 0.200* 
    ERQ Suppression, average  
    item score 
0.10 75 0.073 0.10 66 0.188 0.11 38 0.200* 
    CERQ Adaptive, average item  
    score 
0.05 75 0.200* 0.06 66 0.200* 0.09 38 0.200* 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.14 75 0.001 0.17 66 <0.001 0.14 38 0.045 
*This is a lower bound of the true significance  
**Used for the purpose of diagnostic classification (i.e., to classify participants into one of the three diagnostic participant groups 
[Healthy Control, Subjective Cognitive Decline, or Mild Cognitive Impairment]) 
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Table 4 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Conversion Groups 
(Stable and Declined) 
 
Stable (n = 80) Declined (n = 39)  
Variables Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
Demographic Statistic SE Statistic SE Statistic SE Statistic SE 
    Age (years) 0.31 0.27 -0.75 0.53 0.16 0.38 -0.80 0.74 
    Gender  -0.83 0.27 -1.36 0.53 -1.01 0.38 -1.04 0.74 
    Education (years) -0.56 0.27 0.56 0.53 -0.29 0.38 -0.26 0.74 
Cognitive         
    WTAR, total raw score -0.73 0.27 -0.60 0.53 -0.86 0.38 -0.49 0.74 
Mood         
    GDS, total raw score 1.91 0.27 3.20 0.54 1.63 0.39 2.42 0.76 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.73 0.27 -0.11 0.54 0.78 0.38 0.02 0.74 
Emotion Regulation          
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
-0.48 0.27 -0.21 0.53 -0.49 0.38 0.27 0.74 
    ERQ Suppression, average  
    item score 
-0.04 0.27 -0.70 0.53 -0.47 0.38 -0.23 0.74 
    CERQ Adaptive, average item  
    score 
0.13 0.27 -0.47 0.53 0.01 0.38 -0.17 0.74 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
1.25 0.27 2.02 0.53 0.96 0.38 -0.70 0.74 
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Table 5 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Conversion Groups 
(Improved and Unstable) 
 
Improved (n = 13) Unstable (n = 28) 
Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
 
 
Variables Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE 
Demographics         
    Age (years) 1.27 0.62 2.00 1.19 -0.37 0.44 -0.83 0.86 
    Gender  -2.18 0.62 3.22 1.19 -1.00 0.44 -1.08 0.86 
    Education (years) -0.38 0.62 -1.30 1.19 0.02 0.44 -0.18 0.86 
Cognitive         
    WTAR, total raw score -0.86 0.62 -1.00 1.19 -0.89 0.44 -0.06 1.09 
Mood         
    GDS, total raw score 1.39 0.62 1.62 1.19 2.31 0.44 6.85 0.86 
AMAS-E, total raw score 1.12 0.62 1.08 1.19 0.41 0.44 -0.43 0.86 
Emotion Regulation          
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.28 0.62 0.37 1.19 0.34 0.44 0.28 0.86 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.71 0.62 0.21 1.19 0.22 0.44 -0.68 0.86 
    CERQ Adaptive, average item  
    score 
-0.07 0.62 -1.36 1.19 0.07 0.44 -0.40 0.86 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
1.09 0.62 1.97 1.19 0.58 0.44 -0.79 0.86 
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Table 6 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant 
Conversion Groups (Stable, Declined, Improved, Unstable) 
 
Stable (n = 80) Declined (n = 39) Improved (n = 13) Unstable (n = 28)  
Variables Statistic df p Statistic df P Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Demographics             
    Age (years) 0.08 80 0.200* 0.12 39 0.158 0.19 13 0.194 0.18 28 0.025 
    Gender  0.44 80 <0.001 0.45 39 <0.001 0.51 13 <0.001 0.45 28 <0.001 
    Education (years) 0.13 80 0.002 0.18 39 0.004 0.25 13 0.022 0.17 28 0.045 
Cognitive             
    WTAR, total raw score 0.17 80 0.200* 0.22 39 <0.001 0.29 13 0.005 0.17 28 0.043 
Mood             
    GDS, total raw score 0.31 79 <0.001 0.22 37 <0.001 0.24 13 0.034 0.24 28 <0.001 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.10 78 0.056 0.15 39 0.025 0.16 13 0.200* 0.11 28 0.200* 
Emotion Regulation              
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.11 80 0.026 0.10 39 0.200* 0.11 13 0.200* 0.15 28 0.110 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.09 80 0.175 0.13 39 0.088 0.20 13 0.161 0.14 28 0.200* 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
0.07 80 0.200* 0.09 39 0.200* 0.11 13 0.200* 0.11 28 0.200* 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.14 80 0.001 0.21 39 <0.001 0.17 13 0.200* 0.10 28 0.200* 
 
*This is a lower bound of the true significance  
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Table 7 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups 
for D-KEFS Tower (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 31) Emotion or Coping (n = 42) No Affect (n = 45) 
Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
 
 
Variables Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE 
Demographic             
    Age (years) 0.08 0.42 0.41 0.82 0.04 0.37 -0.82 0.72 <0.001 0.35 -1.00 0.70 
    Gender  -1.94 0.42 1.87 0.82 -0.86 0.37 -1.34 0.72 -0.52 0.35 -1.81 0.70 
    Education (years) -1.23 0.42 -1.40 0.82 -0.15 0.37 -0.55 0.72 -0.58 0.35 0.52 0.70 
Cognitive             
    WTAR, total raw score -1.23 0.42 1.59 0.82 -0.94 0.37 -0.49 0.72 -0.75 0.35 -0.53 0.70 
Tower, total achievement 
score 
-0.41 0.42 -0.18 0.82 -0.15 0.37 0.51 0.72 -0.37 0.39 -0.21 0.76 
Mood             
    GDS, total raw score 2.17 0.42 6.25 0.82 2.10 0.37 4.57 0.73 2.13 0.36 5.04 0.70 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.92 0.42 1.17 0.82 0.94 0.37 0.13 0.72 0.99 0.36 0.19 0.70 
Emotion Regulation              
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
-0.71 0.42 0.11 0.82 -0.18 0.37 -0.90 0.72 -0.29 0.35 0.92 0.70 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
-0.03 0.42 -0.36 0.82 0.37 0.37 0.97 0.72 -0.44 0.35 -0.49 0.70 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
-0.33 0.42 -0.91 0.82 0.46 0.37 <0.001 0.72 -0.04 0.35 -0.15 0.70 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
1.63 0.42 2.42 0.82 1.49 0.37 4.15 0.72 0.57 0.35 -0.25 0.70 
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Table 8 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant 
Behavior Groups for D-KEFS Tower (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 31) Emotion or Coping (n = 42) No Affect (n = 45)  
Variables Statistic df p Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Demographic          
    Age (years) 0.10 31 0.200* 0.09 42 0.200* 0.10 45 0.200* 
    Gender  0.51 31 <0.001 0.44 42 <0.001 0.40 45 <0.001 
    Education (years) 0.26 31 <0.001 0.16 42 0.008 0.11 45 0.180 
Cognitive          
    WTAR, total raw score 0.12 31 0.200* 0.20 42 <0.001 0.15 45 0.015 
Tower, total achievement 
score 
0.13 31 0.176 0.10 42 0.200* 0.08 37 0.200* 
Mood          
    GDS, total raw score 0.23 31 <0.001 0.28 41 <0.001 0.26 44 <0.001 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.14 31 0.147 0.16 42 0.010 0.14 44 0.027 
Emotion Regulation           
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.15 31 0.071 0.11 42 0.200* 0.14 45 0.027 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.11 31 0.200* 0.16 42 0.011 0.13 45 0.062 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
0.11 31 0.200* 0.11 42 0.200* 0.08 45 0.200* 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.22 31 <0.001 0.16 42 0.009 0.11 45 0.200* 
 
*This is a lower bound of the true significance  
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Table 9 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups 
for MIST-A (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 13) Emotion or Coping (n = 52) No Affect (n = 63) 
Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
 
 
Variables Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE 
Demographic             
    Age (years) 0.22 0.62 -1.00 1.19 -0.22 0.33 -0.59 0.65 0.05 0.30 -0.68 0.60 
    Gender  -2.18 0.62 3.22 1.19 -1.07 0.33 -0.89 0.65 -0.50 0.30 -1.81 0.60 
    Education (years) -0.40 0.62 -1.46 1.19 0.08 0.33 -1.05 0.65 -0.51 0.30 0.57 0.60 
Cognitive             
    WTAR, total raw score -0.96 0.62 -0.86 1.19 -0.99 0.33 -0.03 0.65 -0.65 0.30 -0.80 0.60 
MIST-A, total raw score 0.32 0.64 -1.15 1.23 -0.27 0.34 -0.96 0.66 -0.25 0.31 -0.35 0.60 
Mood             
    GDS, total raw score 1.11 0.62 0.24 1.19 2.36 0.33 6.01 0.66 1.98 0.30 3.67 0.60 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.62 0.62 -0.92 1.19 0.94 0.33 0.45 0.66 1.09 0.30 0.47 0.60 
Emotion Regulation              
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.25 0.62 -0.40 1.19 -0.22 0.33 -0.31 0.65 -0.49 0.30 0.09 0.60 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
-0.54 0.62 -1.23 1.19 -0.13 0.33 -0.64 0.65 0.17 0.30 -0.91 0.60 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
0.28 0.62 -1.71 1.19 0.15 0.33 -0.35 0.65 0.15 0.30 -0.33 0.60 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.94 0.62 -0.52 1.19 0.59 0.33 0.40 0.65 1.44 0.30 3.45 0.60 
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Table 10 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant 
Behavior Groups for MIST-A (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 13) Emotion or Coping (n = 52) No Affect (n = 63)  
Variables Statistic df p Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Demographic          
    Age (years) 0.12 13 0.200* 0.09 52 0.200* 0.06 63 0.200* 
    Gender  0.51 13 <0.001 0.46 52 <0.001 0.40 63 <0.001 
    Education (years) 0.23 13 0.070 0.16 52 0.002* 0.13 63 0.008 
Cognitive          
    WTAR, total raw score 0.31 13 0.002 0.17 52 0.001 0.15 63 0.002 
MIST-A, total raw score 0.17 12 0.200* 0.14 50 0.022 0.10 61 0.200* 
Mood          
    GDS, total raw score 0.29 13 0.005 0.30 51 <0.001 0.29 62 <0.001 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.17 13 0.200* 0.11 51 0.148 0.17 63 <0.001 
Emotion Regulation           
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.16 13 0.200* 0.11 52 0.191 0.14 63 0.005 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.20 13 0.154 0.09 52 0.200* 0.10 63 0.200* 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
0.25 13 0.031 0.08 52 0.200* 0.07 63 0.200* 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.19 13 0.200* 0.10 52 0.200* 0.16 63 0.001 
 
*This is a lower bound of the true significance  
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Table 11 
Tests of Skew and Kurtosis for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant Behavior Groups 
for BVMT-R Trial 1 (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 11) Emotion or Coping (n = 53) No Affect (n = 62) 
Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis Skew  Kurtosis 
 
 
Variables Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE Stat. SE 
Demographic             
    Age (years) -0.24 0.66 -1.44 1.28 0.01 0.33 -0.90 0.64 0.02 0.30 -0.67 0.60 
    Gender  -0.66 0.66 -1.96 1.28 -1.64 0.33 -0.71 0.64 -0.40 0.30 -1.90 0.60 
    Education (years) 1.40 0.66 1.57 1.28 -0.25 0.33 -0.62 0.64 -0.49 0.30 0.50 0.60 
Cognitive             
    WTAR, total raw score 0.19 0.66 -1.75 1.28 -1.29 0.33 1.08 0.64 -0.71 0.30 -0.65 0.60 
BVMT-R Trial 1, total raw 
score 
1.93 0.66 4.50 1.28 1.50 0.33 2.50 0.64 1.57 0.30 4.11 0.60 
Mood             
    GDS, total raw score 0.39 0.66 -0.82 1.28 2.36 0.33 6.46 0.65 1.82 0.31 3.11 0.60 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.11 0.66 -0.93 1.28 0.90 0.33 0.30 0.64 0.79 0.31 -0.25 0.60 
Emotion Regulation              
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
-0.39 0.66 -0.60 1.28 -0.62 0.33 0.07 0.64 -0.27 0.30 <0.01 0.60 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.15 0.66 -1.22 1.28 0.11 0.33 -0.80 0.64 -0.26 0.30 -0.77 0.60 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
1.32 0.66 0.75 1.28 -0.23 0.33 -0.28 0.64 0.07 0.30 -0.35 0.60 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
2.13 0.66 5.62 1.28 1.15 0.33 1.68 0.64 0.70 0.30 -0.01 0.60 
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Table 12 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality for Demographic, Cognitive, Mood, and Emotion Regulation Variables for Participant 
Behavior Groups for BVMT-R Trial 1 (Emotion and Coping, Emotion or Coping, No Affect) 
 
Emotion and Coping (n = 11) Emotion or Coping (n = 53) No Affect (n = 62)  
Variables Statistic df p Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Demographic          
    Age (years) 0.21 11 0.173 0.08 53 0.200* 0.09 62 0.200* 
    Gender  0.40 11 <0.001 0.50 53 <0.001 0.39 62 <0.001 
    Education (years) 0.35 11 <0.001 0.15 52 0.003 0.14 62 0.006 
Cognitive          
    WTAR, total raw score 0.19 11 0.200* 0.17 53 <0.001 0.15 62 0.002 
BVMT-R Trial 1, total raw 
score 
0.28 11 0.019 0.22 53 <0.001 0.21 62 <0.001 
Mood          
    GDS, total raw score 0.18 11 0.200* 0.29 52 <0.001 0.22 61 <0.001 
AMAS-E, total raw score 0.19 11 0.200* 0.14 53 0.015 0.12 61 0.025 
Emotion Regulation           
    ERQ Reappraisal, average  
    item score 
0.16 11 0.200* 0.15 53 0.005 0.10 62 0.200* 
    ERQ Suppression, average   
    item score 
0.20 11 0.200* 0.09 53 0.200* 0.09 62 0.200* 
    CERQ Adaptive, average  
    item score 
0.22 11 0.143 0.07 53 0.200* 0.06 62 0.200* 
    CERQ Maladaptive, average  
    item score 
0.24 11 0.075 0.16 53 0.002 0.13 62 0.008 
  
*This is a lower bound of the true significance  
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Table 13 
Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the Mean Item 
Scores for the 10-Item Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 
Item A priori 
classification 
Factors after Rotation 
 Cognitive 
Reappraisal 
(CR) or 
Expressive 
Suppression 
(ES) 
I II III 
1. When I want to feel more positive 
emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about.  
CR 0.45 -0.34 0.41 
2. I keep my emotions to myself.  
 
 
ES 0.43 0.55 -0.28 
3. When I want to feel less negative 
emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
CR 0.62 -0.38 0.18 
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, 
I am careful not to express them. 
 
ES 0.40 0.42 0.62 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful 
situation, I make myself think about it 
in a way that helps me stay calm. 
CR 0.50 -0.01 -0.49 
6. I control my emotions by not 
expressing them.  
 
ES 0.49 0.62 0.21 
7. When I want to feel more positive 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation.  
CR 0.64 -0.40 0.04 
8. I control my emotions by changing 
the way I think about the situation I’m 
in. 
CR 0.61 -0.26 0.04 
9. When I am feeling negative 
emotions, I make sure not to express 
them.  
ES 0.57 0.50 -0.21 
10. When I want to feel less negative 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
CR 0.63 -0.31 -0.32 
  Reap-
praisal 
Sup-
pression 
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Table 14 
Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the Mean Item Scores for the 36-Item Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire 
 
 A priori 
classifica-
tion 
Factors after Rotation 
Item Adapt. (A) 
or 
Maladapt. 
(MA) 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
1.  I feel that I am the one to blame for 
it. MA 0.12 0.27 0.23 -0.28 -0.14 0.26 0.38 -0.18 
2.  I think that I have to accept that this 
has happened. A 0.07 0.20 -0.22 0.06 0.16 0.58 0.09 0.49 
3.  I often think about how I feel about 
what I have experienced. MA 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.78 -0.01 <-0.01 
4.  I think of nicer things than what I 
have experienced. A 0.71 -0.16 -0.04 0.15 0.02 0.28 0.30 -0.11 
5.  I think of what I can do best. A 0.72 0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.10 0.18 -0.09 -0.14 
6.  I think I can learn something from 
the situation. A 0.60 0.12 -0.23 -0.12 0.28 0.12 -0.05 0.03 
7.  I think that it all could have been 
much worse. A 0.41 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.48 0.02 0.30 -0.08 
8.  I often think that what I have 
experienced is much worse than 
what others have experienced. 
MA 0.15 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.29 0.10 0.09 -0.55 
9.  I feel that others are to blame for it. MA -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.76 -0.14 0.07 -0.03 0.05 
10. I feel that I am the one who is 
responsible for what has happened. MA 0.16 0.67 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.27 
11. I think that I have to accept the 
situation. A 0.17 0.20 -0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.27 0.33 0.61 
12. I am preoccupied with what I think 
and feel about what I have MA -0.01 0.49 0.44 0.14 -0.13 0.16 0.28 -0.02 
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experienced.  
13.  I think of pleasant things that have      
       nothing to do with it. A 0.69 0.21 -0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.12 0.29 -0.24 
14. I think about how I can best cope  
      with the situation.  A 0.66 0.28 -0.05 0.07 0.20 0.08 -0.04 0.29 
15. I think that I can become a   
      stronger person as a result of what  
      has happened. 
A 0.66 0.18 <0.01 -0.09 0.37 <-0.01 0.13 -0.03 
16. I think that other people go  
      through much worse experiences. A 0.38 -0.09 -0.09 <0.01 0.62 0.30 0.15 0.01 
17. I keep thinking about how terrible  
      it is what I have experienced. MA 0.13 0.28 0.56 0.20 -0.09 -0.04 0.29 -0.16 
18. I feel that others are responsible  
      for what has happened. MA -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.83 -0.11 0.13 0.09 -0.05 
19.  I think about the mistakes I have  
      made in this matter.  MA 0.20 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.18 <0.01 
20.  I think that I cannot change  
       anything about it. A -0.05 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.13 -0.01 0.72 0.15 
21. I want to understand why I feel the  
      way I do about what I have  
      experienced. 
MA 0.35 0.43 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.19 -0.20 -0.07 
22. I think of something nice instead  
      of what has happened. A 0.71 -0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.16 -0.08 
23. I think about how to change the  
      situation. A 0.66 0.35 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.15 -0.12 0.05 
24. I think that the situation also has  
      its positive sides. A 0.63 0.13 0.08 -0.17 0.33 -0.07 -0.23 -0.06 
25. I think that it hasn’t been too bad  
      compared to other things. A 0.45 0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.62 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 
26.  I often think that what I have  
       experienced is the worst that can  
       happen to a person. 
MA 0.07 0.07 0.70 0.11 -0.07 -0.24 <-0.01 -0.14 
27.  I think about the mistakes others  MA 0.08 0.07 0.31 0.62 0.18 0.06 -0.13 -0.18 
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       have made in this matter.  
28.  I think that basically the cause  
       must lie within myself. MA -0.06 0.68 0.31 -0.04 0.22 -0.02 0.03 -0.11 
29.  I think that I must learn to live  
       with it. A 0.070 0.45 0.13 0.19 0.47 -0.08 0.18 0.31 
30.  I dwell upon the feelings the  
       situation has evoked in me. MA -0.14 0.32 0.66 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.02 
31.  I think about pleasant experiences. A 0.72 -0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.20 -0.06 0.15 0.14 
32.  I think about a plan of what I can  
      do best.  A 0.70 0.08 0.11 -0.07 0.14 0.05 -0.26 0.23 
33.  I look for the positive sides to the  
       matter. A 0.63 -0.05 0.14 -0.13 0.35 -0.09 -0.19 0.39 
34.  I tell myself that there are worse  
       things in life. A 0.41 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.54 0.23 -0.10 0.07 
35.  I continually think how horrible  
       the situation has been. MA <0.01 0.01 0.81 0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.06 <0.01 
36.  I feel that basically the cause lies  
       with others. MA 0.03 -0.13 0.14 0.75 0.23 -0.09 0.16 0.01 
  12/20 
A 
items 
load 
5/16 
MA 
items 
load 
4/16 
MA 
items 
load 
4/16 
MA 
items 
load 
5/20 
A 
items 
load 
1 A &  
1 MA 
item 
load 
1 A &  
1 MA 
item 
load 
1 A &  
1 MA 
item 
load 
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Table 15 
Results of the Forced 2-Factor Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on 
the Mean Item Scores for the 36-item Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 
 A priori 
classification 
Factors after Rotation 
Item Adapt. (A) or 
Maladapt. (MA) 
I II 
1.  I feel that I am the one to blame for it. MA 0.13 0.32 
2.  I think that I have to accept that this has 
happened. A 0.29 0.04 
3.  I often think about how I feel about what I 
have experienced. MA 0.26 0.28 
4.  I think of nicer things than what I have 
experienced. A 0.63 0.08 
5.  I think of what I can do best. A 0.62 0.09 
6.  I think I can learn something from the 
situation. A 0.70 -0.16 
7.  I think that it all could have been much 
worse. A 0.56 0.07 
8.  I often think that what I have experienced 
is much worse than what others have 
experienced. 
MA 0.20 0.36 
9.  I feel that others are to blame for it. MA -0.13 0.38 
10. I feel that I am the one who is responsible 
for what has happened. MA 0.24 0.26 
11. I think that I have to accept the situation. A 0.33 0.09 
12. I am preoccupied with what I think and 
feel about what I have experienced.  MA 0.01 0.70 
13.  I think of pleasant things that have      
       nothing to do with it. A 0.62 0.19 
14. I think about how I can best cope with the  
      situation.  A 0.73 0.09 
15. I think that I can become a  stronger 
person as a result of what has happened. A 0.76 0.07 
16. I think that other people go through much  
      worse experiences. A 0.61 -0.01 
17. I keep thinking about how terrible it is  
      what I have experienced. MA 0.06 0.69 
18. I feel that others are responsible for what  
      has happened. MA -0.10 0.45 
19.  I think about the mistakes I have made in  
       this matter.  MA 0.32 0.46 
20. I think that I cannot change anything about     
      it. A 0.04 0.41 
21. I want to understand why I feel the  MA 0.41 0.24 
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      way I do about what I have experienced. 
22. I think of something nice instead of what  
      has happened. A 0.62 0.09 
23. I think about how to change the situation. A 0.67 0.11 
24. I think that the situation also has its  
      positive sides. A 0.70 -0.04 
25. I think that it hasn’t been too bad 
compared to other things. A 0.64 -0.05 
26.  I often think that what I have experienced  
       is the worst that can happen to a person. MA -0.05 0.52 
27.  I think about the mistakes others have  
       made in this matter.  MA 0.08 0.51 
28.  I think that basically the cause must lie  
       within myself. MA 0.12 0.55 
29.  I think that I must learn to live with it. A 0.32 0.41 
30.  I dwell upon the feelings the situation has  
       evoked in me. MA -0.03 0.70 
31.  I think about pleasant experiences. A 0.71 0.02 
32.  I think about a plan of what I can do best.  A 0.71 -0.03 
33.  I look for the positive sides to the matter. A 0.71 -0.11 
34.  I tell myself that there are worse things in  
       life. A 0.60 0.14 
35.  I continually think how horrible the  
       situation has been. MA -0.04 0.58 
36.  I feel that basically the cause lies with  
       others. MA 0.02 0.40 
  Adaptive Maladaptive 
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Table 16 
Determination of Covariates: Comparing Participant Diagnostic Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
 
Significant difference between groups?  
ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square 
HC 
(n = 75) 
SCD 
(n = 66) 
MCI 
(n = 38) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
M (SD) or 
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
TS df p TS df p TS df p 
Age  81.14 
(5.56) 
81.48  
(5.44) 
81.67  
(6.98) 
0.12 2, 176 
 
0.886 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gender  
% female 
70.70% 
(53) 
65.2%  
(43) 
73.70 
(28) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.94 2 0.624 
Education  14.81 
(3.17) 
15.35  
(3.29) 
12.18  
(3.59) 
-- -- -- 18.75 2 <0.001 -- -- -- 
GDS 1.26  
(1.83) 
2.52  
(2.79) 
2.38  
(2.91) 
-- -- -- 3.33 2 0.189 -- -- -- 
AMAS-E 9.66  
(7.01) 
13.32  
(8.70) 
13.39  
(7.77) 
-- -- -- 9.23 2 0.010 -- -- -- 
Note: HC = Healthy Controls; SCD = Subjective Cognitive Decline; MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; TS = Test Statistic. 
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Table 17 
Determination of Covariates: Spearman’s Rho Statistics to Examine Associations between Potential Covariates and Emotion 
Regulation Dependent Variables in each of the Three Diagnostic Participant Groups  
 
 Healthy Controls Subjective Cognitive Decline Mild Cognitive Impairment 
Variables ERQ 
Reapp. 
ERQ 
Supp. 
CERQ 
Adapt. 
CERQ 
Malad. 
ERQ 
Reapp. 
ERQ 
Supp. 
CERQ 
Adapt. 
CERQ 
Malad. 
ERQ 
Reapp. 
ERQ 
Supp. 
CERQ 
Adapt. 
CERQ 
Malad. 
Education 0.18 -0.09 0.25* -0.19 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.20 -0.12 0.17 -0.01 0.17 
AMAS-E 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.61*** 0.03 <0.01 -0.12 0.34** 0.12 -0.05 -0.11 0.36* 
Note: ERQ Reapp = ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal; ERQ Supp = ERQ Expressive Suppression; CERQ Adapt. = CERQ Adaptive; 
CERQ Malad. = CERQ Maladaptive. 
 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 18 
Determination of Covariates: Comparing Participant Conversion Groups on 
Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
 
Note: TS = Test Statistic. 
*Chi-square test values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stable 
(n = 79) 
Decline 
(n = 39) 
Improve 
(n = 13) 
Variable 
(n = 28) 
Kruskal-Wallis  
or Chi-Square 
 
 
 
Variables 
M (SD) or 
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
TS df p 
Age  
 
80.11(5.81) 82.65(5.34) 81.22(6.89) 81.78(5.42) 6.1 3 0.109 
Gender 
% female 
69.62% (55) 71.79% (28) 84.62% (11) 71.43(20) 1.24* 3* 0.744* 
Education  
 
14.54(3.72) 14.56(2.94) 15.08(3.59) 14.50(10.16) 0.38 3 0.945 
GDS 
 
2.13(2.89) 1.73(2.23) 1.69(2.18) 1.43(1.75) 5.07 3 0.167 
AMAS-E 
 
11.66(7.91) 11.79(7.89) 12.15(10.11) 12.07(7.07) 0.29 3 0.962 
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Table 19 
Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the Mean Scores 
for 10 Cognitive Measures  
 
 A priori 
classification 
Factors after Rotation 
Cognitive Measure Executive 
Functioning (EF) or 
Memory (M) 
I II 
Letter Fluency, total raw score EF .593 .210 
Golden Stroop, Color-Word trial, 
total raw score EF .675 .074 
Trail Making Test, Part B, time in 
seconds EF -.453 -.410 
WAIS-IV Letter-Number 
Sequencing, total raw score EF .722 .044 
D-KEFS Tower Test, total 
achievement score EF .637 .137 
Test of Practical Judgment, total 
raw score EF .441 .224 
WMS-R Logical Memory I, total 
raw score M .171 .688 
FCSRT, Free Recall, total raw 
score M -.103 .718 
MIST-A, total raw score M .320 .578 
BVMT-R, Delayed Recall, total 
raw score M .327 .619 
  Executive 
Functioning 
Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 
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Table 20 
Determination of Covariates: Comparing D-KEFS Participant Behavior Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
 
Significant difference between groups?  
ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square 
E & C 
(n = 31) 
E or C 
(n = 42) 
NA 
(n = 45) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
M (SD) or 
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
TS Df p TS df p TS df p 
Age  81.93 
(4.72) 
82.86 
(5.61) 
81.82 
(5.31) 
0.49 2, 115 0.617 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gender  
% female 
83.87% 
(26) 
69.05% 
(29) 
62.22% 
(28) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 4.18 2 0.124 
Education  14.13 
(2.80) 
14.74 
(3.45) 
14.60 
(3.80) 
-- -- -- 1.30 2 0.521 -- -- -- 
GDS 1.68 
(2.04) 
1.26 
(1.80) 
1.58 
(2.40) 
-- -- -- 1.16 2 0.561 -- -- -- 
AMAS-E 10.16 
(7.04) 
11.21 
(7.89) 
11.43 
(9.34) 
-- -- -- 0.12 2 0.942 -- -- -- 
Note: E & C = Emotion and Coping group; E or C = Emotion or Coping group; NA = No Affect group. 
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Table 21 
Determination of Covariates: Comparing MIST-A Participant Behavior Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood Variables 
 
Significant difference between groups?  
ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square 
E & C 
(n = 13) 
E or C 
(n = 52) 
NA 
(n = 63) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
M (SD) or 
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
TS Df p TS df p TS df p 
Age  81.60 
(4.97) 
83.24 
(5.55) 
80.85 
(5.24) 
2.87 2, 125 0.061 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gender  
% female 
84.62% 
(11) 
73.08% 
(38) 
61.90% 
(39) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 3.35 2 0.187 
Education  15.08 
(2.93) 
14.79 
(3.30) 
14.56 
(3.59) 
-- -- -- 0.17 2 0.917 -- -- -- 
GDS 1.00 
(1.63) 
1.58 
(2.09) 
1.73 
(2.60) 
-- -- -- 2.98 2 0.225 -- -- -- 
AMAS-E 12.62 
(6.44) 
11.18 
(7.95) 
10.59 
(8.77) 
-- -- -- 2.15 2 0.341 -- -- -- 
 
Note: E & C = Emotion and Coping group; E or C = Emotion or Coping group; NA = No Affect group. 
TS = Test Statistic 
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Table 22 
Determination of Covariates: Comparing BVMT-R Trial 1 Participant Behavior Groups on Demographic, Cognitive, and Mood 
Variables 
 
Significant difference between groups?   
ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square 
E & C 
(n = 11) 
E or C 
(n = 53) 
NA 
(n = 62) 
    
 
 
Variables 
M (SD) or 
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
M (SD) or  
% (n) 
TS Df p TS df p TS df p 
Age  81.30 
(4.44) 
81.52 
(5.73) 
82.29 
(5.67) 
0.33 2, 123 0.717 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gender  
% Female 
63.64% 
(7) 
81.13% 
(43) 
59.68% 
(37) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 6.32 2 0.042 
Education  13.18 
(2.09) 
14.75 
(3.38) 
14.65 
(3.52) 
-- -- -- 3.16 2 0.206 -- -- -- 
GDS 1.82 
(1.40) 
1.75 
(2.39) 
2.36 
(2.91) 
-- -- -- 0.23 2 0.893 -- -- -- 
AMAS-E 9.18 
(3.46) 
10.45 
(7.55) 
12.26 
(9.18) 
-- -- -- 0.80 2 0.669 -- -- -- 
 
Note: E & C = Emotion and Coping group; E or C = Emotion or Coping group; NA = No Affect group. 
TS = Test Statistic 
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